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I. INTRODUCTION
West Virginia adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter also referred to as "UCC" or "Code") in 1963,' effective after
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
1. The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted as a joint effort by the National Conference
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July 1, 1964,2 following eighteen other states which had previously
done so. The wording of the West Virginia UCC as originally passed

was an almost verbatim reproduction of the 1962 version of the
Official Text.3 The article and section headings of the West Virginia
statute parallel 4 those of the Official Text. For example, section 2-

207 of the Official Text is identical to section 46-2-207 of the West
Virginia Code. 5 The Official Comments, appearing after each Code
section in almost all printings of the Uniform Commercial Code,
were written by the drafters of the Code to aid in the interpretation
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. It grew out of a dissatisfaction with the variety and antiquity of state laws dealing with commercial problems, and as a
reaction to a 1938 proposal by the New York Merchants' Association for a federal sales act to govern
all interstate sales transactions. Funded by a $400,000 grant from the Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, the two groups formed an editorial board and drafted a proposed code to govern
commerce. This draft, and succeeding drafts, were circulated to, and criticized by, various legal organizations. In 1952, the first Official Text was finished and published with official explanatory
comments. Circulated to state legislatures, it was adopted by Pennsylvania in 1954. The New York
state legislature appointed a large body to study the Code, and after public hearings and debates,
this body issued a report in 1956, entitled "Report of the Law Revision Commission of New York
on the Uniform Commercial Code" (1956), urging the rejection of the Code. As a result, the editorial
board redrafted the Code with the New York commission's criticisms in mind, and published a new
version in 1957, and slightly modified versions in 1958 and 1962. By 1968, all of the states had
adopted the Code with minor revisions (except Louisiana, which adopted some Articles of the Code).
See Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 CoLuM. L. Rv. 798
(1958); Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 U. MLMI L. Ray. 1 (1967).
2. Nettles v. Imperial Distributors, Inc., 152 W. Va. 9, 18-19, 159 S.E.2d 206, 212 (1968);
W. VA. CODE § 46-10-101 (1966).
3. There have been several amendments to the West Virginia UCC over the years. Most of
these have been initiated as a result of changes made in the Official Text of the Code by the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. The Board annually reviews developing case law
and state legislative amendments to the various state versions of the Code. Based upon these and
other considerations, the Editorial Board periodically changes the content of the Official Text, and
urges states to follow suit. Most of these changes have been small. For example, sales of timber to
be cut by the buyer were originally excluded from Article 2 under section 2-107, on the theory they
involved an interest in realty. Upon realizing that commercial practice and several important timbering
states treated such transactions as sales of personal property, the Editorial Board changed the Official
Text and recommended states do the same. West Virginia amended its Code accordingly in 1974. See
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-107 (1966 & Supp. 1990). Some changes have been major revisions of an entire
article. This occurred in 1972 with Article 9, and West Virginia adopted the revisions almost in their
entirety in 1974. In its most recent major work, the Editorial Board drafted a new article, Article
2A, to deal with leases of personal property. Only eight states, including California and Florida but
not including West Virginia, had enacted Article 2A into law by 1990 as part of their UCC.
4. Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649, 651 n.l (W. Va. 1989).
5. The "46" designates the West Virginia Code chapter in which West Virginia's UCC is
found. References to the UCC sections in this article are intended to refer to both the West Virginia
statute and its virtually identical Official Text counterpart and will usually be made by referring to
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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and construction of the Code. 6 The Comments generally have not
been officially adopted by state legislatures, and, since they are not
products of legislative work, the Comments are not entitled to as
much weight as is generally given to legislative history. 7 As one might
guess, courts frequently turn to them when a question arises.' The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals gave the Comments a strong
endorsement as persuasive authority when it stated, "the official
commentary to the UCC is 'recognized by courts and commentators
as an official source document for interpretation of the Code provisions .... ' We must assume that the legislature was aware of
this commentary when it adopted... [the Code]." 9 The court then
raised the Comments to a new level of authority when it stated,
"The reason given for applying the UCC statute of limitations is
contained in the official commentary to the UCC which we adopted
as a part of our Code." 10 No authority was cited for such a fundamentally important statement, and the editor's notes in the West
Virginia Code do not suggest that the legislature adopted the Comments as legislation."
Article 2 of the UCC covers transactions in goods. Article 1
contains general rules which apply to transactions in goods, as well
as to the major subdivisions of commercial law covered by the remaining Articles of the Code. 12 In West Virginia, Article 2 replaces
the common law relating to sales transactions, as West Virginia never
13
enacted the Uniform Sales Act.
6. See Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 597 (1966).
7. J. Wimsn & R. SUMMERs, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 13 (3d ed. 1988).

8. See Comment, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of Comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 962 (1990).
9. Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589, 594 (W. Va. 1985) (citing First National
Bank of Ceredo v. Linn, 168 W. Va. 76, 79 n.4, 282 S.E.2d 52, 54 n.4 (1981)).
10. Id. (emphasis added).

11. See 13 W. VA. CODE 1-2 editor's note (1966 & Supp. 1990). The editors of this annotated
code state that the editor's notes contain special information, including important or unusual features
of a law that are not apparent from the law's text, or special circumstances surrounding passage of
the law. 1 W. VA. CODE XV (1982) ("Editor's Notes").
12. Articles 3, 4, and 4A cover commercial paper and transfers of funds; Article 5 covers letters

of credit; Article 6 covers bulk transfers; Article 7 covers documents of title; Article 8 covers investment
securities, and Article 9 covers secured transactions.

13. Some sections do replace the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, repealed by the enactment

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
of the Code. W. VA. CODE § 46-10-102(1)(d) (1966).
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Article 2 is intended to replace most of the traditional rules of
contract law as to sales of goods, but many pre-existing contract
rules have no Article 2 counterpart and often continue to apply.
Section 1-103 so provides when it states "Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity,
including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. ' 14 Duties set out
in Code sections can be further supplemented by usage of trade,
6
course of dealing, 15 and course of performance.1
The scope of this writing covers almost all West Virginia cases
which cite Article 2, including cases covered by Article 2, cases not
covered by Article 2 but which require application or consideration
of Article 2 rules to reach that conclusion, and cases which use
Article 2 for analogy or support for an existing or developing common-law policy. Also mentioned are cases in which the court should
have applied Article 2, but failed to do so. A significant number
of Article 2 rules or issues are addressed by the West Virginia cases
without citation to the appropriate Code section or Code language.
These rules and issues are discussed in this article. Specific Code
sections and issues which are not addressed by post-1964 West Virginia cases are generally not addressed in this article.
There have been approximately twenty-five West Virginia cases
citing Article 2 and either addressing issues covered by Article 2 or
purporting to address them: Approximately three additional cases
address Article 2 issues without citing the Code, and approximately
nine cases do not address Article 2 issues, but cite the UCC as an
example of policy or law making.' 7 The purpose of this article is
to present a brief analytical summary of these cases, and to identify,
and at times critically discuss, the courts' statements concerning issues covered by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

14. Id. § 46-1-103.
15. Id. § 46-1-205.
16. Id. § 46-2-208.
17. These
figures
include Repository
cases decided@by
federal
courts sitting in West Virginia.
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Two

Generally

The scope of the transactions covered by Article 2 is set out in
sections 2-102, 2-105, and 2-107. Unless the context otherwise re-

quires, Article 2 applies to transactions in goods. 8 "Transactions"
is not defined by the Code. It does not apply to any transaction

intended to operate only as a security interest.' 9 "Goods" means all
things, including specially manufactured goods, which are movable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale including the

unborn young of animals, 2" growing crops and timber, 2' and minerals
including oil and gas if they are to be severed by the seller. 22 In

West Virginia, Article 2 has been applied to the sale of a cheeseburger, 21 bricks, 24 house siding, 25 a front-end loader, 26 fire sprink32
lers, 27 cars, 28 trucks, 29 mining machinery, 30 coal, 3' and oil and gas.
It has also been applied to a dealership agreement combined with
a lease of realty, 33 to the collection of the price for the sale of stone, 34
to commercial sellers and nonmerchant sellers, 35 to the determination

18. W. VA. CoDE § 46-2-102 (1966).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 46-2-105.

21. Id. § 46-2-107(2).
22. Id. § 46-2-107(1) (1966 & Supp. 1990) (effective 1974).
23. Dawson v. Canteen Corp., .158 W. Va. 516, 212 S.E.2d 82 (1975).
24. Basham v. General Shale, 377 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1989).
25. Roxalana Hills Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
26. Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1989).
27. Jones v. W. A. Weidebusch Plumbing and Heating Co., 157 W. Va. 257, 201 S.E.2d 248
(1973).
28. Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1991); Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales,
Inc., 370 S.E.2d 734 (XV. Va. 1988); Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988);
Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238 (1966).
29. Davis v. Dils Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D. W. Va. 1983); City National Bank of
Charleston v. Wells, 384 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1989).
30. Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d
886 (1980).
31. Sylvia Coal v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 256 (1967).
32. Welch v. Cayton, 395 S.E.2d 496 (W. Va. 1990).
33. Ashland Oil v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976).
34. Greer Limestone v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589 (,V. Va. 1985).
35. Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1989).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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of whether a taxable sale occurred 3

6

and to the determination of

when the risk of loss passes when the parties failed to insure the
37
goods sold.

West Virginia courts have found that the Code is not applicable
to the sale of blood when it was accompanied by professional serv-

ices in a blood transfusion3 8 to the sale of cement slabs to be installed in the building by the seller, 39 or to implied indemnity in a

product liability setting. 4° However, the Code has been used by analogy in finding implied indemnity41 and in resolving product-liability
actions. 42 The court has used the Code for analogy in examining the

fairness of a prenuptial agreement, 43 to determine the validity of an
arbitration clause in a contract, 44 to support finding indemnity be-

tween tort feasors, 45 to show that a choice of forum clause is not
invalid, 46 to determine conscionability of an oil and gas lease47 and
of a coal lease, 48 and in determining the fairness and conscionability

of an escrow contract to transfer securities on the death of a promisor .49
Among the first steps in analyzing a legal problem is to determine

which body of laws applies to that problem. To determine whether
the problem falls within the scope of Article 2, the lawyer must
examine sections 2-102 and 2-105, and sometimes 2-107. In most

cases the determination is clear and easy. A contract involving the
sale of an automobile is easily seen as a "transaction in goods"
under 2-102, and the automobile, being movable, is clearly goods

36. H.O. Anderson, Inc. v. Rose, 352 S.E.2d 541 (,V. Va. 1986).
37. Parsley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 167 W. Va. 866, 280 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va.
1981).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Foster v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n of Charleston, 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975).
Elkins Manor Assoc. v. Eleanor Concrete Works, Inc., 396 S.E.2d 463, (1990).
HI v. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980).
Goldring v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 59 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
Hill v. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980).
Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106 (%V.Va. 1985).
Board of Education v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 160 W. Va. 473, 236 S.E.2d 439 (1977).
Goldring v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 59 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
McMellon v. Adkins, 300 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1983).
Newell v. High Lawn Memorial Park Co., 164 W. Va. 511, 264 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1980).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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under 2-105. The conclusion is clear, Article 2 applies to the substantive contract problems arising out of the transaction.
There are transactions or problems where the applicability of
Article 2 is not clear. For example, the Code leaves open the question
of whether Article 2 applies to leases of personal property. Section
2-102 states that Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods," but
nowhere does Article 2 define "transactions." A court will have to
decide whether it will apply Article 2 as the appropriate law, whether
it will apply the substance of Article 2 by analogy as the applicable
common-law rule, ignore Article 2 and apply the traditional nonCode contract law of the jurisdiction, or use Article 2 in some other
way. Some courts, viewing leases as very similar to sales, routinely
apply Article 2 to warranty questions arising in a lease arrangement. 50 A related question is whether the transaction under examination is really a lease. The transaction, while dressed up like a
lease, may really be intended by the parties as a permanent transfer
of the property from the transferor to the transferee, wherein the
transferor keeps the title for security purposes until the end of the
lease, at which time the transferee will be able to keep the goods
either for no further payment or for a nominal amount. The Code
gives some guidance to determining whether the transaction is a lease
when it defines "security interests." 5' If the court determines that
the transaction is not a true lease, but is a permanent transfer made
with the intent to retain a security interest, the transaction is treated
as a sale of goods where the substance of the sale transaction is
covered by Article 2, and the security issues are covered by Article
9.52

In Leasewell Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford Inc. 53 the federal district
court was called upon to decide whether a contractual forum se-

50. Although the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC has drafted a new article, Article
2A, to address leases of personal property, it has not been adopted by most states.
51. W. VA. CODE § 46-1-201(37) (1966 & Supp. 1990).

52. Hill v. Bentco Leasing, Inc., 288 Ark. 623, 708 S.W.2d 608 (1986); Advanced Computer
Sales, Inc. v. Sizemore, 186 Ga. App. 10, 366 S.E.2d 303 (1988); Transcontinental Refrigeration Co.
v. Figgins, 585 P.2d 1301 (Mont. 1978). See also W. VA. CoDE §§ 46-9-102, 46-9-203 (1966 & Supp.
1990).

53. 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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lection clause was valid. The court found that in order to determine
the validity of this clause, it first had to apply West Virginia's conflict-of-laws rules to determine which state's laws applied. The UCC
has its own conflicts-of-laws rule5 4 which applies to transactions in
goods. Leasewell involved a contract under which a New York business agreed to lease auto repair equipment to a West Virginia auto
dealer. The facts in the opinion do not reveal whether the transaction
was a true lease, or whether it was a permanent transfer dressed up
like a lease. For a true lease, West Virginia common-law conflicts
rules could apply. But if it was a permanent transfer, then it was
a "transaction in goods" covered by Article 2, and the Code conflicts rule of 1-105 would likely apply.." The court neither raised the
question nor examined the facts to determine the true nature of the
transaction. Instead, it routinely applied the West Virginia commonlaw-conflicts rule. The outcome of the case was fair, and would
likely have been the same whether it applied the common-law-conflicts rule or the Code conflicts rule, but a court's loose methodology
in approaching these legal questions greatly increases the chances
for error, and teaches or reinforces bad habits among lawyers who
56
look to court opinions to set the example for legal analysis.
Other situations which present the question of whether Article
2 applies include transactions in which the seller of goods also performs services for the buyer, transactions which involve the sale of
property connected in some way with real estate, and transactions
which result in personal injury or property damage which come under the description of product liability. These problems are addressed
in more detail in the following pages.
It is important for the courts to carefully address the question
of whether Article 2, or some other body of contract law, applies
to the case before it. By carefully following the Code methodology
in determining which body of law applies, a court is more likely to
54. W. VA. CODE § 46-1-105 (1966 & Supp. 1990).

55. "This Act applies to all transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state." Id. §
46-1-105.
56. The court did refer to W. VA. CODE § 46-1-105, but only in a discussion of whether the
contract clause choosing New York law and New York as a forum was contrary to public policy.
See Leasewell, 423 F. Supp. at 1014.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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choose the proper law and enable the parties and the attorneys who
read its opinions to understand which law applies and why. In a
number of West Virginia cases, it appeared that Article 2 did apply,
at least at the time of the decision, but the courts failed to even
mention the Code. For example, in McClung v. Ford Motor Company,57 the court decided a case involving injuries to a purchaser of
a new car allegedly caused by design defects and breaches of warranties. In a detailed discussion of the alleged breach of warranties,
the court never mentioned the Uniform Commercial Code, which
of course, was the applicable law concerning warranties. In Whittington v. Eli Lilly and Company5 8 a purchaser of birth control
pills alleged an express warranty by the manufacturer and a breach
thereof. The court devoted most of its opinion to a discussion of
whether this warranty was created. The court made no mention of
the Uniform Commercial Code, again the controlling law on the
issue.
In other opinions, the court has cited the Uniform Commercial
Code, and possibly even applied the Uniform Commercial Code,
but did not make clear which body of law it was actually applying.
In John Lodge DistributingCo. v. Texaco Inc. ,9 the court examined
the validity of a termination clause in an oil distributorship contract.
Among the issues addressed was an allegation that the termination
clause was unconscionable. In deciding that it might be unconscionable and remanding the case, the court did not question whether
the contract was covered by the Code, making the unconscionability
question covered by section 2-302, but merely stated in its discussion
of unconscionability "see also W. VA. CODE section 46-2-302 dealing
with sale of goods.'"'6 One result of this failure is that neither the
attorneys nor the circuit judge upon remand could have known
whether the UCC applied to the issues at hand. Another result is
that attorneys who read the opinion are left without guidance as to
whether all similar transactions are covered by the law of Article 2
or by the general common law of contracts.
57. 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).
58. 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).
59. 160 W. Va. 603, 245 S.E.2d 157 (1978).
60. Id. at 610, 245 S.E.2d at 161.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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B.

Sales of Goods and Services
Most transactions in goods include at least some services, if nothing more than the service involved in making the contract, receiving
the payment, and handing over the goods. Many contracts involve
much more in the way of services. The sale of a home air conditioning unit might require the seller to install the unit into an already
existing forced-air-heating system. A truck repair might involve $4,000
in new parts and $3,000 in labor. The issue of whether a contract
involving both the transfer of goods and the rendition of services
should be covered by the Code or by non-Code contract law has
been addressed by numerous cases throughout the country. Courts
have designed a number of approaches to determine whether Article
2 should be applied as controlling law for these- transactions, in61
cluding the following:
1. Determine if any goods are transferred in the transaction and if they are,
apply Article 2 to all of the contract issues. This test is rarely if ever articulated,
but can explain the result in some cases.
2. Determine if any services are involved in the transaction, and, if the services
are substantial, do not apply Article 2 to any of the contract issues. This is also
an unarticulated test.
3. Determine if that part of the transaction involving the problem before the
court involves the goods aspects or the services aspects of the contract, and then
62
apply the Code only to problems involving the goods aspects.
4. Determine whether the goods or the services aspects of the transaction predominated, and then apply the law appropriate to the dominant element to all
of the issues in the case. This test, referred to-variously as the "predominating
purpose" or "predominating element" test, is clearly the most widely used test
for determining whether to apply Article 2 to a transaction. 6 In determining which

61. In one situation, the Code itself provides the answer. Section 2-314(1) provides that for
purposes of implied warranty of merchantability, "The serving for yalue of food or drink to be
1
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale."
62. See, Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967) (D.N.M.); Envirex,
Inc. v. Ecological Recovery Associates Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1329 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 574
(1979); Anthony Pools Div. of Anthony Industries, Inc. v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434
(1983). Professors White and Summers look upon this test with favor. See, WVIrra & SUMmEs, supra

note 7 at 26.
63. See, De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912
(1975); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974); Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743
(D. Md. 1982); Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 690 P.2d 1280 (Colo. App. 1984); Yorke v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 220, 474 N.E.2d 20 (1985); Perazone v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 128
A.D.2d 15, 515 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1987); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dalton 665 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.
1984); See also, Annotation, Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contractsfor Sale of Goods
4th 501
(1981).
and Services,
5 A.L.R.
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predominates, the courts can take into account a number of considerations, the
most important usually being the allocation of the contract price between the
goods aspects and the service aspects.
5. Determine the policy objectives of the particular Code section asserted as
possibly covering the problem, and determine whether the facts supporting those
policy considerations are present in the case before the court. This test, called
the "policy approach" test by White and Summers, is recommended by them as
the best general approach. 64

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has addressed hybrid sales-service transactions in four cases,6 s and a hybrid sale of
securities and services contract in a fifth case. 66 Of the four West
Virginia cases involving the hybrid sale of goods and services, the
court cited the Article 2 scope provisions (sections 2-102 and 2-105)
in only two cases. In the other two, the court did not carefully
examine the issue of whether Article 2 or the common law of contracts should apply. The court merely proceeded to apply Article 2.
In the first case, Jones v. W. A. Weidebusch Plumbing & Heating Co.,67 the seller contracted to sell and install sprinkler heads in
an old building housing a department store, and to remove the old
sprinkler heads in the process. The seller subcontracted the work to
a third party who supplied and installed the sprinkler heads, billing
the seller for the price of the heads and the labor. The seller then
billed the buyer. Three months after the sprinkler heads were installed, they released water without apparent cause, resulting in damage to the store. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
without citation to or discussion of Code sections 2-102 and 2-105,
and without raising the question of what body of contract laws

64. Wmm & Sumrims, supra note 7 at 25. See Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey Con-

struction, Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975).
65. Elkins Manor Associates v. Eleanor Concrete Works, Inc., 396 S.E.2d 463, (W. Va. 1990);
Ashland Oil v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976); Foster v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n
of Charleston, 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975); Jones v. W. A. Weidebusch Plumbing &
Heating Co., 157 W. Va. 257, 201 S.E.2d 248 (1973).
66. Quinn v. Beverages of West Virginia, Inc., 159 W. Va. 571, 224 S.E.2d 894 (1976). The
sale of securities aspect of this case was covered by Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In
a sixth case, the court addressed a contract under which a trucking company agreed to transport
goods for a shipper (apparently a service contract), but which was treated by the trucking company
on its books as a purchase and resale contract because of an unusual Maryland statute. Accordingly,
the West Virginia Supreme Court treated the contract as sale of goods transaction for purposes of
West Virginia sales tax. See H.O. Anderson, Inc., v. Rose, 352 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1986).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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should apply, moved directly into a discussion of the plaintiff's theory of the case relating to implied warranties of fitness and implied
68
warranties of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The court's decision to apply Article 2 to this case could be explained
by the third test, in that the facts demonstrated circumstantially that
the defects were in the sprinkler heads themselves (the goods), and
not in the manner in which they were installed (the services). 69 The
court could have chosen to apply the fourth test, determining whether
the goods or the services aspects of the transaction predominated,
by referring to the relative charges made for the sprinkler heads and
for the labor. This is the usual, but not the only factor used in
determining which aspect of the transaction predominates. By not
discussing why the Code should govern this mixed sale of goods
and services transaction, the court left lawyers without the guidance
they would find useful on this question.
Ashland Oil Co. v. Donahue70 involved two separate written contracts executed the same day between the Ashland Oil Co. and a
service station dealer. The first contract provided for a lease of real
estate. The second was a franchise agreement covering mainly the
sale of petroleum products. The issue before the court was whether
a clause in the second contract providing for disparate termination
rights was enforceable against the dealer. The court determined that
the two contracts, both part of the same overall commercial transaction, were to be treated as one contract, and, because petroleum
products were involved, both contracts were covered by Article 2
of the UCC.7 1
Not only was Ashland a hybrid sale of goods and services case,
but it also included a lease of real estate. The court did not explain
why it applied Article 2 to the transaction, but simply stated:

68. Id. at 265, 201 S.E.2d at 253. For a discussion of the warranty issues in Jones, see infra
discussion at note 319.
69. The water apparently came right from the sprinkler heads, and not from a joint. After
replacement with a new sprinkler head of the same 165 degree specifications, no further problem
occurred. Id., at 264, 201 S.E.2d at 252.
70. 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976). For a more detailed discussion of the facts of
Ashland Oil, see infra text following note 222.
71. Id. at 473-74, 223 S.E.2d at 440.
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Having determined in this case that the lease agreement and the dealer contract should be construed together and considered to be one transaction, it is
clear that what is involved is a transaction in goods (petroleum products) which
is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales. See W. VA. CODE §§ 46102 and 46-2-105.72

In reaching its determination the court might have used the first
test, that is, decided that because some goods were involved in the
transaction, Article 2 should apply. Then again, the court might
have used the third test, that is, noticed that the problem arose not
in the real estate lease contract, but in the termination clause in the
dealership sale of goods contract (and found the services aspect of
the dealership contract incidental). Or the court might have operated
under the fourth test, the "predominating factor" test, assuming
that the amount of money paid by the dealer was most likely much
greater for the petroleum products than it was for the services accompanying the dealership or for the lease of the building and property. Without the court's explanation, we are again left to guess.
There is nothing particularly unfair about applying Article 2 to the
issue involved,73 but the court should have explained why it did so,
identified the test it found appropriate, and in the process discussed
the provisions of sections 2-102 and 2-105 enacted by the legislature
to control this determination.
A number of cases have addressed the issue of whether dealer
contracts of the type involved in Ashland are covered by Article 2,
and the results are mixed. Where the franchise agreement provided
for the sale of goods under that agreement, and the sale was the
dominant aspect of the agreement, the courts have had no trouble
74
in finding that the transaction was covered by Article 2.
Foster v. Charleston Memorial Hospital Association of
Charleston75 was the first of two West Virginia opinions which ac72. Id.
73. For a criticism of the court's determination that the clause was unconscionable, and of the
court's methodology in reaching this conclusion, see the discussion of section 2-302 and unconscionability in part IV infra.
74. See Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co., 210 Cal. App. 3d 368, 258 Cal. Rptr. 473, (1989); United
Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp., 108 N.M. 467, 775 P.2d 233 (1989). See
also, Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980).
75. 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d at 916 (1975).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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tually discussed the question of whether Article 2, or some other
body of law, applied to the facts before the court.
In Foster, the plaintiff sued the defendant hospital for breach
of warranties when she contracted serum hepatitis from a blood
transfusion. The court stated that to merely characterize the transaction as a sale and apply the Code, or as a service and not apply
the Code, would provide "a result without a reason. ' 76 According
to the court, the question should not be whether some personal
property passed under the transaction, but whether the transaction
77
is of the type contemplated under the law of implied warranty.
Discussing blood transfusions, the court pointed out that the decision of whether to transfer blood to the patient and the actual
transfer of that blood, both integral parts of the transfer of the
goods, cannot be segregated from the exercise of the skill and judgement by the persons making the decision whether or not to transfer
the blood. The important part of the transaction is the process of
balancing the risks and benefits in deciding whether or not to give
the patient blood, and the focus is on this decision-making process,
not on the quality of the blood itself. The court then discussed
various considerations underlying the development of a seller's liability for implied warranty. It noted that:
A hospital or doctor does not exactly fit into the mold of a 'merchant' ....
There is a ... difference between a merchant ... who is engaged in the active
promotion and sale of his product such as Coca Cola bottles .... and a doctor,
dentist, or lawyer ... who supplies medicine, blood, tooth filings or legal briefs
in the course of his professional relationship with a patient or client .... [B]lood
is not such a standardized product that its use can be segregated from the skill
and judgement of the person prescribing it in the same way that an automobile
wheel can be segregated from the skill and judgement of the mechanic installing
that wheel on a vehicle .... [T]he hospital has not undertaken to be an insurer
.... [U]nlike standard commercial products, however, blood is dispensed under
a wide variety of circumstances which do not lead to the imposition of the type
of uniform standard of care envisaged by the law of warranty ... [and goods]
are amenable to quality control by the manufacturer while human blood is obviously not.,

76. Id. at 150, 219 S.E.2d at 919.
77. Id.

78. Id.at 152-54, 219 S.E.2d at 919-21.
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The court went on to examine the product itself, noting that
blood is not the type of standard mass-produced product for which
the doctrine of implied warranties was created. The court pointed
out that the majority of courts around the country have held that
blood transfusions do not constitute a sale of goods under Article
2. 79 Finally it noted that after Mrs. Foster received her transfusion,
the West Virginia legislature enacted a statute providing that furnishing blood and other human parts for transplantation is a service
and not a sale, and no warranties are applicable. 80
The court broadly held:
[W]here an individual contracts for professional services involving an incidental

transfer of personal property as a necessary part of such service, and where the
appropriate use of such personal property depends primarily upon the skill and
judgement of the person rendering the service, such a transfer of personal property
by the professional is not within the contemplation of West Virginia Code 46-2314 (1963) or 46-2-315 (1963) and any injury or damage resulting from such

transfer of personal property must be recovered by an action grounded in negligence .... 81

A case could be made that this discussion is an exercise in the
application of the "predominating purpose" test: the court looks
at the transaction and determines whether the overriding features
of the transaction focus on the provision of services or on the transfer and acquisition of the goods. But it is more likely that the court
followed the "policy approach" of the fifth test. Focusing on the
policies behind the Code's implied warranty provisions, the court
determined that the factors underlying implied warranties, including
making sellers liable for heavily marketed, mass-produced goods
which are sensitive to quality control efforts, and purchased as a
result of the exercise of buyer's choice, made without the accompanying advice and service of a trained professional, were simply
not present in a transaction for a blood transfusion.

79. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
80. W. VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1991). The court in Fostercould have avoided the entire discussion
by ruling that the recent statute embodied West Virginia's policy on such matters, and that the court
was applying this policy as the common law governing the case at hand. Fortunately, the court did
not, and shed some guidance on the scope of Article 2.
81. Foster, 159 W. Va. at 155, 219 S.E.2d at 921 (emphasis by the court).
82. Of course it is possible that the court might have been motivated by matters unrelated to 16
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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Fosteris solid precedent in West Virginia for not applying Article
2 to hybrid sales-service contracts where the seller is a professional.
It does not provide reliable precedent for the usual case where the
seller is not such a professional. Will the court apply Article 2 to
a transaction involving the replacement of part of an airplane engine
where the parts were billed to the buyer at $6000 and the labor at
$4000? The Foster analysis is relevant, but not dispositive.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' second direct examination of whether the Code should apply to a hybrid sales-service
transaction occured in Elkins ManorAssociates v. Eleanor Concrete
Works, Inc. 3 In Elkins, the developer of a housing project, subsidized by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), made a contract
with the seller in which the seller agreed to manufacture, deliver
and install precast, prestressed concrete planks for use as the floors
and ceilings in the housing project. The contract, with a total price
of $160,000, required the seller to deliver and install the planks and
all grouting required, to furnish a crane to perform the work, to
furnish all labor, tools, equipment, and material to perform all of
the work, and to comply with the guidelines of the FHA. After the
first floor of the project was installed by the seller, FHA inspectors
discovered that the planks had not been anchored in accordance with
the specifications and that several of the planks were cracked and
warped and possibly did not comply with the standards of the American Concrete Institute (ACI) as required by the contract. Government agents then inspected the seller's manufacturing plant, located
180 miles from the project, and determined that the plant's manufacturing process did not comply with ACI standards. As a result,
the government refused to allow any of seller's planks to be used
in the project until seller's process was approved by the ACI. Approval was not obtained until January, 1980, at least four months
after installation was to begin. After a delivery of planks during
February, seller experienced financial difficulties and could not pro-

any of the five tests or methodologies. For example, the result might have been driven by the fact
that the defendant was a non-profit organization (at least technically), transferring a necessity of life,
and the defect (serum hepatitis) could not have been detected either by any laboratory test, or by
any economically feasable test.
83. 396
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vide delivery to the site. The owner then hired its own trucks to
pick up the planks, some of which could not be supplied with a
full load. The owner also rented a crane and used its own personnel
to install the planks. Installation required lifting the planks to the
building, anchoring the planks to the outside walls, and grouting
between the planks. The late deliveries caused late completion of
the project.
After the December, 1980 completion of the project, the owner
sued the seller for breach of contract. The seller countersued for
the remaining amount owed on the contract. At the close of the
plaintiff-owner's case, the trial court granted a motion for a directed
verdict, finding the evidence insufficient to show that the seller had
breached the contract, and, alternatively, found that if the seller had
breached, it's nonperformance was excused under section 2-615(a)
of the UCC. 4 The court also ruled that the seller's counterclaim for
the remaining amount due under the contract should be offset by
the owner's cost in shipping, installing, anchoring, and grouting the
concrete planks, duties that contractually were to have been performed by the seller.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support a holding that
the seller breached the contract. The court also held that the contact
was a "construction" contract, that the Uniform Commercial Code
did not apply to construction contracts, and, therefore, the Code
excuse for failure to perform provided by section 2-615(a) was not
available to the seller.
Although it is difficult to question the result reached by the Supreme Court of Appeals, there are serious problems with the methodology the court used in reaching that result. First, the court began
its analysis by reviewing the evidence and the law to determine
whether the plaintiff-owner presented sufficient evidence of the seller's breach. In this review, the court applied the common law of
84. Id. at 467. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-615(a) (1966) provides that: "delay in delivery ... is not
a breach of ... a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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contracts to the issues of right to terminate because of delay where
time is of the essence, waiver of damages for failure to terminate,
and measure of damages for breach, all without even questioning
whether the transaction was covered by Article 2 of the UCC. s5 The
court failed to mention either the scope sections of Article 2 sections 2-102 and 2-105 - or the substantive provisions of Article
2. Only when the court examined the section 2-615(a) defense did
the court raise the issue of whether the Code applied to the transaction.
The court began by stating that "most courts hold that the UCC
does not generally apply to alter the terms of a construction contract." 8 6 The court supplied no authority for this bold statement.
It then went on to explain that the reason often used is that the
UCC deals with the sale of goods, and services are not included in
the definition of goods.8 7 "Consequently," the court continued, "a

construction contract which involves the supply of labor and materials is not controlled by the UCC if the service component is the
predominant factor in the contract." 88 The court quoted the leading
case of Bonebrake v. Cox"9 as setting forth the test which many
courts have adopted:
The test for inclusion or exclusion [under Article 2] is not whether they [goods
and services] are mixed, but granted that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of
services with goods incidentally involved (e.g. contract with artist for painting)
or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g. installation of
a water heater in a bathroom).29

The court then went on to give two reasons why the UCC should
not apply to construction contracts. First, the court opined that the
UCC evolved from commercial sales where goods were often bought
85. The Code supplies some rules governing the buyer's right to terminate in sections 2-601
and 2-711, governing waiver of damages in section 2-610, and for measuring damages where the seller
breaches in sections 2-711 through 2-719. Generally speaking, issues surrounding "time is of the
essence" and other "waiver" issues will be governed by common law rules. See section 1-103.
86. Elkins, 396 S.E.2d at 468.
87. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 46-2-102, -105 (1966)).
88. Id. at 468.
89. 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (S.D. Iowa).
90. Elkins,
396Research
S.E.2d atRepository
469, (quoting@ Bonebrake
v. Cox, 499 F.2d at 960).
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and sold without any extensive contract document spelling out the
rights and remedies of the parties, stating:
The UCC is derived from a variety of legal sources that were utilized to categorize
the commercial rules, many of which were established by merchants dealing with
each other ....

mhe sales section of the UCC itself recognizes that specific

contractual terms may supersede its provisions. Thus, it would appear that the
main purpose of the UCC is to fill in the gaps of the sales agreement which is
either ambiguous or contains no express statement as to a particular right or duty.
In contrast, a building construction agreement often contains detailed contract
provisions and specifications .... Moreover, the ultimate "owner" of the facility

does not directly buy the goods. These are supplied by contractors or subcontractors who in turn purchase the goods from third parties. 91

The thrust of the court's discussion, to the extent it can be determined, is that since (according to the court) the main purpose of
the UCC is to supply terms of a contract which are not provided
by the parties, there is little reason to apply the UCC to construction
contracts because they often contain detailed contract provisions and
specifications.
The second reason given by the court for not applying the UCC
to this problem is that the Bonebrake test, providing for determination of the "predominant factor," is too subjective to provide
any rational analysis of most business contracts. "In virtually any
building contract," reasoned the court, "if the total cost of the
project were considered, the 'predominant factor' would almost always be the cost of materials incorporated into the building. '92
"Thus," concluded the court, "under Bonebrake, the UCC would
control unless the 'predominant factor' were left entirely to the court's
intuition. ' 93 The thrust of this second reason seems to be that since
the predominant factor, if determined by the relative allocation of
the price for goods and price for labor, would always equal a sale
of goods, we should not use that test.
The court then concluded with its rule for West Virginia: "[t]here
is a presumption that the sales provisions of the UCC will not apply
to a building construction contract unless the party seeking a UCC
91. Id. at 469. What these last two sentences have to do with the prior statements is unclear.
92. Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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right is able to demonstrate substantial justification for its use." ' 94
There were a number of serious errors in the court's analysis.
First, it is no more true that the main purpose of the UCC is to
provide terms missing from the parties' contract than it is true that
the main purpose of the common law of contracts is to provide
these same terms. For example, in a service contract where a contractor hired by a building owner to paint a building quits in the
middle of the job and leaves 200 gallons of paint on the site, if the
contract is silent on the matter, the common law of contracts has
no trouble determining what the building owner's duties are with
respect to the contractor's paint. Similarly, in a sale of goods contract where a seller contracts to sell 200 gallons of paint to a buyer
and ships 200 gallons of the wrong paint, if the contract is silent
on the matter, the Code (2-603) determines what the buyer's duties
are with respect to the seller's 200 gallons of paint. It is also true
that under the doctrine of freedom of contract, incorporated by the
UCC, the parties are free to specify most of their respective duties
in the contract. 95 But the same is also true at common law. More
importantly, neither of these points are a reason to say that one
body of contract law applies instead of another body of contract
law.
Second, the court gave no reason why the Bonebrake test is not
a good test, or why, just because it would almost "always" result
in the sale of goods aspect predominating, that it is not a good test.
For one thing, the court misapprehended the range of factors that
can be considered in the Bonebrake predominating factor test. It is
true that the majority of cases seem to allocate costs between goods
and services and determine which is greater. But others do not and
ask other questions, including "which predominated in the minds
of the parties, the service part or the goods part?" The court might
have done the same thing in Elkins.

94. Id. at 470 n.13.
95. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46-1-102(2) (1966): "Underlying purposes of this Act are ...

(b) to permit continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of
the parties;" (emphasis added), and § 46-2-301; "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver
and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract." (emphasis added).
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Third, the "predominating factor" test is not the only test used
for determining whether Article 2 or other contract law covers the
transactions, as mentioned earlier. 96 If the court found the predominating factor test unsuitable, then it should have considered other
tests.
Fourth, and most important, this court simply assumed the contract was a "construction" contract, without giving any basis for
this determination. Why did it not simply assume the contract was
a "sale of cement planks" contract? This initial process of labeling
the contract as a "construction" instead of a "sale of goods" contract was what compelled the court to ultimately choose to apply
the common law of contracts instead of Article 2. It was the test
or methodology that the court used in concluding the contract was
a "construction" contract and not a "sale of goods" contract that
was most important. The court failed to tell us which test or methodology it used. To lay out a rule that the Code does not apply to
"construction" contracts without explaining what constitutes a
"construction" contract does not give sufficient guidance. What is
needed are guidelines for determing when a hybrid goods-services
contract is a sales contract subject to the Code, or a service (construction) contract subject to the common law. The court should
have articulated these guidelines.
Finally, the court in Elkins might well have found that Article
2 did not apply to the issues simply as a way to avoid giving the
trial court a chance to decide whether there was a basis in fact for
finding an excuse for nonperformance under section 2-615 (Failure
of Presupposed Conditions and Commercial Impracticability). This
makes little sense. First, it is extremely unlikely that the lower court
was justified in finding that an excuse existed, even under section
2-615. 97 Second, the defense of excuse for nonperformance due to
failure of presupposed conditions and commercial impractibility is
not avoided by simply finding that the Code and section 2-615 does
not apply. This defense has a commonlaw counterpart as evidenced

96. See supra notes 61-64.

97. See infra discussion in text following note 498.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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by the Restatement of Contracts, 98 and the trial court would have
to examine the issue again under common law even if Article 2 does
not cover the issues.
In summary, except for hybrid goods-services contracts involving
professional services, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has failed to develop a test for determining whether the UCC or
the common law applies to a contract involving both sale of goods
and of services, despite several clear opportunities. This leaves uncertain an important issue in the jurisprudence of contract law in
the state.
C. Real Estate
Transactions in real estate are not included in the definition of
"goods" in sections 2-105 and 2-107. Growing crops, timber to be
cut, and other things attached to realty and capable of severance
without material harm to the realty are considered "goods" under
Article 2, 99 as are minerals, oil, and gas, if under the contract for

sale they are to be severed by the seller. 10 Several West Virginia
cases have considered the application of Article 2 to transactions
having some relation to real estate and have either applied Article
2 as the controlling law or have cited provisions of Article 2 for
use by analogy.
In Ashland Oil Co. v. Donahue,01 discussed earlier, the court
examined a commercial transaction which involved a lease of real
estate and a separate dealership agreement providing for the sale of
petroleum products. The court, noting that the two separate documents were executed on the same day and finding that they were
so interconnected that the parties would not have executed either
without the other, held that the two contracts should be treated as
one transaction. Further, because the transaction involved the sale
of petroleum products, the court held that it was covered by Article
98. Id.
99. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-107(2) (1966 & Supp. 1990).
100. Id. § 46-2-107(1).
101. 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra
text following
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2 of the UCC. The issue before the court was the validity of a
termination clause in the dealership (sales) document. If the issue
before the court had been covered by the real estate lease document,
especially if it had been an issue traditionally covered by real property law, the court might well have refused application of Article
2, and 4pplied the common law of real property to the problem.
In Welch v. Cayton,'10 2 the surface owner of a tract of land, who
thought he owned the mineral rights but in fact did not, leased the
oil and gas rights to a producer who extracted the oil and gas and
sold it to buyers. The true owner of the oil and gas rights later
learned of the extraction and sale, and sued a number of the parties,
including the buyers of the oil and gas, for the value of the oil and
gas sold. The court applied property law to determine who owned
the oil and gas rights in the real estate, but held that the rights of
the buyers of the oil and gas were covered by Article 2 of the UCC
under section 2-107(1). The court then held that the buyers did not
take true title to the oil and gas as good faith purchasers under
section 2-403 because the producing seller, having the same claim
as a thief, had no power to pass good title.
Troy Mining Corporation v. Itmann Coal Co.,103 involved a contract mining agreement calling for the contractor to mine the owner's
coal, and then apparently sell most or all of the coal to the owner
(the facts are not clear on this latter point). After several years, the
owner terminated the contract under a termination clause which the
contractor asserted was unconscionable. The court held the agreement was a contract for services not covered by Article 2, not discussing the provisions of the contract or the facts surrounding the
performance in any detail. There is some chance that the contract
more closely approximated a sale of coal, and could have been held
a transaction in goods covered by Article 2 of the UCC. As it was,°4
the court did cite the unconscionability provision of the Code,1
using it by analogy in determining what law of unconscionability
0 5 the court
should be applied in the case. In McGinnis v. Cayton,1
102. 395 S.E.2d 496 (f. Va. 1990).
103. 346 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1986).
104. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-302 (1966).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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examined the enforceability of a nineteenth century oil and gas lease.
A concurring opinion stated that oil and gas leases are closer to
16
sales of good than to a typical property lease, citing section 2-107(1) 0
and discussing several Article 2 provisions in deciding what to do
10 7
with the case.
Finally, beginning in 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals cited the Uniform Commercial Code as an example in a
series of cases dealing with residential property. In Teller v. McCoy, 108 the court cited sections 2-314 and 2-315 on implied warranties
as it proceeded to establish a warranty of habitability in the lease
of a dwelling. In Thacker v. Tyree, 1' 9 the court cited the same sections in holding the seller liable for defects which substantially affected the habitability of a house, where the defects were unknown
to the buyer and difficult to discover, and which were known to
the seller but not revealed to the buyer. In Gamble v. Main,10 the
court cited section 2-315 on implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose in establishing an implied warranty of fitness and
habitability in the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor.
Although Article 2 does not apply to transactions in real estate,
the foregoing cases show that, depending on the facts, Article 2 can
and has been used to assist courts in deciding problems which arise
in real estate transactions.
D. Product Liability
The term "product liability" generally encompasses injury to
person or property caused by defective goods. Traditionally, such
106. Id. at 772.
107. The concurring opinion included an analysis of the use of the Code rules of commercial
impractability, W. VA. CODE § 46-2-615 (1966) and unconscionability, § 46-2-302, as ways to avoid
harsh contractual obligations in oil and gas leases. Another case, McMellon v. Adkins, 300 S.E.2d
116 (W. Va. 1983), also cites section 46-2-302 in examining alleged unconscionability in a coal lease.
108. 162 W. Va. 367, 378-79, 253 S.E.2d 114, 122 (1979).
109. 397 S.E.2d 885, 886 (W. Va. 1982).
110. 300 S.E.2d 110, 114 (W. Va. 1983). The holding was dictum in that the court found that
the warranty did not extend to adverse soil conditions of which the builder-vender was unaware and
could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable care.
In finishing out this series, in 1988 the majority of the court extended the implied warranties
of habitability and fitness to second and subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time, without
reference to the UCC. Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988) (Neeley, J., dissenting).
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injury has given rise to a remedy for breach of contract under the
Code, and additional remedies in tort for negligence and strict iIability.'11 But where the defect causes only economic loss and does

not cause damage to person or to property, the majority of courts
have held that the buyer's remedy is under the Code, and there is
no cause of action in negligence or strict liability.1 2 West Virginia

has considered product liability actions in a number of cases dealing
mainly with the existence of a cause of action in strict liability.
In Star FurnitureCo. v. PulaskiFurnitureCo.,113 the buyer pur-

chased a clock from the seller for retail display purposes. The clock
malfunctioned, apparently causing a fire which damaged both the
clock and the buyer's business establishment. The buyer sued in

negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The court held
that the doctrine of strict liability is applicable where the damage

to the purchased product itself results from a sudden violent event
and not as a result of an inherent defect which merely reduced the
product's value without inflicting physical harm to the product."14
The court illustrated the difference in the types of damages which
give rise to a warranty cause of action on the one hand, and a tort
cause of action on the other, with two Alaska cases. In the first,
Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc. ,115 the roof of the purchased
mobile home leaked continually. Although it was unpleasant to live

111. See Tarwackiv v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 330 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1976); Williams v. Fulmer,
695 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1985); Timsah v. General Motors Corp., 225 Kansas 305, 591 P.2d 154 (1979);
Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983). "Product liability actions may be
premised on three independent theories-strict liability, negligence, and warranty. Each theory contains
different elements which plaintiffs much prove in order to recover. No rational reason exists to require
plaintiffs in product liability actions to elect which theory to submit to the jury after the evidence
has been presented when they may elect to bring suit on one or all of the theories." Ilosky, 307
S.E.2d at 605 syllabus point 6, 613. This is dicta in Ilosky as the plaintiff alleged causes of action
in negligence and strict liability but not in warranty. Id. at 607, 613.
112. Seely v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Amelio Bros. Meat Company, 182 111.App. 3d 863, 131 Ill. Dec. 332, 538 N.E.2d 707 (1989);
Prairie Production, Inc. v. Agchem Division-Pennwalt Corp., 514 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1987); Utah
International, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 108 N.M. 539, 775 P.2d 741 (1989). For cases
finding a negligence cause of action where the only loss is economic loss, see Omni Flying Club v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Mass. 154, 315 N.E.2d 885 (1974); Berg v. General Motors Corp. 87 Wash.
2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
113. 297 S.E.2d 854 (,V. Va. 1982).
114. Id. at 858.
115. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
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in the mobile home, the leaky roof did not pose a hazard to life
or property. Accordingly, the Alaska court held that the buyer had
no cause of action in strict liability against the manufacturer, but
only an action for breach of warranty. In contrast, in Cloud v. Kit
Manufacturing Co.,116 the heating unit in a newly purchased mobile
home ignited the adjacent pipe insulation, causing a fire which damaged the mobile home. The court found that the sudden event which
physically harmed the purchased product (mobile home) gave the
buyer an action in strict liability against the manufacturer of the
home.
The West Virginia Court of Appeals stated its rule as follows:
In West Virginia, property damage to defective products which results from a
sudden calamitous event is recoverable under a strict liability cause of action.
merely because of a "bad bargain" are outside the scope
Damages which result
7
of strict liability."

The court went on to hold:
Our decision not to extend strict liability to mere loss in value cases also means
that strict liability cannot be used to recover lost profits ....

The proper relationship between tort law and the Uniform Commercial Code requires that lost profits be pursued under a warranty
11 8
or contract theory cause of action rather than strict liability.
The court first affirmed Star Furniturein Capitol Fuels v. Clark
Equipment,"9 where the purchased front-end loader suddenly caught
fire and consumed itself when a fuel leak dripped on the engine.
There was no damage to personal property other than the purchased
product itself. The court'held that if the product defect is dangerous
to users, and destroys the product itself in a sudden calamitous
event, then the buyer may recover under strict liability. The court
went on to state that "[d]amages which result merely because of a

116.
117.
118.
119.

563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
Star Furniture, 297 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 859-60.
382 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1989).
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'bad bargain' are outside the scope of strict liability,' '1 20 and must
be recovered under breach of contract. The court affirmed Star Furniture again in Anderson v. Chrysler Corp.,I12 where a fire began
burning under the dashboard of the plaintiff's three-month old car,
destroying the car. The court affirmed an action in strict liability,
allowing the buyer to make a prima facie case through circumstantial
evidence.
Star Furniture and Capitol Fuels only addressed the question of
whether a cause of action in strict liability could be maintained in
product liability suits. Neither addressed the buyer's breach of warranty action under the Code. In 1973, the court allowed a breach
of warranty recovery for property damage caused by defective fire
sprinklers in Jones v. Weidebusch, discussed earlier.' Decided six
years before West Virginia adopted strict liability, Jones was clearly
a product liability case. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals next discussed the applicability of the Code to product liability
cases in Hill v. Ryerson & Son, Inc.- 3 In Hill, the eye of the buyer's
employee was injured when a hydraulic cylinder split while the employee was working on it. The employee sued the seller of the cylinder in strict liability and breach of implied warranty of fitness.
The seller sued the manufacturer in strict liability, implied warranty
of fitness, and implied indemnity. The trial court awarded the employee $125,000. The manufacturer defended in part on the ground
that it did not receive timely notice of the claim under section 2607(3)(c) of the Code."24 In holding that the notice requirements of
the Code were not available as a defense in a product liability action
on a related implied indemnity suit, the West Virginia Supreme Court
120. Id. at 311 syllabus point 1. The court went on to state in syllabus point 2: "Under the

"bad bargain" concept of Star Furniture ... the fact that the product may be flawed or defective,
such that it does not meet the purchaser's expectations or is even unusable because of the defect,
does not mean that he (buyer) may recover the value of the product under a strict liability in tort
theory. The purchaser's remedy is through the Uniform Commercial Code. In order to recover, the
damage to the product must result from a sudden calamitous event attributable to the dangerous
defect or design of the product itself." Id.
121. 403 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1991).
122. Jones, Inc. v. W. A. Weidebush Plumbing & Heating Co., 157 W. Va. 257, 201 S.E.2d

248 (1973). See supra discussion at note 67.
123. 165 W. Va. 222, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980).

124. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying note 448.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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of Appeals stated that there can be little doubt that the Uniform
Commercial Code was not enacted to encompass product liability
cases,125 that the Code's provisions cannot be deemed to restrict the
judicially created doctrine of implied warranty of fitness in the product liability field, and that the Code has little relevance to the product liability field. 26 The court did go on to state that the Code could
be used for guidance in product liability cases where appropriate,
particularly where express warranties or other features peculiar to
commercial transactions are involved. 27
Three years after Hill, in Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp.,"2 the
court stated that product liability actions may be premised on strict
liability, negligence, and warranty, although the statement was dicta
because the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action in breach of
warranty. Finally, in the Anderson case discussed above, the court
confirmed that a buyer of a new automobile had a breach of warranty action for the sudden calamitous destruction of the automobile, in addition to a cause of action in strict liability. 2 9 Clearly
the Hill court's comments must be limited to the facts of Hill.
In most cases, strict liability provides the buyer with the primary
advantages of a breach of warranty action, that is, defect plus causation plus injury equals recovery, without requiring the buyer to
prove the contract and warranty and without subjecting the buyer
to the seller's contract defenses. 130 But in several unusual situations,
such as where the two-year tort statute of limitations has run before
the four-year Code limitation, 3 ' or where there is difficulty in prov-

125. Hill, 228, 268 S.E.2d at 302 (1980).
126. Id. at 231, 268 S.E.2d at 305.
127. Id. This is consistent with the West Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Valloric v. Dravo
Corp., 357 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1987) in which the court held that where the contract between the
defendants contained a clause governing indemnity rights between the parties, this contract clause and
not the common law of implied indemnity governed the indemnity rights between the parties. See
also, Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Products, Inc., 169 W. Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511 (1982).
128. 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).
129. Anderson v. Crysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 194-95 (1991).
130. Contract disclaimers under section 2-316, requirement of timely notice under section 2607(3), and privity of contract in those jurisdictions requiring privity.
131. See infra Part XI.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 93

ing the product was not reasonably safe, 32 the Code cause of action
in product liability cases is still a valuable tool.
E.

Use By Analogy

The Code has been used by courts in non-Code cases as support
for both the creation of a similar rule of common law, and as the
embodiment of a common-law rule which is then adopted and used
in the particular area as a rule of common law. As stated by the
Idaho Supreme Court and reproduced in White & Summers,
We will look to the commercial setting in which the problem arises and contrast
the relevant common law with Article 2. We will use Article 2 as "a premise for
reasoning" only when the case involves the same considerations that gave rise to
the Code provisions and an analogy is not rebutted by additional antithetical
circumstances.' 33

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has cited the Code
as support for continuing old law or developing new law on a number of occasions. In Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc.,'
a non-Code case, the court stated, "The concept of unconscionability under the Uniform Commercial Code 'has been applied to
many other kinds of contracts, either by analogy or as an expression
of a general doctrine.' ",135 For example, in recognizing the doctrine
of implied warranty of fitness in the sale of a new home by a buildervendor, the court stated:
Courts and commentators have also commented on the irony that protection is
afforded a purchaser of personal property under the Uniform Commercial Code

132. Apparently required to sustain a cause of action in strict liability. See Morningstar v. Black
and Decker Manufacturing Co. 162 W. Va. 857 (1979). Several other west Virginia cases have made
statements which could be relevant to the relationship between contract (including the Code) and tort
law. These include statements that economic loss is recoverable under negligence, Sewell v. Gregory,
371 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988) (where the court examined the liability of the builder of a house to a
non-privity subsequent purchaser), that a mere bad bargain did not give rise to recovering under torts
Roxalana Hills Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1194 (w.Va. 1986), and where there is merely
economic loss, there is no tort, Basham v. General Shale, 377 S.E.2d 830 (V. Va. 1988) (involving
deteriorating bricks on the exterior of new homes).
133. Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Gaily Construction Co., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184
(1975), quoted in WHnM & SUMNMRS, supra note 7, at 26.
134. 369 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1988).
135. Id. at 885 (quoting E. FARswoRTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (1982)).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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by an implied warranty of fitness (W. Va. Code 46-2-315) no matter how modest
the value, and yet without an implied warranty of habitability, the purchaser of
a new home may have no protection." 6

As mentioned above, the court similarly cited the Code in its
earlier extension of implied warranty of habitability to leased prem7
ises. 13
In another case, the court cited the Code conflicts-of-law rule
as evidence that choice of law and forum selection clauses are not
violative of West Virginia public policy.13 8 In Goldring v. Ashland
Oil & Refining Co. ,'9 a case involving an implied right of indemnity
between tortfeasors, the court cited section 2-607(5) of the Code
stating, "The UCC acknowledges that one person in the chain of
distribution may be answerable over to another."' 4 In Everett v.
Brown, 4 1 the court stated that all of the West Virginia statutes of
fraud, including the four UCC statutes of fraud, 42 display common
characteristics and create similar problems, implying that the Code
statutes of fraud case law has precedential value for cases arising
under non-Code statutes of fraud. Finally, the court in seven nonCode cases involving transactions as disparate as prenuptial agreements and oil and gas leases has cited the Article 2 rule on unconscionability for guidance in- applying some concept of
43
unconscionability to the non-Code facts before the court.
III. FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT AND FoRMAITmEs
A.

Generally

1. Formation
Part 2 of Article 2 provides the Code rules concerning the formation of a contract and the form the contract must take. With
136. Gamble v. Main, 300 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1983).
137. Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978). See supra notes 108-19 and
accompanying text.
138. Leasewell Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D. W. Va. 1976)
(citing W. VA. CODE § 46-1-105 (1966)).
139. 59 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
140. Id. at 490.
141. 321 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1984).
142. Including the Article 2 statute of frauds, W. VA. CODE § 46- 2-201 (1966), and § 46-1-206
(general), § 46-8-319 (sales of securities), and § 46-9-203 (1966 & 1990 Supp.) (secured transactions).
143. See infra discussion of these cases in Part IV.
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several exceptions provided by the Code, the common-law rules governing offer and acceptance, assent, agreement, interpretation, bargain, and consideration apply to the formation of contracts for the
sale of goods.
Section 2-204 provides that "[a] contract for sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such contract.' " Section 2-207(3) provides that "[c]onduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish
a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract."' 45 Section 2-206(1) provides, "[u]nless
otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
...
an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.' 1 46 In some situations, the Code requires the offeror to
keep the offer open when the offeror has promised to do so in a
signed writing, even if the offeree has given no consideration for
that offer. 47
In its most radical deviation from the common law in the area
of offer and acceptance, the Code provides that a contract can be
formed by an acceptance which states terms not contained in the
offer. Specifically, the Code provides in section 2-207(1) that "[a]
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance ... which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered ... unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms."' 4 This type of nonidentical "acceptance" response creates a contract under this section only, when read as a
whole, it indicates that the 6fferee by her response is "definitely"
accepting the offer notwithstanding the different or additional terms

144. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-204(1) (1966).
145. Id. § 46-2-207(3).
146. Id. § 46-2-206(I)(a).
147. This applies where the offeror is a merchant, who, in the signed writing, gives assurance
that the offer will be held open. This "firm offer" must be held open for the time stated or for a
reasonable time, but in no event exceeding three months. Id. § 46-2-205.
148. Id. § 46-2-207(1).
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contained in the response. Finally, section 2-209 provides that the
parties may modify their contract without consideration as long as
the statute of frauds is satisfied.1 49
2.

Terms

The Code also provides some specific rules which help to determine what terms become part of the contract. Section 2-207 provides that a merchant may unilaterally bring some terms into the
contract by including these terms in the acceptance or in a confirmatory memorandum if the terms do not materially alter the contract, 10 the offer does not exclude the term,' 5 ' or notification of
objection to the term has not already been given by the other party
or is not given thereafter within a reasonable time. 52 The Code also
provides that the terms of the contract will be supplemented or qual53
ified by usage of trade, by course of dealing between the parties,
and by course of performance of the contract itself.' 54 The Code
further provides, that "[e]ven though one or more terms are left
open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy.111
Many Code sections provide contract terms to fill in needed provisions when the parties have themselves failed to provide the terms
in their agreement. Among these are sections providing that the price
shall be a reasonable price at the time for delivery, 56 the place for
delivery is the seller's place of business,' 57 the merchant seller war-

149. Id. § 46-2-209(1)(3).
150. Id. § 46-2-207(2)(b).

151. Id. § 46-2-207(2)(a).
152. Id. § 46-2-207(2)(c).
153. Id. § 46-1-205(3). "Usage of trade" is defined as "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will
be observed with respect to the transaction in question." Id. § 46-1-205(2). A "course of dealing"
is defined as "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which
is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Id. § 46-1-205(1).
154. Id. § 46-2-208(1).
155. Id. § 46-2-204(3).

156. Id. § 46-2-305(1).

157. Id.by§ The
46-2-308(a).
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rants that the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used, 58 the seller in a shipment contract must take the
goods to a common carrier and make a reasonable contract for their
transportation, 159 and the payment is due upon tender of delivery
of the goods (which may be made by check if ordinarily done in
the business, unless the seller demands cash and gives reasonable
additional time for the buyer to secure the cash). 6°
Finally, Article 2's parol evidence rule prevents the introduction
of evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement which would contradict a term set forth in a writing intended by the parties as the final expression of their agreement on
such a term. This provision prevents the introduction of evidence
of noncontradicting, consistent, additional terms where the court
finds the writing to have been intended by the parties as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.','
Surprisingly, few West Virginia cases have touched upon issues
concerning the Code provisions relating to the formation of a contract or the formal requirements of such contract. Indeed, only one
case has directly addressed a main issue of any of these Code provisions.
B.

Statute of Frauds

Two West Virginia cases have involved issues relating to the statute of frauds contained in Article 2.162 Marion Square Corp. v. Kro-

158. Id. § 46-2-314(c).
159. Id. § 46-2-504.
160. Id. § 46-2-511.
161. Id. § 46-2-202.

162. Marion Square Corp. v. Kroger Co., 873 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1989) (S.D. W. Va.); Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980).
A third case, Everett v. Brown, 321 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1984) is a non-Code case addressing
issues relating to Article 2's statute of frauds.

A fourth case, Quinn v. Beverages of West Virginia, Inc., 159 W. Va. 571, 224 S.E.2d 894
(1976), involved the application of the Uniform Commercial Code's Article 8 statute of frauds covering
the sale of securities to an oral employment contract giving the employee an option to purchase shares
of stock in the employer company. After making the oral agreement, the employee terminated his
previous job, moved to the location of his new employer's business, and worked as a vice president
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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ger Co.1 63 involved an alleged contract for sale between Marion
Square, the owner of a building, and Kroger, which leased the prem-

ises for a grocery store. Marion Square alleged that Kroger orally
agreed to sell the grocery store equipment for $44,000 to Marion

Square as part of a plan for early termination of the lease. Kroger
thereafter wrote a confirmatory letter stating "This letter will confirm our understanding that you have agreed to purchase our existing

equipment at $44,000. Such an agreement will be between Kroger
and yourself and I expect this to be part of our verbal agreement

with you."' 64 The letter also mentioned a cancellation of the lease,
and a second letter from Kroger, sent the same day, further discussed
the lease cancellation. During the negotiation of this sale, Kroger
was aware that Marion Square was negotiating with another grocery

store chain, Giant Eagle, for a new lease of the premises and a
In suing for breach of contract, the employee introduced a sheet of paper containing notations, or
scribblings, as evidence of the contract. The court first found that the part of the contract providing
for the option to purchase stocks was covered by the aforesaid Code statute of frauds applicable to
the sale of securities. W. VA. CODE § 46-8-319 (1966 Supp. & 1991). It then correctly found that the
memorandum was patently insufficient to satisfy the statute, and held the stock option was therefore
unenforceable. The court further found that the contract was primarily an employment contract and
not a sale of stock contract, that the intention of the parties was to treat the stock option as severable,
and that the elimination of the stock option was not fatal to the main purpose of the employment
contract. The court remanded the case for consideration of the employer's additional defense that
the remainder of the employment contract was barred by the statute of frauds applying to contracts
which cannot be performed within one year. W. VA. CODE § 55-1-1(f) (1981 & Supp. 1990).
A strong dissent argued that the stock option was inextricably part of the employment agreement
and was therefore not separable. The dissent would have affirmed a summary judgement for the
employer on the entire agreement on the grounds that, since the stock option was not enforceable
because of the Code statute of frauds, the entire contract was not enforceable. A sounder approach
would have been to find that the stock option was part of the employment contract, and if the whole
contract, including the stock option, was enforceable, either (1) because of part performance or (2)
because the entire transaction was primarily an employment contract not covered by the statute of
frauds, then find the whole contract enforceable, including the stock option. It clearly does not seem
fair to exclude evidence of an integral part of the contract just because that part, standing alone,
was covered by the statute of frauds, while the primary contract was not covered by the statute of
frauds.
Quinn demonstrates the willingness of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to divide
a contract performance into Code concerns covered by a Code statute of frauds (albeit the Article
8 statute of frauds, not the Article 2 statute of frauds) and non-Code concerns not covered by a
Code statute of frauds, and enforce that part of the contract not covered by the Code. Quinn also
examined the sufficiency of a writing not signed by the defendant and not indicating the contract
was formed but simply containing rough notes of issues clearly related to the alleged contract, and
held that if it was not a sufficient writing under Article 8's statute of frauds.
163. 873 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1989).
164. Id.byatThe
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resale of the subject grocery store equipment to Giant Eagle as part
of the new lease. "Indeed, the two letters ...

were written so that

the availability of the premises could be demonstrated to Giant Eagle." 165 Shortly after receipt of the letters, Marion Square contracted
to lease the premises and sell the subject equipment to Giant Eagle.
Kroger then informed Marion Square that it did not wish to cancel
the lease.
Marion Square sued Kroger to enforce the lease cancellation and
the sale of the equipment. The trial court held for Kroger on the
statute of frauds. The Supreme Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that Kroger's letter confirming the cancellation of the lease satisfied the applicable statute of frauds for
cancellation of leases. 166 As for the agreement to sell the equipment,
the court implied without comment that the sale of the equipment
was separately covered by the Article 2 statute of frauds. Kroger
argued that the letter's reference to "our existing equipment" was
not sufficient to satisfy the Code's requirement that the writing state
"the quantity of goods."' 167 The court of appeals disagreed, finding
the written description stating "our existing equipment" clearly referred to all the equipment located in the grocery store, and that
either party could have visited the store to more specifically complete
the identification of the equipment and make a detailed inventory.
Referring by analogy to an earlier West Virginia statute of frauds
case involving the sale of land, the court quoted "[in] description,
that is certain which can be made certain."' 68 The court remanded

165. Id.
166. Citing W. VA. CODE § 36-1-3 (1985) and Kennedy v. Burns, 84 W. Va. 71, 101 S.E. 156
(1919). See Marion Square, 873 F.2d at 74.
167. Section 2-201 Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent
or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed

upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraphbeyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing.
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-201(1) (1966) (emphasis supplied).
168. Marion Square, 873 F.2d at 74, (quoting Jones v. Hudson, 160 W. Va. 518, 236 S.E.2d
51 S.E. 135 (1905)).
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with instructions to assess damages and enter a judgement for Marion Square.
The court's holding the writing was sufficient to satisfy section
2-201's description requirement was sound, and consistent with the
case law of other jurisdictions. But the court should have also addressed section 2-201's requirement that the writing be "sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties. ' 169 The idea is that there be some writing showing that the
parties have already made a contract. A writing confirming that
negotiations on a contract have, or still are, taking place should not
be enough to establish a contract. 170 The confirmatory letter did state
"This letter will confirm our understanding that you have agreed
to purchase our existing equipment," but went on to state "Such
an agreement will be between Kroger and yourself and I will expect
this to be part of our verbal agreement with you." The first sentence
clearly confirms that an agreement has already been made, but the
latter sentence indicates the agreement was still to be made in the
future. In this, the letter is ambiguous, and the court should probably have remanded this question for jury determination. 71
72
In Mountaineer Contractors,Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc.,
the seller, as part of an oral contract to sell used mining machinery,
169. See W. VA. CODE § 46-2-201(1) (1966), supra note 167 (emphasis supplied).
170. Marion Square, 873 F.2d at 73.
171. The second letter, sent the same day, did refer to the lease cancellation, and the court
could easily have determined the lease cancellation and the sale of equipment constituted one transaction. See Ashland Oil Co. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 233 S.E.2d 433 (1976). The court indicated
as much when it stated: "As part of the lease cancellation agreement, it was contemplated that Kroger
would sell ... the equipment . . . ." Marion Square, 873 F.2d at 73. Yet the court proceeded as if
there were two separate contracts, each needing its own writing, or that there must be a writing
evidencing each part of the transaction, or that the writing(s) must contain each of the elements
required by both the lease statute of frauds and the sale of goods statute of frauds. In any case, the
second writing also did not clearly confirm an already-concluded agreement. It stated "this letter shall
serve as our company's intent to execute a cancellation agreement relative to the captioned store
subject to receiving the same from you." Id. (emphasis supplied). "Intent to execute" is not the same
as "already agreed."
It must be pointed out that the facts could have easily supported a finding that both statutes
of frauds were satisfied by promissory estoppel, see Everett v. Brown, 321 S.E.2d 685 (V. Va. 1984),
but again, this should be a jury determination.
172. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980). For a further discussion of this case, see infra
text accompanying notes 288, 338, 535, 619. See also, Comment, UCC Warranties: Mountaineer
Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 83 W. VA. L. REv. 581 (1981).
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agreed to pay for all repairs the buyer deemed necessary at the end
of the first day buyer used the machinery. The court considered the
oral promise of repair to be an express warranty. A subsequent
written security agreement contained a clause excluding all express
warranties. Upon the delivery of the mining machinery the buyer
discovered serious defects (the machinery could not even be driven
off the flat-bed-delivery truck) and refused to accept the machinery.
The seller responded by again promising to pay for all the repairs
needed. Relying on this promise, the buyer accepted the machinery.
After paying to have the machines repaired, and not receiving reimbursement from the seller, the buyer was again told on several
occasions by the seller that it would pay for the repairs. The court
described these repeated promises to repair as "subsequent oral
modifications of the contract as contained in the written agreement
.

..

[which] ... promises of the seller constitute express warran' 73

ties.'
The court went on to say that even if the original oral
promise to repair is excluded as a matter of law (by the exclusion
clause in the written security agreement), the subsequent promises
were modifications of the contract creating new express warranties.
In upholding the subsequent oral promises as "modifications" of
the contract, the court did not cite 2-209 of the Code which governs
modifications, nor did it cite the 2-201 Code statute of frauds which
is made applicable to modifications by subsection (3) of 2-209.174
In light of the court's failure to cite the applicable Code sections,
it would be difficult to say that Mountaineeris solid precedent for
the proposition that oral modifications of sale of goods contracts
for over $500 are enforceable. A later court should, and is likely
to, hold that the Mountaineer court erred in overlooking the requirement that modifications satisfy the statute of frauds.
Even if the repair promises had been invalid as modifications
because of the statute of frauds, the result in Mountaineer could
have been justified on two separate legal grounds. First, the oral
173. Mountaineer, 165 W. Va. at 301, 268 S.E.2d at 892.

174. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-209(3) (1966), providing "[the requirements of the statute of frauds
section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its prohttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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promise to repair made in response to the buyer's rejection could
be characterized not as a modification of the original contract, but
as a part of seller's cure of the breach. Because such accommodations are commonly made without the formality accompanying
the usual initial contract for sale, the statute of frauds under section
2-201 should not apply to these remedial agreements. Although the
Code does not specifically address this process of readjusting the
performance obligations of the parties following breach, it is certainly implied in sections 2-209(4) (change of contract through
waiver), 2-208 (course of performance as altering the contract), 2508 (cure by seller), 2-601 (accepting only some of the goods upon
seller's breach), 2-608(1)(a) (revocation of acceptance), 2-614 (substituted performance), 2-615(b) (duties when strict contract duties
are excused), 2-616 (procedure when seller's strict performance is
excused, especially Comment 1 on waiver through acquiescence), 2715 (consequential damages must be mitigated), 1-102 (liberal construction of the Code), 1-103 (supplemental legal principals applicable), and, in general, trade practices of responding to
nonconforming tenders, as covered by 1-205(3).
Second, buyer's decision to rely on the seller's promise to repair
and forego its right to reject, should constitute promissory estoppel.
The court stated, "Where a seller promises to pay for repairs to
goods delivered to the buyer in a defective condition and the buyer
accepts the defective goods in reliance upon the promise to repair,
such promises of the seller constitute express warranties."'1 75 The
court could just have easily dropped the last clause of the sentence
and substituted "the seller is bound to the promises under the doctrine of promissory estoppel."
Four years after Mountaineer, the West Virginia Supreme Court
discussed promissory estoppel in a non-Code case, alluding to the
Code statutes of frauds in the process. In Everett v. Brown, 176 the
court enforced an oral agreement to extend a pre-existing but expired
written real estate listing contract on the grounds of promissory
estoppel as provided in section 139 of the Restatement (Second) of
175. Mountaineer, 165 W. Va. at 301, 268 S.E.2d at 892.
176. 321byS.E.2d
685 (-V. Va.
1984).
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Contracts. 177 In discussing the West Virginia statute of frauds applicable to a real estate listing contract, 178 the court stated that the
statute was just one of a number of statutes of frauds in West
Virginia, and went on to refer to the four statutes of frauds contained in the Uniform Commercial Code, including section 46-2-201
on sale of goods.17 9 Importantly, the court stated that "[a]ll of these
statutes display common characteristics and they all create similar
problems (and) we hold that the decisional law that governs statutes
of frauds in other areas applies as well to that code section." 1 0 The
import of Everett to the Code is the court's clear implication that
the West Virginia case law concerning non-Code statutes of frauds
also apply to the Code statutes of frauds.
C. Parol Evidence Rule
Article 2's parol evidence rule provides that a term set forth in
a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such term may not be contradicted by evidence
of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement, 8'
but may be supplemented by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the judge finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of all of the terms of the agreement. 8 2 The rule always allows evidence of usage of trade, course
of dealing, and course of performance to explain or supplement the
writing. 8 1 The rule also applies in cases where there is no single
177. Section 139. Enforcement by Virtue of Action and Reliance:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as
justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRAcTs § 139 (1981).

178. W. VA. CODE § 47-12-17(c) (1986).
179. The other Code statutes of frauds include § 46-1-206 applying to contracts for the sale of
certain types of personal property not including goods, § 46-8-319 applying to the sale of securities,
and § 46-9-203 applying to security interests in personal property.
180. Everett, 321 S.E.2d at 689 (referring to W. VA. CODE § 47-12-17(c) (1986)).
181. W. VA. CODE § § 46-2-202 (1966).

182. Id. § 46-2-202(b).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
183. Id. § 46-2-202(a).
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writing intended by both parties as an expression of their agreement,
but, rather, where there are two confirmatory writings, one sent by
each of the two parties to the contract. In such case, "[t]erms with
respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree
... may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement . . . 114

Two West Virginia cases have discussed the Code parol evidence
185 the court found that
rule. As discussed earlier, in Mountaineer
the oral promise, made by the seller sometime after the original
contract was made, constituted an oral modification of the contract
creating an express warranty. The seller argued that the oral promise
was excluded by the 2-202 parole evidence rule. The court disagreed,
stating, "[t]he code section clearly restricts evidence of oral terms
only in the case of agreements made contemporaneously with the
transaction embodied in the written instrument. ' 186 The subsequent
oral promises were held not to be excluded by the parol evidence
rule. This holding is consistent with the case law as the clear language of section 2-202 so provides when it states that written instruments "may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement (emphasis supplied).

18 7

The parol evidence rule came up in the Ashland Oil case, discussed earlier,18 where the court found the termination clause in the
sale of oil products to be invalid because it was unconscionable.
After making this finding, the court then had to determine how the
trial court should fashion new termination rights of the parties under
the contract. The court found that the trial court should hear evidence of the commercial setting and purpose of the transaction. It
also held that the trial court should allow the buyer to testify that

184. Id. § 46-2-202.
185. Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d

886 (1980). See supra discussion at note 172.
186. Id. at 300, 268 S.E.2d at 892.
187. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-202 (1966).
188. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976). For a more detailed
discussion of the facts of Ashland Oil, see infra text after note 222. See also discussion at notes 70

and 101. by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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the parties had orally agreed that there would be no termination
without good cause as part of explaining or supplementing the written instruments, and cited the Code parol evidence rule. The court
went on to say, "[tihis procedure also does no violence to the traditional parol evidence rule relied upon by Ashland [the plaintiff],
because with its ten-day cancellation clause declared unconscionable,
an element of vagueness and ambiguity exists which would make
parol evidence admissible."'8 9
Although the court's conclusion was correct, the court did not
need to rely on any perceived vagueness or ambiguity in order to
admit the extrinsic evidence. The clear language of the Code keeps
out evidence of prior agreements or contemporaneous oral agreements only where the evidence would contradict a term in the writing, or, where the evidence adds terms to the writing and the court
specifically finds the writing was intended by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. In Ashland Oil, the evidence offered (to show that the parties at the time
of the original contract had agreed that there would be termination
only for good cause) clearly did not contradict any term in the written contract because the written contract termination clause was declared void by the court as unconscionable. The clause being voided,
there was nothing left in the contract that would be contradicted
by evidence of an alleged oral agreement providing for termination
for good cause only. Likewise, after the court had thrown out the
contract clause providing for termination, the court should not have
been able to say that the parties had intended the remaining writing
to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. They clearly had no such intention, because they had intended
part of the writing to cover the termination issues of the arrangement, and the contract was left without such terms. What was left
was not intended by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement.
D. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation Under
Section 2-207
No West Virginia case has applied 2-207, but the facts of at least
one case probably called for its application. In Hill v. Joseph T.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2

189. Ashland Oil, 159 W. Va. at 475, 223 S.E.2d at 440.
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Ryerson & Son, Inc.,' 9 the product liability case discussed above, 9'
the defendant supplier of the defective steel pipe initiated its purchase of the pipe from the manufacturer by sending a form purchase
order to the manufacturer. The purchase order contained boiler plate
clauses providing for indemnification and for seller's liability for
defects. 92 The manufacturer responded with its own order acknowledgement form containing an exculpatory clause limiting liability of
the manufacturer to replacement of the pipe or return of the purchase price.
Although the court in Hill stated that the Uniform Commercial
Code was not enacted to encompass product liability cases, 93 it later
stated that the Code can be used "for guidance in product liability
cases, particularly where express warranties or other features peculiar
to the particular commercial transactions are involved. ' 194 The court
first discussed whether the exculpatory clause was unconscionable
without concluding whether it was or was not. Then, the court noted
that there was no advance bargaining between the manufacturer and
the supplier, that there was no signed formal contract, and that
terms in the initial purchase order were inconsistent with the exculpatory language in the manufacturer's acknowledgement form.
The court concluded "[t]his fact [referring to the inconsistency between the two forms], when coupled with the absence of any evidence to demonstrate that there has been any bona-fide bargaining
over the terms and conditions of the sale, compels us to conclude
that the exculpatory language asserted by U.S. Steel was not an

190. 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 1980).
191. See supra discussion at note 123.
192. It provided in part:
3. You agree to indemnify us and our successors and assigns, against all liabilities and
expenses resulting from any claim or infringement of any patent in connection with the
production of goods or the performance of services hereby or the use or sale of such goods.
2. Our inspector's receipt does not release you from liability for any errors or defects
discovered after delivery. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any document
or writing prepared or furnished by you, acceptance by us of delivery shall not constitute
assent or agreement by us to any term or condition stated by you to be applicable to the
transaction covered hereby.
Hill at 39 n.9, 268 S.E.2d at 307 n.9.
193. Id. at 35, 268 S.E.2d at 305.
Disseminated
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essential part of the sale."' 195 The court then disregarded the exculpatory clause.
In fact, section 2-207 was designed to apply to this kind of situation and the court should have used section 2-207, at least, "for
guidance." The section provides that a response to an offer which
contains terms not included in the offer, may work as an acceptance
of the offer if, judged as a whole, the response is a "definite expression of acceptance" of the offer. If so, the additional terms in
the response will be viewed as proposals for addition to the contract. 96 If both parties are merchants, the proposed additional terms
in the response automatically become a part of the contract unless
(a) the offer limited acceptance to the terms of the offer, (b) the
additional terms materially alter the bargain contained in the offer,
or (c) objection to this additional term has been given or is given
within a reasonable time.' 97 Similarly, if a contract already exists
before the writing(s) (as when the contract is made over the telephone), a subsequent timely memorandum sent by one of the parties
confirming the earlier agreement but containing terms additional to
those contained in the agreement, is viewed as also proposing the
additional terms to the contract, and, if both parties are merchants,
can automatically bring those additional terms into that contract on
the conditions stated above.
Section 2-207 also provides that where a written offer is followed
by a written response which contains additional terms, different
terms, or both, and the response, viewed as a whole, is determined
not to be a definite expression of acceptance, but the parties have
proceeded to conduct themselves as if a contract existed (as by their
sending and accepting the goods), then a contract does exist. In this
case, the terms of the contract are those upon which the written
offer and the written response agree, supplemented with other terms
supplied by the UCC.198
The opinion in Hill suggests that the contract might have been
formed by the retail buyer's purchase order and the manufacturer's
195. Id. at 39, 268 S.E.2d at 307.
196. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-207(1) (1966).
197. Id. § 46-2-207(2).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
198. Id. § 46-2-207(3).
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responsive acknowledgement form which, in spite of its containing
different and/or additional terms, could be viewed as a definite expression of acceptance forming a contract under section 2-207(1).
Alternatively, if the writings themselves did not form a contract,
but the parties conducted themselves as if a contract existed by sending and accepting the goods, then a contract was formed under 2207(3). In either case, the exculpatory clause contained only in the
manufacturer's acknowledgement form would not become a part of
the contract under 2-207. If the contract was formed by the exchange
of the two forms, 2-207(2) provides that only the "additional terms"
in the response become part of the contract, not the "different,"
exculpatory terms.19 9 If the contract was formed by conduct and not
the exchange of the writings, then 2-207(3) states that only those
terms agreed upon by both writings become a part of the contract
as a result of the writings, and the exculpatory clause, present in
only one writing, would not come into the contract.
Section 2-207 of the Code is a complicated statute which has
caused great confusion among lawyers. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals had an opportunity in Hill to clarify the application of this important section, and unfortunately passed it by.
E. Modification
The distinctive features of the Code provision on modification
of contracts are its provisions discarding the requirement of consideration, and its requirement that a modification must still meet
the requirements of the statute of frauds. ° West Virginia courts

199. Whereas subsection (1) of 2-207 refers to "additional" and "different" terms, subsection
(2) only provides that the "additional" terms are added to the contract. The clear implication is that
the "different terms" are not eligible for addition to the contract. Furthermore, subsection (2) allows
additional terms into the contract unless "notification of objection to the term has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time." W. VA. CODE § 46-2-207(2)(c) (1966). If a conflicting (different)
term is in the first writing, it should be held to "object" to the "different" term in the second
writing.
In Hill, the exculpatory clause in the manufacturer's acknowledgement form was "different"
from, and conflicted with, clauses in the earlier order form supplied by the purchaser providing for
indemnification and liability for defects (see supra note 192). As such, the clause should therefore
not come into the contract.
200. W.
§ 46-2-209(1),
(3) (1966).
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have addressed modification of a contract for the sale of goods in
two inconsistent opinions, neither of which cited 2-209 as the relevant law.
As described above, the court in Mountaineer Contractors, Inc.
v. Mountain State Mack, Inc. 201 found that oral promises to repair
the goods, made by the seller to the buyer at a time significantly
after the contract was made, became part of the contract as an oral
modification. In a later federal court case, Roxalana Hills, Inc. v.
Masonite Corp.,202 the court considered seller's statement made after
the goods were delivered to, and used by, the buyer. The court held
the statement could not have created an express warranty because
it was made after the contract was formed, and therefore could not
have been "a basis of the bargain" as required by the Code section
20 3
on express warranties.
The Roxalana opinion was clearly questionable in that it was a
federal court decision made after Mountaineerand should have followed the rule laid out in Mountaineer as the issue was clearly one
of state law. If the court thought it could distinguish the two cases,
which is clearly possible, the court should have done so. Because
these issues more directly involve the elements of express warranty
than the elements of modification, they will be discussed more fully
later in this article.2 m It should be pointed out that Comment 7 to
the Code provision on express warranties states, "[i]f language is
used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking
delivery, asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty
becomes a modification, and needs not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order (§ 2-209).' 1 205 Yet,
the majority of cases find that promises made after the original
contract was made, and which are not part of a clearly negotiated
new undertaking of the parties, do not create an express warranty
because they do not "become part of the basis of the bargain" as
required by 2-313 on express warranties. 26
201. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980). See supra text accompanying note 172.
202. 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).

203. Id. at 1200; see W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313 (1966).
204. See infra discussion in Part V(B).
205. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313 comment 7 (1966).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
206. See infra discussion in Part V(B).
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IV.

UNCONSCIONABILITY

The Code continues the slowly developing common-law practice
of refusing to enforce contracts, or parts of contracts, when results
of such enforcement would be so unfair as to be unconscionable.
"In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and
acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public
policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract." 2 7 West Virginia
courts have refused to enforce contracts because the result would
be unconscionable at least as early as 1899.208 In 1907, the court
stated in syllabus point 1 in Starcher Brothers v. Duty,2'0
Specific performance of an option contract will not be decreed ... if the actual
result would be an inequality resulting from ignorance or inexperience, or where
the terms of the contract are so indefinite, or assented to with such a lack of
caution, that the enforcement of the contract would produce an inequality not
foreseen ....

In addition to the Code provision on unconscionable contracts,
the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act allows a court
to refuse to enforce a contract "unconscionable at the time it was
made or to have been induced by unconscionable conduct.1 21 0 The
' 21 1
Act does not define the term "unconscionable.
The Code provides that if the court as a matter of law finds the
contract, or any clause therein, to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or take some other action as appropriate. 212 It goes
on to provide:

207. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-302 comment 1 (1966).
208. Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S.E. 923 (1899).
209. 61 W. Va. 373, 373, 56 S.E. 524, 524 (1907). See also Lowther Oil Co. V. Guffey, 52 W.
Va. 88, 91, 43 S.E. 101, 102 (1902) ("Or the contract is so unfair and uneven as to render its
enforcement equivalent to the perpetration of a fraud.").
210. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121 (1986).
211. The drafters of the similar section in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code stated, "the
relevant standard of conduct is... that which measures acceptable conduct on the part of a businessman to a consumer. See UzurFoRm CoNsUmER CREDrr CODE § 5.108 comment 1, 7 U.L.A. 811
(1985).
(1966)@(Unconscionable
§ 46-2-302(1)
212. W.
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When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid a court
in making the determination.213

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has applied Article
2-302 as the controlling rule of law in one important case, Ashland
Oil Co., Inc. v. Donahue,214 and possibly in a second case, John
W. Lodge Distributing Co., Inc. v. Texaco Inc. 215 West Virginia
courts have used the Code unconscionability section for guidance
and support by analogy in at least seven other cases not covered by
the UCC, including a termination clause in a contract to mine coal, 21 6
an arbitration clause in a contract to excavate rock, 217 an oil and
gas lease, 218 a coal lease, 2 9 a waiver of exemptions in a loan agreement,mO an escrow contract for the transfer of stock upon death, 22
and a prenuptial agreement. 222
Ashland, discussed earlier, is an important early West Virginia
Uniform Commercial Code case. The seller and the buyer entered
into an arrangement whereby the buyer would operate an Ashland
Oil service station. They executed two separate contracts on the same
day, one a lease of the realty, and the other a dealer sales agreement
calling for the buyer to purchase petroleum products from the seller.
The lease agreement provided that either party could terminate the
lease upon ten-days' notice. The dealer sales contract allowed termination by either party with notice given sixty days before the end
of each year of the renewable lease, but also allowed the seller to
terminate the contract upon ten-days' notice if the buyer defaulted
or indulged in any practices which, in the opinion of the seller,

213. Id. § 46-2-302(2).
214. 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976).
215. 161 W. Va. 603, 245 S.E.2d 157 (1978). The court cites the IJCC in John W. Lodge, but
does not clearly state that the case, involving the termination of a distribution contract, is covered
by Article 2.
216. Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Corp., 346 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1986).
217. Board of Education v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 160 W. Va. 473, 236 S.E.2d 439 (1977).
218. McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (V. Va. 1984).
219. McMellon v. Adkins, 300 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1983).
220. Orlando v. Finance One of W. Va., 369 S.E.2d 882 (WV. Va. 1988).
221. Newell v. High Lawn Memorial Park Co., 164 W. Va. 511, 264 S.E.2d 454 (1980).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
222. Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985).
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would tend to impair the quality or reputation of the products or
the good-will which had been built up by the seller. Seven years
into the contractual relationship, and after yearly renewals, the seller
terminated both the dealer contract and the lease agreement, effective ten days from receipt of the notice. Upon the buyer's refusal
to vacate the premises, the seller instituted the lawsuit to recover
possession of the property. Among other defenses, the buyer asserted
that (1) the two contracts were part of an integrated business relationship, and should be treated as one, and (2) that the ten-daycancellation policy in the sales agreement was void as against public
policy because it was grossly unfair, and because the plaintiff was
in a grossly superior bargaining position at the time of making the
contract. The trial court struck these defenses, and granted the seller
a motion for summary judgement. The case came before the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on a certified question of law.
The court began by finding the contracts were so inter-related
that the parties would not have made one without the other, and
held that they should be construed together as one contract. The
court then held that the contract provisions allowing the seller the
right of ten-day termination in both documents, but giving the buyer
inconsistent ten-day and sixty-day rights of termination, were "indeed incapable of being reconciled in such a manner as to be clearly
expressive of an intention which can be said to have been within
the reasonable contemplation of the contracting parties."2 The court
said that these termination provisions could produce a "completely
absurd" result. As an example, the court pointed out that, theoretically, Ashland could terminate the lease agreement by giving a
ten-day written notice of cancellation, but still require the buyer to
continue to purchase and accept deliveries of gasoline for the ensuing
year in minimum and maximum quantities specified in the contract,
until Donahue's once-a-year right to terminate upon sixty days' notice came about. 224 The court then discussed an important New Jer-

223. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 463, 159 W. Va. 469-70, 223 S.E.2d 433, 438 (1976).

224. Id. It is equally absurd to think that a seller could think that they could get away with
such an action, or that a court would allow it. To use an absurd example to automatically strike
down a contract clause that is applied by a party in an arguably reasonable manner is questionable
indeed.
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sey decision where similar contracts were found to be grossly unfair
because of the significantly disproportionate bargaining power between the seller and the buyer.2
The court then made a second important determination when it
held that the lease of real estate and the dealer contract, being considered one transaction, was clearly a transaction in goods (petroleum products) which is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
citing sections 46-2-102 and 46-2-105 of the West Virginia Code. 226
Then, without further discussion, the court held that the ten-day
cancellation clause contained in the dealer agreement and available
only to the seller was unconscionable on its face. The court did not
clearly articulate the basis for its conclusion. The court did say that
it was not necessary to base its holding on the disparity of bargaining
power between the parties.2 7 The court went on to state that the
rules governing the transaction are generally stated in the Uniform
Commercial Code, and that the other defenses of the buyer must
be considered, along with the good faith requirement of section 1203 of the Code. It then said that it could not apply these rules
further without more evidence, and that the lower court should examine buyer's remaining defenses. "Having determined that the tenday cancellation is unconscionable, we cannot and do not leave the
parties with an irrevocable relationship. '"m
On remand, the court directed the trial court to determine whether
to refuse to enforce the agreement, to enforce it without the unconscionable clause, or to limit the unconscionable clause so as to
avoid an unconscionable result, citing section 46-2-302(1). It then
stated that for the purpose of making this determination the lower
court should receive evidence regarding the commercial setting, purpose, and effect of the transaction according to section 2-302(2),
and should allow the buyer a full opportunity to present its defenses.

225. Shell Oil Co. v. MarineUo, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920,
94 S. Ct. 1421, 39 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1974).

226. Ashland, 159 W. Va. at 473-74, 223 S.E.2d at 440. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 70.
227. Id.

228. Id.
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The serious error in the court's determination was its failure to
follow the clear rule laid out in section 2-302. After stating that the
Uniform Commercial Code governed the transaction, the court went
on to ignore subsection (2) of 2-302, which requires the court to
consider the facts carefully before it decides whether or not a contract is unconscionable. Subsection (2) provides:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the

court in making the determination.?

This subsection clearly requires the court to allow both the seller
and the buyer to present facts before a court determines the contract
unconscionable. The court failed to do this. Surprisingly, after finding the contract unconscionable without a consideration of the facts,
the court then cited this very section in determining that the case
must be remanded to the lower court for a hearing of the evidence
and determination of facts before the lower court could decide what
to do with this unconscionable clause.
As Comment 1 to section 2-302 states: "The basic test is whether,
in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract."2 30 The court
had before it no record of such background, needs, and circumstances. It might well have been that the seller gave something in
return for the buyer granting a one-sided ten-day right of termination. At the end of its opinion the court recognized that the parties
had dealt with each other under a lease for almost five years, that
presumably they were knowledgeable with reference to the commercial requirements of the service station business as well as with
credit arrangements, business arrangements, dealings, usages common to the trade, and customs of performance known and relied
upon by each other, and were cognizant of the additional terms
surrounding the integrated business relationship known and accepted

229. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-302(2) (1966).
230. Id. at comment 1.
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by both Ashland and Donahue.23' The problem with the Ashland
decision is not the court's reversal of the lower court's summary
rejection of the unconscionability defenses. That was clearly a correct decision. The real error, made so clear by the precise language
of section 2-302(2) requiring that the parties be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to the commercial setting of the
contract, together with the court's detailed statement that the parties
likely were acting with special knowledge of practices unknown to
the court, is that the court went ahead and found the contract clause
unconscionable on its face without hearing evidence of the surrounding facts. This part of the decision constitutes a gross error
in the methodology of the court's analysis of the statute and in the
substance of the result.
Does Ashland mean that parties to contracts may not have grossly
disparate correlative duties? The answer should be no for at least
two reasons. First, the parties could make it clear in the contract
that in exchange for giving one party an advantage not given to the
other party, a quid pro quo was given in return. Second, Ashland
was followed by several cases which alter the hard result and erroneous methodology of Ashland. In John Lodge Distributing Co.,
Inc. v. Texaco Inc.,22 the seller terminated a distributorship agreement under a contract allowing termination by either party on five
days' notice. The buyer alleged, among other things, that the contract was against public policy and unconscionable. The trial court
granted a motion to dismiss which was reversed by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. The supreme court held that the trial
court must decide, in light of all the material facts, whether the
termination provision was so one-sided as to be unconscionable, and
in doing so "should consider evidence regarding such things as the
commercial setting under which the contract was made, any possible
disparity in bargaining power, the purpose and effect of the contract
and any common business practices or expectation upon which either
party may have relied." 3 As authority, the court cited the Re-

231. Id. at 475-76, 223 S.E.2d at 441.
232. 161 W. Va. 603, 245 S.E.2d 157 (1978).
233. Id. 608, 245 S.E.2d at 160.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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statement (Second) of Contracts, 234 section 2-302 of the Code, and

Ashland with the words, "[t]his court stated then and still agrees
that, 'Evidence is required [and] the lower court is required to give
both parties a reasonable opportunity to present it. "'235 Of course,
the John Lodge termination clause gave each party a right to cancel
with five-days notice while the Ashland clause provided sixty-day
and ten-day respective termination periods. But these factual dif-

ferences do not seem important in light of the court's emphasis on
the requirement that the court hear evidence of the surrounding
circumstances from both parties before making a determination of
unconscionability. 26
Further support for the conclusion in Lodge came five years later
in McMellon v. Adkins,237 a lawsuit to invalidate coal leases as unconscionable on their face because they were so one-sided. Applying
the common law to mineral leases not covered by the Code, the

court cited section 2-302 to show that there must be a detailed analysis of facts in each case before a determination of unconscionability
can be made. The court stated that unconscionability cannot be declared in the abstract, and held that the lower court had to consider
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the leases, general,

accepted terms of such leases at the time they were executed, underlying economic justification for such terms, and the actual un238
derstanding and experience of the lessors.

A number of other cases have applied section 2-302 of the Code
as a guide to determining unconscionability in non-Code cases. In
234. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 234 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
235. John Lodge, 161 W. Va. at 608, 245 S.E.2d at 160 (quoting Ashland, 159 W. Va. at 474,
223 S.E.2d at 440).
236. Another possible difference between the cases might be that Ashland, in the eyes of the
court, was clearly a Code case covered by 2-302, while the court never tells us what law it is applying
to John Lodge. In John Lodge, the court quoted the Restatement of Contracts, evidence of common
law contract rules, Ashland, (which applied section 2-302), and section 2-302 itself when it stated
"See also W. VA. CODE § 46-2-302 dealing with the sales of goods." Id. at 609, 245 S.E.2d at 161.
There is no apparent reason to believe that this difference could explain the differing results.
237. 300 S.E.2d 116 (%V.Va. 1983).
238. The lawsuit employed a creative way of attacking the validity of a number of coal leases
by asking the supreme court to exercise original jurisdiction in mandamus to order the clerk of the
county commission to strike from the land books all mineral leases containing the similarly oppressive
terms. Of course, they failed.
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Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc.,239 the court stated,
"Although ...

2-302 applies only to 'transactions in goods' ...

the concept of unconscionability under the Uniform Commercial
Code 'has been applied to many other kinds of contracts either by
analogy or as an expression of the general doctrine."' ' ° In Orlando,
the court refused to find loan agreements unconscionable in an attempt by a class of borrowers to collect statutory damages from a
bank. The loan agreements contained a clause providing that the
borrower waived all debtors' exemptions "[t]o the extent permitted
'
by law.' "A
In denying statutory penalties under the West Virginia
Consumer Credit Protection Act, the court noted that the exemptions were in fact not waived because the clause provided "to the
extent permitted by law," there was no evidence that the borrowers
did not understand the clause, and the lending bank never made an
attempt to enforce the clause.
In Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co.,22 a contractor operated a coal mine under a coal mining contract with the owner.
The contract allowed each party to terminate upon seven-days notice, and after seven years, the owner terminated the contract upon
such notice. The court held the contract termination clause was not
unconscionable, using section 2-302 as a guide to the common-law
concept of unconscionability, even though the court found the case
involved services and not goods. The court stated that the commonlaw concept of unconscionability is largely the same as the UCC
provision, citing the comments to section 2-302 and Code cases,
including Ashland and McMellon. In finding the clause conscionable, the court pointed out that it was mutually beneficial, and
that the contractor was not only familiar with the clause, but had
itself used a similar clause to terminate an earlier contract with another party.
In McGinnis v. Cayton,24 3 the owners of realty sued to void a
ninety-year-old oil and gas lease which paid a nominal sum for gas
239. 369 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1988).
240. Id. at 885 (quoting E. FARNswoRTH, supra note 135, § 4.28).
241. Id.at 883.
242. 346 S.E.2d 749 (NV.Va. 1986).
243. 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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and a market price for oil. At the time of the execution, leases were
made primarily for the oil, and the gas had so little value it was
often discharged into the air. The plaintiffs asserted the leases should
be voided because they were no longer commercially reasonable, and
the trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that it
was possible that a trier of fact could find that the parties might
have been mutually mistaken in their belief that the value of gas
would remain de minimus in the future. A concurring opinion took
a more detailed look at several possible causes of action, including
unconscionability. In citing section 2-302 as a guide to unconscionability in this non-Code case, the concurring opinion presented a
detailed review of unconscionability, including section 2-302, and
referred to the equitable principles contained in section 1-103 of the
Code. 244
In Board of Education v. W. Harley Miller Inc.,245 the court
examined the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an excavation
contract. The court announced a new rule of law providing that
where the parties "bargained for" an arbitration provision, arbitration is mandatory and a resulting decision enforceable. The court
went on to state that an arbitration provision would not have been
"bargained for" in a contract of adhesion, or whenever a party can
bring the arbitration provision within the unconscionability provision
of section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.24 In Gant v.
Gant,247 the court validated a prenuptial agreement. But the court
proceeded to state that such an agreement would not be enforced
if it were so outrageous as to come within the unconscionability
principles as developed in commercial contract law (citing section

244. W. VA. CODE § 46-1-103 (1966) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to

capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
245. 160 W. Va. 473, 236 S.E.2d 439 (1977). The real question raised by this opinion is whether
it is better known for its three-page footnote, or for its discussion of rabbits, foxes, and "wolfery,"
and the concurring opinion possibly prompted by an objection to this discussion of "animal law."
246. Id. at 486-87, 236 S.E.2d at 447.
247. 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985).
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2-302). In Newell v. High Lawn Memorial Park Co.,248 the court
examined an escrow contract providing for the transfer of stock
upon the death of the original owner. The court discussed a challenge to the contract based on failure of consideration, and cited
as its counterpart the Code provision on unconscionability as a guide
to handling problems concerning the objective nature of the bargaining process.
The number of cases discussing section 2-302 indicate that attorneys have been made aware of the Code's unconscionability provision and its use in non-Code cases. The cases themselves suggest
that in determining whether a contract is unconscionable, the court
will consider circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, 249 generally accepted terms contained in contracts of the kind
made by knowledgeable parties,2-0 underlying economic justification
of the terms in the contract, 2 1 the level and equality of the understanding and the business experience of each party,2 2 inequality of
bargaining power, 253 whether the parties read and understood the
contract,2 4 and whether the contract was mutually beneficial.255
V.

WARRmNs

A.

Generally
The UCC lays out a number of rules relating to warranties in
sections 2-312 through 2-318 and in section 2-719. In every transaction in goods the seller warrants that the title shall be good and
its transfer rightful and that the goods shall be free from any security
248. 264 S.E.2d 454 (1980). This opinion should become best known for its inclusion of a twentyone line poem by Robert Frost, which recommends that women who have the misfortune of living
into old age should store up their resources so they may purchase friends in their later years.
249. McMellon, 300 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1983); John Lodge, 161 W. Va. 603, 245 S.E.2d 157
(1978).
250. McMellon, 300 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1983); Troy, 346 S.E.2d 749 749 (NV.Va. 1986); John
Lodge, 161 W. Va. 603, 245 S.E.2d 157 (1978).
251. McMellon, 300 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1983).
252. Id.
253. Ashland, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976); Bd. of Education, 160 W. Va. 473, 236
S.E.2d 439 (1977); Troy, 346 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1986).
254. Orlando, 369 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1988); Troy, 346 S.E.2d 749 (NV.Va. 1986).
255. Troy, 346 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1986).
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interest or other incumbrance of which the buyer has no knowledge.2 6 The warranty of title may be excluded or modified only by
language which gives the buyer reason to know that the seller does
not claim the title in the goods or that she is only selling such right
7
as she may have.2
Express warranties may be created by any affirmation of fact,
promise, 2 8 description of the goods,2 9 or sample or model, 260 which
is made part of the basis of the bargain. The result is an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation, promise,
description, sample, or model. Although there is no need to use
formal language, or to even have a specific intention to make a
warranty, a mere statement of the value of the goods or the seller's
opinion or recommendation of the goods does not create a war1
ranty. 26
An implied warranty of merchantability is given in every sales
transaction where the seller is a merchant with respect to the kind
of goods sold, unless it is effectively excluded. 262 "Merchantable"
means the goods must, among other things, pass without objection
in the trade under the contract description, be fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used, be adequately packaged
26
and labeled, and conform to the promises of fact on the container. 1
An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is created
where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know of
any particular purpose for which the goods are required, has reason
to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgement
to select suitable goods, the seller does select the goods, and the
buyer relies on the seller's selection. 264 Unless excluded, this creates
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

W.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

VA. CODE § 46-2-312(1) (1966).
§ 46-2-312(2).
§ 46-2-313(I)(a).
§ 46-2-313(1)(b).
§ 46-2-313(I)(c).
§ 46-2-313(2).
§ 46-2-314(1). "Merchant" is defined in 46-2-104(1).
§ 46-2-314(2).
§ 46-2-315.
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Express warranties, once given, may not be excluded, although
words of exclusion will be read wherever reasonable as consistent
with words creating such warranty. 265 Warranties of merchantability
may be excluded by contract exclusion language which mentions the
word "merchantability" or the words "as is," "with all faults" or
other similar language, but if in writing, the exclusion must be conspicuous. 2 6 6 The implied warranty of fitness may be excluded by
similar language, but it must be in writing and be conspicuous. 267
Implied warranties may be excluded with regard to defects which
ought to have been revealed by the buyer's examination of the goods,
if the buyer did examine them or has refused to examine them. 261
Implied warranties may also be excluded by course of dealing, course
of performance, or usage of trade. 269
Warranties shall be construed as consistent with each other and
as cumulative. To the extent this is unreasonable, the intention of
the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant. 270 In ascertaining that intention, specifications displace an inconsistent sample, model, or general description, 271 a sample displaces an
inconsistent general description,272 express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties of merchantability, and an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose displaces express warranties. 273 The parties in their contract may limit the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price, or to repair, or
to replacement, and may also exclude consequential damages if such
an exclusion is not unconscionable. 274 The seller's warranty extends
to any natural person in the buyer's family or household, or who
is a guest of the buyer, if it is reasonable to expect such person
265. Id. § 46-2-316(1). Of course, a written exclusion of warranties will operate to keep out any
evidence of oral statements creating express warranties under the parol evidence rule, id. § 46-2-202,
and result in the exclusion of express warranties.
266. Id. § 46-2-316(2).
267. Id.
268. Id. § 46-2-316(3)(b).
269. Id. § 46-2-316(3)(c).
270. Id. § 46-2-317.
271. Id. § 46-2-317(a).
272. Id. § 46-2-317(b).
273. Id. § 46-2-317(c).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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may be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty. 275
B. Express Warranties
At least six cases have involved express warranties under West
Virginia law. Two cases directly addressed the creation of express
warranties under section 2-313 of the Code. 276 Of the other four,
two addressed the creation of express warranties as a main issue in
the case, but did not cite section 2-313 as the applicable law.277 The
remaining two involved statements by the seller which probably created express warranties under the Code, but the opinions focused
fraud and did not discuss
on whether the statements constituted
278
warranties.
express
of
issues
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has made it clear
that the existence of a UCC warranty is a question of fact for the
jury. 279 This is consistent with the comments to the Code. 280
In one of its first cases addressing the UCC, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals examined the creation of express warranties by sample. In Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke
Co., 281 the buyer visited the seller's place of business and was shown
a pile of coal to be sold. Although the evidence was contradictory,
the buyer stated he was also shown a bag of coal and a written coal
analysis prepared by a laboratory which showed the coal to have
between nine and ten percent ash content. The seller agreed that he
had shown the buyer the written analysis, but testified that he told
the buyer that the analysis was of coal taken from another part of
275. Id. § 46-2-318.

276. Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va. 1986); Sylvia
Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
277. Whittington v. Eli Lilly and Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980).
278. Muzelac v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988); Painter v. Raines Lincoln
Mercury, Inc., 323 S.E.2d 596 (V. Va. 1984).
279. Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. at 825, 156 S.E.2d at 6; Mountaineer, 165 W. Va. at 301, 268

S.E.2d at 892.
280. See W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313 comment 3 (1966); § 46-2-315 comment 1; and § 46-2-316
comment 6.
281. 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
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the mine and that the coal pile to be sold was of substandard quality,
containing considerable slate and rock. According to the seller, the
written analysis was exhibited just to indicate the quality of the
original seam, not of the pile of discarded coal that was for sale.
In a suit for breach of warranty, the buyer asserted (among other
claims) that the sale was a sale by sample, and that the delivered
coal did not conform to the written coal analysis exhibited with the
282
bag of coal.
To create an express warranty through the exhibition of a sample,
the Code provides: "Any sample or model which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole
of the goods shall conform to the sample or model. ' 283 The court
in Sylvia Coal held that the exhibition of a sample during negotiations for a sale does not necessarily make it a sale by sample so as
to thereby create an express warranty under section 2-313. "The
contract must evidence intention to contract by sample." 284 The court
observed that there was credible evidence that the seller told the
buyer that the written analysis referred to the original seam and not
to the coal offered for sale, and therefore the jury was justified in
finding the parties did not intend the written analysis (and the accompanying bag of coal) to be a sample of the coal contracted for.
In Code language, the sample was not "made part of the basis of
the bargain" as required by section 2-313(1)(c).
The opinion in Sylvia Coal raises a number of questions. If the
buyer examined the part of the actual pile of coal to be sold, that
pile itself could be considered a sample, and, if it was patently inconsistent with the bag and the accompanying written analysis, the
"sale by sample" express warranty should be the one created by
the coal-pile sample, the actual goods to be sold, not the bag and
282. The opinion does not state whether the coal in the bag was examined by the buyer, or

whether the buyer would be able to determine the characteristics of the coal, including ash content,
from an examination of the coal. Later in the opinion, the court stated that the buyer's examination
of the coal pile might well have revealed the quality of the coal to be sold, thereby excluding any
express warranties that were inconsistent with the quality of the coal in the pile examined. Id. at 827,
156 S.E.2d at 7.
283. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313(1)(c) (1966).
284. Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. at 827, 156 S.E.2d at 7 (citing American Canning Co. v. Flat
Top Grocery Co., 68 W. Va. 698, 70 S.E. 756 (1911) (a pre-Code case)).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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written analysis sample. Another way of looking at it is that if two
inconsistent samples are shown, the ambiguity created prevents either
sample from being a "part of basis of the bargain" between the
parties. The Sylvia Coal court's only mention of this fact is its statement that the buyer's examination of the coal pile itself and subsequent order of delivery could have constituted an exclusion under
section 2- 316(3)(a) and (b) of any (implied) warranty that the coal
would be of higher quality than that coal in the pile.2 5
It is also interesting that the court (and likely the buyer's lawyers)
did not discuss the written coal analysis as creating an express warranty. Section 2-313(b) provides: "Any description of the goods which
is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.' '286 Clearly the written analysis creates an express warranty under this section if it was
"part of the basis of the bargain." Additionally, if both the written
analysis and the coal pile sample were part of the basis of the bargain, they both would have satisfied the section 2-313 requirements
for creating express warranties. Yet the two were inconsistent with
each other. If so, the written-analysis-description warranty would
supersede the coal-pile-sample warranty under section 2- 317, which
provides: "Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent
sample. ' 287 This argument would have favored the buyer.
The court examined the "part of the basis of the bargain" requirement of section 2-313 again in Mountaineer Contractors, Inc.
v. Mountain State Mack, Inc.288 In Mountaineer, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that a promise made after the contract was made could create an express warranty as a modification,
even though it might not constitute part of the "basis of the bargain" of the original contract. This issue, and the contrary state-

285. Id. at 827-28, 156 S.E.2d at 7-8. After receiving several deliveries, and not being satisfied

with the coal, the buyer went to seller's coal yard and after first stopping delivery, directed seller's
agents to load specific coal from specific parts of the pile.
286. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313(b) (1966).

287. Id. § 46-2-317(a) entitled "Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express or Implied.").
288. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980). For a detailed discussion of the facts of Mountaineer, see supra text accompanying note 172.
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ments in a later federal court opinion,289 were examined in the earlier

discussion of modification of contracts under the Code. 290
Not all promises or apparent statements of facts become express
warranties under section 2-313, even if they were arguably part of
the basis of the bargain. Section 2-313(2) provides: "An affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty. ' 291 Such statements are sometimes referred to as
"sales talk" or "puffing". Determining what statements constitute
an express warranty and what statements merely constitute "puffing" is a question of fact for the jury. A West Virginia court examined this question in Roxalana Hills Ltd. v. Masonite Corp.292
In Roxalana, the buyer purchased house siding which, after time,
began to absorb moisture leading to decay and rot. The buyer sued
the manufacturer for, among other claims, breach of express warranties. The buyer asserted three communications allegedly creating
express warranties. First there was an advertisement published prior
to the purchase stating that the siding was "specially formulated for
weatherability and durability." Next, after the contract was made
and the siding delivered and affixed to the building, and after problems developed with the siding, the seller wrote buyer a letter which
recommended specific installation techniques for the siding and ended
by saying if the recommended changes in construction technique
were made, the board would perform "quite satisfactorily.' '293 Finally, after the siding was sold and affixed to the side of the buildings, and after the lawsuit was brought, two of the seller's agents
stated at depositions that if the siding were properly installed, it
would last the lifetime of the building.
The trial court easily found that the two statements made after
the contract, delivery, and use, were incapable of being "part of
289. 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).

290. See supra text accompanying notes 201-06.
291. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313(2) (1966).
292. Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. 1194. For a further discussion of Roxalana and issues closely related
to the issue discussed here, see infra text preceding and following note 618.
293. Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. at 1200.
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the basis of the bargain" as required by section 2-313 because they
were made after the sale. 294 The court found the advertisement statement "specifically formulated to provide durability and weatherability" to be merely a statement which "relates to the value of the
product and falls short of the factual affirmation or description
which forms the basis of the bargain." 295 This statement indicates
the court found the advertisement to be a mere seller's commendation, "puffing," incapable of being taken seriously enough by the
buyer to constitute a part of the basis of the bargain. The court
again referred to the statements made after the contract, delivery,
and use, and characterized these also as "puffing" which "are easily
dismissed as merely opinions. "296
The thrust of the seller's defense in Roxalana was that the lawsuit
was brought after the Code's four-year statute of limitations. The
buyer attempted to show that express warranties were made as to
the future performance of the siding, so as to toll the running of
the statute. 29 The court was likely too liberal in deciding as a matter
of law298 that all of the statements made by the seller's agents were
mere opinions or statements of value of the product which could
be easily dismissed. Certainly reasonable jurors could find that a
written brochure describing house siding and stating "the siding is
specifically formulated for weatherability and durability" is "an affirmation of fact" or "a description ' 299 that is not met if the siding
actually absorbs moisture and rots. Although it might be expected
that many courts would let such a question go to the jury, it would
have made no difference in this case because even if the statement
did create an express warranty, the buyer's action would still have
been barred by the statute of limitations and thus the dismissal was
justified on grounds independent of the creation of an express warranty.

294. Id.
295. Id.at 1201.
296. Id.at 1201.
297. For a discussion of the statute of limitations issues in Roxalana, see infra text following
note 591.
298. Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. at 1201.
299. W.
§ 46-2-313
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Another West Virginia express warranty case which deserves some
comment involved the sale of birth control pills. In Whittington v.
3°°
Eli Lilly & Co.,
the buyer's physician prescribed an oral contraceptive named "C-Quens" and gave the buyer a pamphlet prepared
by the manufacturer. The pamphlet stated, "When taken as directed,
the tablets offer virtually 100% protection. "30 ' The buyer took the
prescription to a pharmacy, purchased the drugs, and used them for
a year during which time she became pregnant. The birth was normal
and the baby healthy. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for, among
other things, a breach of an express warranty promising the absolute
efficiency of the contraceptive tablets.
The opinion makes no mention of the UCC or of section 2-313
on express warranties-the law governing the issues presented. The
court focused on the language of the alleged express warranty and
cited Webster's Dictionary as defining "virtually" as "almost entirely." The court concluded that clearly the advertisement's statement that the tablets "offer virtually 100% protection" did not mean
absolute protection, but "almost entire" protection. Therefore, there
was no warranty, or at least no warranty of absolute protection.
The trouble with the court's analysis, in addition to its failure to
cite the clearly applicable statutes, was that it focused too narrowly
on the language used in the pamphlet. The court focused on the
word "virtually" and used the Webster's Dictionary definition of
that word. In fact, the advertisement did not state "virtually." Instead, it said "virtually 100%." To the average consumer, "virtually
100%" might not have the same connotation or meaning as "virtually." In fact, the buyer testified that she did not know what
"virtually" meant.3° If in fact it is common for buyers to think
that "virtually 100% protection" means absolute protection, then
the court at least ought to allow a jury decide whether that is the
message conveyed by the seller's statement and determine whether
the other requirements of section 2-313 were met.
None of this is to suggest that the plaintiff should have won the
lawsuit. First, the opinion did not reveal any evidence that the state300. 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
301. Id. at 100.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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ment made was "part of the basis of the bargain" in the sense that
the buyer was aware of the statement at the time of making the
contract. Second, there was no evidence that the buyer played any
role in choosing C-Quens over any other birth control method, as
the tablets were prescribed by the physician and probably chosen
by the physician. Finally, if the C-Quen tablets in fact offered about
the same level of protection against pregnancy as any other birth
control method, as a policy matter, it would seem unfair to hold
the seller liable for the expected chance pregnancy unless it is clear
that the seller intended to undertake that risk at the time of the
contract.
A decision for the buyer might possibly be justified on punitive
grounds. The facts of Whittington create a suspicion that the seller
chose the figure "100%" to encourage whoever read the message
to buy the product, yet added the word "virtually" for legal protection, confident that "virtually" would not seriously interfere with
the connotation of absolute protection that accompanies the term
"100%."
C.

Implied Warranties of Merchantability

The Code provides that in every sale by a merchant the seller
warrants that the goods shall be merchantable, unless the warranties
are effectively excluded in the contract. In West Virginia, a seller
may not exclude or limit warranties in a sale of goods for under
twenty-five thousand dollars where the purchase is made for a personal, nonbusiness use.30 3 The Code provides the general parameters
3 4
of the substance of the implied warranty of merchantability.

303. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1986).
304. (2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:

(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity
within each unit and among all units involved; and

(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (19660.
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Approximately seven West Virginia cases have involved implied
warranties of merchantability. Of these, two assumed the warranties
existed but did not discuss issues surrounding the warranties. 05
The determination of the existence of implied warranties is a
question of fact for the jury.3° The existence of an implied warranty
of merchantability may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and
the buyer need not prove the breach by direct evidence, or exclude
every possible cause for the defective condition of, or damage to,
the goods. 3°7
In two cases involving goods related to health care, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has refused to find implied warranties of merchantability. In Foster v. Memorial Hospital Association of Charleston,30 8 the court held that the sale or transfer of
blood in a blood transfusion was not a sale of goods for which
implied warranties apply. In Rohrbough v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc.,30 9 the buyer's child developed a seizure disorder after a diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine was administered. The plaintiff
sued the manufacturer in strict liability and on implied and express
warranty theories, and the court granted the manufacturer a summary judgement on all three claims. The court found that Wyeth
adequately warned the administering health-care professional (the
physician), and the manufacturer's duty to warn was satisfied under
the "learned intermediary" doctrine. 310 In doing so, the court equated
the warning to the learned intermediary with knowledge of the warning on the part of the consumer. It then went on to state:
furthermore, assuming that Wyeth adequately warned of the risks associated with
its DTP vaccine, see infra, it did not breach the warranty of merchantability. So
long as the consumer accepts a product with knowledge of its dangers, the man-

305. Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988); Jones, Inc. v. W. A.
Weidebush Plumbing and Heating Co., 157 W. Va. 257, 201 S.E.2d 248 (1973).
306. Mountaineer, 165 W. Va. 292, 301, 268 S.E.2d 886, 892 (1980); Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va.
818, 825, 156 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1967).
307. Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189 syllabus point 4 (W. Va. 1991); Jones, Inc.,
157 W. Va. 257 syllabus point 5, 201 S.E.2d 248 syllabus point 5 (1973).
308. 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975). For a detailed discussion of Foster, see supra text
accompanying note 75.
309. 719 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. W. Va. 1989).
310. Id. at 478.
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ufacturer cannot be held liable for impliedly warranting against injuries that it
warned the consumer might occur."31'

The court also specifically found that the vaccine would pass
without objection in the trade, as required by section 2-314(2)(a) 312 .
The section 2-314 implied warranty of merchantability is only
created where the seller is a merchant. "Merchant" is defined as
"a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
314
13
the practices or goods involved in the transaction. In Sylvia Coal,
the seller had no experience in the sale of coal, as his experience
was only in the production of coal.3 15 In its discussion of the implied
warranty of fitness under section 2-315, the court held the seller was
not a merchant. Yet, when addressing the implied warranty of merchantability, the court proceeded to allow the jury to consider the
existence and substance of any implied warranty of merchantability
that might have been created. This inconsistency was clearly erroneous. First, the seller was selling coal commercially and was certainly a merchant of coal. No case has been found which excuses
a business operator from the duties of a merchant under sections
2-104316 and 2-314 because of lack of experience. Furthermore, if
the court found that the seller was not a merchant, the court should
have found that no warranty of merchantability existed as a matter
of law.
D. Implied Warranties of Fitness For a ParticularPurpose
Two West Virginia cases have addressed the creation of implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose.3 17 The West Virginia

311. Id. at 478.
312. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314(2)(a) (1966). The court also pointed out that West Virginia requires
that goods fully comply with state and federal regulations. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(c) (1986 &
Supp. 1991). The court found that the vaccine was the only type of vaccine licensed for use in the
country, and as such complied with all federal regulations.
313. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-104(1) (1966).
314. Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
315. Id. at 828, 156 S.E.2d at 7.
316. "'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind ...." W. VA. CODE § 462-104(1) (1966).
317. Jones,
Inc.Research
v. W.A. Weidebusch
Heating Co., 157 W. Va. 257, 201 S.E.2d 67
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Supreme Court of Appeals has followed the Code Comment and
held that the existence of an implied warranty of fitness for a par318
ticular purpose is a question of fact for the jury.
In Jones Inc. v. W. A. Weidebusch Plumbing and Heating Co.,
the buyer-store owner relied upon the seller to select and furnish
fire sprinkler heads suitable for operation in the buyer's store.3 19
After the seller's agent installed the sprinkler heads, they suddenly
discharged water, damaging the contents of the buyer's store. The
court held that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under section 2-315 and the implied warranty of merchanta2
bility under section 2-314 are not mutually exclusive and can coexist. 0
In analyzing the seller's liability under section 2-315, the court laid
out the elements of 2-315 as:
(1) The seller at the time of contracting had reason to know the particular purpose
for which the goods were required; (2) the reliance by the plaintiff as buyer upon
the skill or judgement of the seller to select
suitable goods; and (3) that the goods
32
were unfit for the particular purpose. '

To these elements should be added a fourth, a requirement that
at the time of contracting the seller also had reason to know the
buyer was relying on the seller's skill to select suitable goods, 3n and
a fifth, that the seller in fact selected the goods. The Jones court
had no problem in finding that all of the elements of section 2-315
were present.
248 (1973). A third case, Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Assoc. of Charleston, 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d
916 (1975), held that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply to the
transfer of blood in a blood transfusion, but there was no real discussion of § 2-315 in the court's
opinion; Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
318. Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. at 825, 156 S.E.2d at 6. See W. VA. CoDn § 46-2-315 comment

1 (1966).
319. 157 W. Va. 257, 201 S.E.2d 248 (1973). For a detailed discussion of the facts of Jones,
see supra text accompanying note 67.
320. Jones, 157 W. Va. at 266, 201 S.E.2d at 254. See also W. VA. CODE § 46-2-315 comment
2 (1966). In Jones, the particular purpose for the sprinklerhead was to operate properly inside the
buyer's store, which was likely the general purpose of sprinkler heads covered by the implied warranty
of merchantability under § 2-314(2)(c), which provides: "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used."
321. Jones, 157 W. Va. at 258, syllabus point 2, 267, 201 S.E.2d at 249, syllabus point 2, 254.
322. The first clause in § 2-315 reads "Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason
to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgdment to select or furnish suitable goods . . . ." W. VA. CODE § 46-2-315
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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In Jones, the court compared the buyer's lack of knowledge and
the seller's expertise with the facts of Sylvia Coal.323 Sylvia Coal
involved an experienced coke maker who visited the seller's coal
mine site and inspected the coal that seller was offering for sale.
"[T]here was evidence that the seller knew nothing about the technical aspects of the use of coal for coke and that the buyer not only
did not rely on this skill, but possessed more technical knowledge
than the seller. ' 324 The Jones court went on to point out that in
Sylvia Coal there was conflicting evidence on the respective knowledge and reliance of the parties, while in Jones, the seller confirmed
that the buyer had no skill or knowledge and in fact relied on the
skill and knowledge of the seller. Consequently, the court stated
that the issue of reliance was not even a jury question in Jones.325
In Sylvia Coal, the court incorrectly characterized the seller as
not a "merchant" for selling coal. 326 The court went on to state
that "[i]n such case, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is not ordinarily applicable.''327 As support, the court cites

Comment 4 to section 2-315 which provides: "Although normally
the warranty will arise only where the seller is a merchant with the
appropriate 'skill or judgement,' it can arise as to non-merchants
where this is justified by the particular circumstances. ' 328 The court
appears to overstate the thrust of the Comment. In the usual case
where an implied warranty of fitness is found, the seller certainly
is a merchant. But that is not to say that the implied warranty of
fitness is not "ordinarily applicable" where the seller is not a merchant. It would depend upon the conduct of the seller, the reliance
of the buyer, the reasonableness of such reliance, and the seller's
perceptions of the existence of such reliance.

323. Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967). For a detailed discussion of the facts

of Sylvia Coal, see supra text accompanying note 281.
324. Jones, 157 W. Va. at 270, 201 S.E.2d at 255.

325. Id.
326. Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. at 828, 156 S.E.2d at 7. As stated above, the Code definition of

"merchant" includes "a person who deals in goods of the kind." W. VA. CODE § 46-2-104(1) (1966).
The seller in Sylvia Coal was a coal mine operator selling coal.
327. Id.
328. to W. VA. CODE § 46-2-315 comment 4 (1966).
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Finally, the court in Jones held that circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to show a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for
3 29
a particular purpose.
E.

Exclusion of Warranties

An exclusion of warranties is generally valid if it meets the requirements of section 2-316 of the Code and complies with the re33 0
quirements of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act if the Act applies,
unless it is unconscionable, 331 or is covered by the West Virginia
Consumer Credit Protection Act. 33 2 Warranties can be excluded by
express statements, both oral and written, and by an examination
of the goods or of a sample or a model of the goods, which ought
to reveal the defect in the goods, 333 and by course of performance
and usage of trade.3 34 In construing written exclusions, all ambiguities will be resolved against the drafter.3 35 The court in Sylvia
CoaP36 stated that the buyer's examination of the actual coal piles
from which the coal was sold, and later actions in directing the
seller's loader to places in the coal pile from which to take coal,
could "tend to prove the exclusion of implied warranties as allowed
337
by [the] Code."
In MountaineerContractors,Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc. ,338
the seller offered the buyer the opportunity to inspect written service
records concerning the equipment to be sold, but the buyer declined.

329. Jones, 157 W. Va. at 270, 201 S.E.2d at 256.

330. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1988), especially §§ 2303 and 2304. The Act applies to consumer
sales and sets minimum standards for written warranties.
331. See W. VA. CODE § 46-2-302 (1966).
332. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (invalidating disclaimers in sales trans-

actions where the purchase is under $25,000 and is made by a consumer for a personal, non-business
purpose).
333.
334.
335.
Nisbet v.
336.
of Sylvia

W. VA. CODE § § 46-2-316(3)(b) (1966).
Id. § 46-2-316(3)(c).
Davis v. Dils Motor Company, 566 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 & n.16. (S.D. W. Va. 1983) (citing
Watson, 162 W. Va. 522, 251 S.E.2d 774 (1979)).
Sylvia Coal, 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967). For a detailed discussion of the facts
Coal, see supra text accompanying note 281.

337. Id. at 827-28, 156 S.E.2d at 8.
338. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980). For a detailed discussion of the facts of Mounhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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The court found that the issue of whether an inspection ought to
have disclosed the defects was a question of fact for the jury,33 9 and
that the evidence at trial tending to show that the defects in the
goods arose after the opportunity to inspect the records was suf34
ficient to support a jury determination that there was no exclusion. 1
Significantly, the court went on to say that there is no indication
in section 2-316(3)(b) that the refusal to examine records with respect
to goods operates as a waiver of implied warranties, pointing out
that "the Code clearly refers only to the buyer's refusal to inspect
the goods themselves." 341
The seller in Mountaineerattempted to exclude all warranties by
a clause in a written security agreement, executed apparently sometime after the original contract was made and maybe after the equipment was delivered, providing: "No oral agreement, guarantee,
promise, representation or warranty shall be binding." 342 The court
did not determine whether this written provision constituted a valid
exclusion under section 2-316, but limited its analysis to whether the
written statement operated to exclude evidence of oral express warranties under the parol evidence rule. The real issue in Mountaineer
was whether an express oral promise to repair the goods, which the
court characterized as an express warranty, became part of the contract. Part of the issue was whether evidence of the oral promises
were kept out by the later written statement that "no oral agreement,
guarantee, promise, representation or warranty shall be binding."
In the end, the court determined that it did not exclude at least
those oral promises made after the written exclusion. 343
In Davis v. Dils Motor Co. ,4 the buyer purchased a used trucktractor. The sale was evidenced by an invoice (also referred to as
a "purchase order") and a contemporaneously executed security

339. Id. at 297, 268 S.E.2d at 890.
340. Id.
341. Id. Although the court did not discuss it, there was also an issue as to whether a mere
"failure" to examine proferred records constitutes a "refusal" to examine such records under the
language of section 2-316(3)(b), "or has refused to examine."
342. Id. at 300, 268 S.E.2d at 891.

343. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 185.
344. 566 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D. W. Va. 1983).
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agreement. The invoice contained a number of clauses providing
among other things:
[Buyer has read all of the provisions of this invoice] including the reference to
Warranty and NO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS.
[This order] is the complete and exclusive agreement on the subject matters covered by this Order.. .SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR INFORMATION ON WARRANTIES. (continuing on the reverse side of the invoice) If said vehicle is delivered
during said warranty to DILS FORD for.. .repairs.. .all parts... will be furnished by... dealer at a cost of 50% discount on parts and labor.. .The terms
and conditions of this DILS USED CAR WARRANTY are only these stated
herein... WARRANTY DISCLAIMER ... consequential damages are not covered... any and all implied warranties of fitness and merchantability shall be
limited to the duration of this warranty .... 4

The contemporaneously executed security agreement also "conspicuously provided" a disclaimer which read:
DISCLAIMER: There are no warranties other than those made by the manufacturer of the Collateral. SELLER MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE QUALITY, WORKMANSHIP, DESIGN, MERCHANTABILITy, SUITABILITY, OR FITNESS OF
THE COLLATERAL FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR ANY OTHER
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, unless such warranties are in writing and signed by Seller. Seller shall
not under any circumstances by liable for loss of anticipatory profits or consequential charges.-

The court was called upon to decide whether the attempted disclaimers contained in the invoice and security agreement effectively
excluded the implied warranty of merchantability under 2-314 and

the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under 2315.347

The court began its analysis by determining whether the language
in the invoice, standing alone, was effective to "waive or modify"

345. Id. at 1363. The language quoted is taken from five separate paragraphs of the invoice
appearing in the court's opinion. The opinion itself did not reproduce all of the invoice, some language
from the invoice referred to in the text of the opinion does not appear in the opinion.
346. Id. at 1364.
347. The court also ruled that the Secretary of Transportation's order excluding heavy trucks
from the odometer requirement of the Motor Vehicle Information and Costs Savings Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1980) was void. Therefore, the seller was subject to the requirements of the Act. Id. at 136263.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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the implied warranty of merchantability (2-314) or the implied warranty of fitness (2-315).348 Noting that there was no evidence indicating it was an "as is" sale, the court stated that it must apply
section 2-316(2) to determine whether the attempted warranty exclusion was effective. Section 2-316(2) provides:
[To exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of

it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied

warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."

-4

9

First addressing the attempted exclusion of the implied warranty
of fitness, the court focused on the invoice language "NO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS" and "The
terms and conditions of this DILS FORD USED CAR WARRANTY
are only those stated herein." Without further analysis, the court
concluded that this language waived the implied warranty of fitness. 50 The court did not clearly articulate precisely why it held the
language sufficient to disclaim the implied warranty of fitness. The
court could have reasoned that the invoice provision: "The terms
and conditions of this DILS FORD USED CAR WARRANTY are
only those stated herein," was similar to the sample exclusion specifically offered in section 2-316(3)(b): "Language to exclude all warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof.' 35 1 Or, the court might have found that the same invoice
language invoked the parol evidence rule, effectively keeping out
inconsistent evidence of facts necessary to the creation of an implied
warranty of fitness.3 5 2 The court reached its conclusion that implied
warranties of fitness were excluded by the invoice without considering the disclaimer in the security agreement.
348. Davis, 566 F. Supp. at 1363.
349. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316(2) (1966).
350. Davis, 566 F. Supp. at 1364 & n.16A.
351. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316(2) (1966) (emphasis added).
352. An unusual use of the parol evidence rule. The rule keeps out evidence of contradicting
"agreements." Id. § 46-2-202. Yet the Code definition of "agreement" includes "The bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances." See id. § 461-201(3).
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The court next examined the attempted disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability. It immediately concluded that the invoice only limited the implied warranty of merchantability to a period of thirty days on any subsequently replaced parts, and could
not operate as a general waiver of the implied warranty of merchantability. 3 3 It is not clear how the court reached this conclusion,
as there is no mention of a thirty-day period in the portions of the
invoice reproduced in the opinion. What is apparent, is that the
court found the language in the invoice, that both attempted to
exclude the warranty of merchantability and limited the exclusion
to thirty days, to be "ambiguous ' 354 and ineffective as a general
exclusion.
The court then considered the separate disclaimer contained in
the security agreement. It viewed the security agreement disclaimer,
standing alone, to contain "clear waiver language. ' 355 It also rejected buyer's argument that the security agreement disclaimer should
be ignored simply because it was in a security agreement and not
in the contract of sale, holding that the terms of the invoice and
security agreement "having been executed together.. .should be
construed together" unless the terms conflicted. 356 The court then
found that the clear language of exclusion in the security agreement
did conflict with the ambiguous language in the invoice, and held
that the security agreement language must be disregarded.5 7
It is difficult to see how the court found the waiver of the fitness
warranty, while finding the waiver of the merchantability warranty
353. Davis, 566 F. Supp. at 1364 (text following n.16A).
354. Id. at 1365.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1364. The Buyer argued that the security agreement disclaimer should be ignored,
because of W. VA. CoDE § 46-9-206(2) comment 3 (1966 & Supp. 1991), providing:
It also prevents a buyer from inadvertently abandoning his warranties by a "no warranties"
term in the security agreement when warranties have already been created under the sales
arrangement. Where the sales arrangement and the purchase money security transaction are

evidenced by only one writing, that writing may disclaim, limit or modify warranties to the
extent permitted by Article 2.
The court stated that the security agreement should be ignored when it is created after the contract
for sale, but not where, as here, it was created contemporaneously with the contract for sale.
357. Davis, 566 F. Supp. at 1365. The court concluded by denying the seller's motion for summary judgement on the buyer's claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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to be ambiguous. The invoice statement "NO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS" suggesting total exclusion,
contrasted with "SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR.. .WARRANTIES"
and "all implied warranties of... fitness and merchantability shall
be limited to the duration of this warranty" which suggest no total
exclusion. These inconsistent invoice statements referring to merchantability also refer to fitness. The Davis court failed to adequately articulate the reasons for its holding.
In the recent Rohrbough decision, a West Virginia federal court
adopted the "learned intermediary" doctrine, holding that where a
drug manufacturer warns the health care professional about the dangers and risks associated with a DPT drug, the warnings are effective
against the consumer of the drug.358 Although the case was tried
primarily as a product liability tort case, the buyer also asserted the
drug was unmerchantable under the Code. The court, equating adequate warnings with a valid exclusion under section 2-316, held
that as long as the consumer accepts a product with knowledge of
its dangers, the manufacturer cannot be held liable for impliedly
warranting against injuries it warned might occur.
F. Privity
"Privity" refers to a contractual connection between two parties.
Traditionally, contract law has made privity a condition of contract
liability.359 "Vertical non-privity" refers to a lack of contractual connection between two persons in the distributive chain of goods. For
example, a buyer who buys a good from a retailer is not in "vertical
privity" with the manufacturer of the good. "Horizontal non-privity" refers to a lack of contractual connection between a user or
consumer of a good who did not purchase the good in the distributive chain and the last seller of the good. For example, the daughter
using a power saw purchased by her mother is not in "horizontal
privity" with the seller who sold the saw to the mother.

358. Rohrbough v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D. W. Va. 1989).
359. Always subject to some conditions, including third party beneficiary liability.
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The West Virginia version of the Code privity provision, section
2-318, does not address the issue of vertical privity. 360 It does provide
that the seller's warranties extend to any natural person who is in
the family or household of the buyer, or is a guest in the buyer's
house, if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
the warranty. 361 The growth of strict liability in the United States
during the time since the original drafting of the Code has made
this Code privity section much less important than originally antic2
ipated. 36
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the question of privity in Dawson v.Canteen Corp.3 63 where the buyer purchased a cheeseburger from a vending machine. The buyer suffered
acute food poisoning from mice feces in the cheeseburger, and sued
the non-privity bread bakery for breach of implied warranty. In
determining whether the lack of privity barred the buyer's claim
against the manufacturer, the court noted that the UCC eliminated
the privity requirement as to horizontal non-privity users.3 64 The court
also noted that the West Virginia legislature had recently eliminated
the requirement of privity in the vertical chain of distribution for
consumer transactions in the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act. 365 Importantly, the Dawson court held, "[i]t is sufficient merely to hold that lack of privity alone is no longer a defense
'366
to a warranty action in West Virginia.
The Dawson court seemed to go well beyond the facts in the
case, which concerned a non-vertical privity consumer who suffered
360. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-318 (1966). This was Alternative A of the 1962 Official Text of the
Code. Alternatives B and C, adopted by a number of states, address both vertical and horizontal
privity.
361. Id.
362. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); State

ex rel. Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1093, 89 S. Ct. 862 (1969).
363. 158 W. Va. 516, 212 S.E.2d 82 (1975).
364. Id. at 519, 212 S.E.2d at 83.

365. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-108 (1986 & Supp. 1991), providing "no action by a consumer for
breach of warranty or for negligence with respect to goods subject to a consumer transaction shall
fail because of a lack of privity between the consumer and the party against whom the claim is made."

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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personal injury, and hold that lack of privity is no longer a defense
in any warranty action, presumably including both consumer transactions and non-consumer transactions, actions involving economic
loss and those involving personal injury, and transactions including
lack of vertical privity and those involving lack of horizontal privity.
The issue arose again thirteen years after Dawson in Sewell v. Gregory, 67 a non-sale of goods case. In Sewell, the contractor built a
house and sold it to a first buyer. Three and a half years later, the
first buyer sold it to a second buyer, and soon thereafter the house
flooded, apparently because of defects in the construction. The second buyer sued the contractor (and the first buyer) in strict liability,
negligence, and breach of warranties of habitability and fitness for
a family residence. In holding that contractors can be liable for
breach of an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for use as
a family home to non-privity subsequent buyers, the court found
that the lack of privity between the contractor and the second buyer
was not a barrier in matters of implied warranty, citing Dawson as
precedent.3 68 Interestingly, Justice Neely, who had written the sweeping opinion in Dawson, dissented vigorously to the majority holding
on privity in Sewell. Arguing that the Dawson abolition of privity
was restricted to goods which were mass produced and mass distributed, and lamenting that the majority had misconstrued Dawson,369 Justice Neely stated that privity should be a warranty
370
requirement in actions involving non-mass marketed sales.
VI.

BUYER'S RIGHTS UPON SELLER'S NONCONFORMING DELIVERY

A.

Generally
The traditional choice of a buyer faced with a nonconforming
tender 371 was to either refuse to accept the nonconforming tender
367. 371 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988).
368. Id. at 86.
369. Id. at 87.
370. Id. at 89. Justice Neely concluded by arguing that economic loss should not be recoverable
under negligence, but should be recognizable only in an action for breach of contract (although
acknowledging that the court had affirmed recovery of economic losses under strict liability in Star
Furniture v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (NV. Va. 1982)). Id. at 89-90, 89 n.6. Justice Neely
closed by opining that the majority decision only provides an additional chapter in the "Lawyers
Relief Act."
371. "Nonconforming"
means@the
proffered
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or to accept the tender despite the inconsistency with the contract
requirements. In either case, the nonconforming tender likely constituted a breach of the contract, and if the buyer suffered a loss
as a result of the breach, the buyer had the usual range of breach
of contract remedies. If the buyer first accepted the goods without
discovering they were nonconforming and then discovered the nonconformity, buyer's choice was to either keep the goods and hold
seller liable for any resulting loss, or if certain conditions were met,
rescind the contract, return the goods, and recover any monies paid
the seller. 372
The Code has a carefully developed scheme for dealing with these
issues. The seller has an obligation to deliver goods in accordance
374
with the contract,3 73 including tendering them at a reasonable hour
and notifying buyer of the tender. 375 If they are to be shipped, seller
must also deliver the goods to an appropriate carrier, make a suitable
contract for their delivery, and tender any document necessary to
enable buyer to take possession of the goods.37 6

The buyer has an obligation to accept the goods and pay according to the contract. 377 But "if the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract," the buyer has a
choice of rejecting all of the goods, accepting all of the goods in
spite of their nonconformity, or accepting any part of the goods
or did not meet express or implied warranties, or were improperly packaged, etc., or the delivery

was late, or to the wrong place, or was otherwise inconsistent with the contract terms. The Code
states: "Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 'conforming' or conform to the
contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract." W. VA. CODE § 462-106(2) (1966).

372. In Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238 (1966), the court
reviewed the pre-Code West Virginia case law concerning rescission of an executed contract. The court
cited several pre-1921 cases which did not allow rescission for breach of warranty unless there was
fraud or the parties otherwise agreed, and a later case, Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S.E.
369 (1922), apparently allowing the buyer to either keep the goods and sue for breach, or rescind

and return the goods and recover the purchase price. Shreve, 150 W. Va. at 674- 76, 149 S.E.2d at
242-43; see Donley, Rescission For Breach of Seller's Warranty, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 134 (1936).

373. "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept
and pay in accordance with the contract." W. VA. CODE § 46-2-301 (1966).
374. Id. § 46-2-503(1)(a).
375. Id. §§ 46-2-503(1), 46-2-504(c).
376. Id. § 46-2-504.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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and rejecting the rest. 378 This "perfect tender rule" requires the seller

to perform to the letter of the contract.3 79 This requirement is subject
to a number of rules ameliorating the seller's strict obligation. There
is no such obligation if the parties are held to have agreed otherwise
by express terms in their contract 80 by usage of trade'38 1 by course
of dealing,382 or by course of performance.3 83 Buyer's good faith

obligation to observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade ''384 could prevent him from rejecting where the nonconformity is minor or the motivation for rejecting is unrelated to
the nonconformity.38 5 The equitable concept of de minimus could
3 86
prevent buyer from relying on a trivial nonconformity to reject.
Finally there are two statutory exceptions to the strict rejection standard. It does not apply to installment contracts, 387 and, if the non-

conformity consists of a failure to make a proper shipping contract
or to notify the buyer of shipment, the resulting loss must be ma38
terial in order to justify rejection.

378. Id. § 46-2-601.
379. Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978). First stated by
Judge Learned Hand in Mitsubishi Goshikaisha v. J. Aron & Co., 16 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1926), the
rule reasons that the buyer is not required to complete delivery of his performance obligation (pay
the price) until seller tenders full performance. Because of the numerous exceptions noted in the text
following this note, some commentators, including White and Summers, have concluded that 2-601
is a "substantial performance rule, not a perfect tender rule." See J. WiTnE & R. SummaRs, supra
note 7, at 357.
380. WEST VmoAN CODE § 46-2-601 (1966). This would include an agreement limiting buyer's
remedies under § 46-2-719(1).
381. Id. § 46-1-205(3); see also W. VA. CODE § 46-2-508 comment 4.

382. Id. § 46-1-205(3).
383. Id. § 46-2-208(1).
384. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Id. § 46-1-203. Under Article 2, "good faith" in the case of a merchant
includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 462-103(b).
385. Printing Center, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1984); see also
T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 57 N.Y.2d 574, 443 N.E.2d 932, 457 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1982).
386. "De minimus [non curat lex] means the law does not care for small things and has always
been taken to mean trifles, that is, matters of a few dollars or less . . . ." Coakley v. Marple, 156
S.E.2d 11, 16 (W. Va. 1967), aff'd on rehearing, 152 W. Va. 68, 159 S.E.2d 378 (1968); see also
338 Cartons, More or Less, of Butter v. United States, 165 F.2d 728, 730 (4th Cir. 1947); Annotation,
De Minims Non Curat Lex, 44 A.L.R. 168 (1926); D. DOBBS, RE DMS § 3.8 (1973). For its application to 2-601, see R. NoRDsTRoM, LAW OF SALES 308 (1970).
387. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-601 (1966).
388. Id. § 46-2-504.
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When the buyer has the right to reject, he must do so within a
reasonable time, 3 9 seasonably notify the seller of the rejection,3 90
including, in some cases, describing the particular defect, 39 1 refrain
from exercising ownership of the goods 92 or doing any act inconsistent with seller's ownership, 393 and take care not to signify "to
the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take them
in spite of their nonconformity. ' 394 When the buyer already has
possession of the goods after a rightful rejection, the buyer has the
duty to hold the goods with reasonable care at the seller's disposition, 395 exercise good faith, 396 follow the seller's instructions in dealing with the goods if seller has no agent at the market of rejection,
and to sell the goods if they threaten to decline in value speedily,
retaining a right to expenses and a commission. 3 97 Otherwise, if no
instructions are received within a reasonable time, the buyer has the
option to store the goods for seller, reship them to seller, or resell
3 98
them for seller's account.
Once the buyer effectively rejects, the seller has a right to cure
the nonconformity if the contract provides, 399 or if the time for performance has not expired and the seller seasonably notifies buyer
of his intention to cure.4°° If the time for delivery has expired, seller
has a further reasonable time to cure with a conforming delivery
if, at the time of her tender, the seller had reasonable grounds for

389. Id. § 46-2-602(l). What constitutes a "reasonable time" depends on the nature, purpose
and circumstances. Id. § 46-1- 204(2).
390. Id. § 46-2-602(1). "Notice" is defimed in § 46-1-201(27). Notice is given "reasonably" if
given within the time agreed or within a reasonable time. Id. § 46-1-204(3).
391. The buyer must particularize any defect ascertainable by reasonable inspection in cases where
the seller could have cured if stated seasonably, or where both seller and buyer are merchants and
seller has requested in writing a written statement of defects. If the buyer fails to do so, he may not
rely on the defect to reject or claim breach. Id. § 46-2-605(1).
392. Id. § 46-2-602(2)(a).
393. Id. § 46-2-606(1)(c).
394. Id. § 46-2-606(l)(a). Telling the seller that the goods are conforming eliminates the right
to reject (and constitutes acceptance) only if done after the buyer has had an opportunity to inspect
the goods. Id. §§ 46-2-606(1)(a), 46-2-513(l).
395. Id. § 46-2-602(2)(b).
396. Id. § 46-2-603(3).
397. Id. § 46-2-603(1)-(2).
398. Id. § 46-2-604.
399. Id. §§ 46-2-601, 46-2-719(1).
400. Id. § 46-2-508(1).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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believing the goods would be acceptable to buyer, with or without
a price discount for the nonconformity. 401
When the buyer has effectively rejected the goods and the seller
has not cured, buyer has the right to monetary damages 4°2 if he has
suffered a loss. 403 Where the buyer has accepted the nonconforming
tender, buyer has a similar right to monetary damages, 4°4 but only
if he notifies the seller of the breach within a reasonable time. 405
Once the buyer has accepted the goods, buyer loses his § 2-601
4°6
right to reject for "failing in any way" to conform to the contract.
Buyer must, in the usual case, settle for keeping the goods and suing
for any damages resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
seller's breach. 4° A major exception is the buyer's right to revoke
the prior acceptance where the buyer has accepted the goods without
discovery of the defects, either induced by the difficulty of discovery
or by seller's assurances, 4°8 or, has accepted the goods with knowledge of the nonconformity but on the assumption that the nonconformity would be cured. 40 9 However, this right to revoke
acceptance and return the goods to buyer is limited to cases where
the nonconformity substantially impairs its value to buyer. 410 In such
a case, the buyer must notify the seller of the revocation within a
reasonable time after discovery of the defects, and before any substantial change has occurred in the condition of the goods not caused
by the defects. 411 Finally, a buyer who revokes acceptance under

401. Id. § 46-2-508(2).

402. In a proper case, the buyer would also have a right to specific performance. Id. § 46-2716.
403. Id. §§ 46-2-711, 46-2-712, 46-2-713, 46-2-715.
404. Id. §§ 46-2-714(1), 46-2-715.
405. Id. § 46-2-607(3)(a). See also Envirix, Inc. v. Ecological Recovery Assoc., Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 1329 (M.D. Pa. 1978); A & G Constr. Co., Inc. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207
(Alaska 1976); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co., 120 N.J. Super. 350, 294 A.2d

62 (1972).
406. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-607(2) (1966); see, id. § 46-2-601 comment 2.
407. Id. §§ 46-2-607(1), 46-2-714(1), 46-2-715.
408. Id. § 46-2-608(l)(b).

409. Id. § 46-2-608(i)(a).
410. Id. § 46-2-608(1).
411. rd. § 46-1-608(2).
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section 2-608 has the same rights and duties as if he had rejected
under section 2-601. 412
Six West Virginia cases have addressed the Uniform Commercial
Code law on acceptance, rejection, cure, and revocation of acceptance. 413 Of these, two are personal injury cases citing the notice or
indemnity provisions of section 2-607. 414
B. Buyer's Rejection Under Section 2-601 Through Section 2-606
Unfortunately, no West Virginia case has examined the section
2-601 right of the buyer to reject for just any nonconformity in
seller's tender, so we cannot predict how closely the court will follow
the perfect tender rule. In Kesner v. Lancaster,45 a case involving
a buyer's attempt to return the goods shortly after purchase and
discovery of the defects, the court did not discuss the buyer's opportunity to reject under section 2-601, apparently because the buyer's inspection, taking possession, and beginning use, constituted
acceptance, thus depriving buyer of his right to reject. In the same
case, the court also noted that a buyer who justifiably revokes acceptance under section 2-608 has the same rights "as one who had
4
rejected the goods originally" under section 2-601 .16
To date, no West Virginia case has addressed either the elements
of a buyer's proper steps for rejection under section 2-602 or what
acts of a buyer constitute acceptance under section 2-606, although
there have been several references to section 2-602. In Shreve, et al
v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., the court stated that "under the Uniform Commercial Code, the rejection or rescission must be within
a reasonable time after the delivery thereof, and ... is ineffective

412. Id. § 46-1-608(3).
413. Goldring v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 59 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1989); City Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 384 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1989); Hill
v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales,
Inc., 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971); Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669,
149 S.E.2d 238 (1966). A seventh case, Patterson v. Warner, 415 U.S. 303, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d
306 (1974), cites § 46-2-602, but neither discusses the Code nor addresses Code issues.
414. Goldring v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 59 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Hill v. Joseph
T. Ryerson & Son, 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980);
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller. Code, 46-2-602."417
The court was clearly quoting the language of section 2-602(1) and,
on its own, adding the word "rescission" to the Code language.
The facts of the case show that the court was dealing with an attempted revocation of acceptance (under section 2-608) and not a
section 2-602 rejection. This is made clear by the court's use of the
word "rescission," which is the traditional contract term denoting
cancelling the contract and returning the goods after accepting them.
The court erred in treating the situation in Casto as a section 2-602
rejection instead of a section 2-608 revocation, an error common
during the early transition from the common law to the Uniform
Commercial Code. The court made a similar error in Reece v. Yeager
Ford Sales, Inc. ,418 where it again referred to section 2-602(1) when
discussing "rescission" in the context of a section 2-608 revocation.
Taking a step in the right direction, the court also referred to section
41 9
2-608 in the same citation.
The United States Supreme Court referred to West Virginia's
section 2-602 in Patterson v. Warner,420 but the case concerned the
constitutionality of West Virginia's Justice of the Peace fee system,
and there was no discussion of Code-related issues. In Kesner, the
court cited section 2-602(2)(6) in a reference to the buyer's duty to
preserve goods, but there was no discussion of the issue or the Code
section. 42 In this same note, the court made its only reference to
date to the Code's section 2-603 buyer's duties and rights as to
rightfully rejected goods. There apparently has been no reference in
West Virginia case law to section 2-604 concerning buyer's rights
and duties as to rightfully rejected goods or to section 2-605 concerning buyer's duty to describe the particular defect or risk the loss
of remedies.
C.

Seller's Right to Cure Under Section 2-508
After the buyer has rightfully rejected the goods before accepting
them, the seller has a conditional right to cure the nonconformity
417. 150 W. Va. 669, 676, 149 S.E.2d 238, 242 (1966).
418. 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971).
419. Id. at 460, 184 S.E.2d at 726.

420. 415 U.S. 303 (1974). (The buyer of an automobile attempted to reject the automobile under
section 2-602,bystopped
payments,Repository
and was sued
by the1991
seller.)
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under section 2-508. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has yet to address the parameters of these conditions. 42 The court
has, on three occasions, discussed the question of whether section
2-508 gives the seller a right to cure after acceptance and a revocation
of that acceptance, and has appeared to answer yes, generally no,
and no.
In Reece,42 a consumer bought a new car on July 5. While driving it from Coalwood, West Virginia to Chicago, Illinois and back,
the buyer noticed white specks of paint on the car, ill-fitting chrome
along the rear window, rolls (irregularities) on the top of the car,
a broken seat catch, and a fallen dashboard panel. On July 23, the
buyer returned the car for repairs and picked it up the next day.
It was then driven an additional 1,800 miles. On August 14, the
buyer told the seller it was not fixed properly. It was inspected by
the seller on that day, and then by the manufacturer on September
19. The manufacturer said it would pay for the repairs, which by
all estimates would cost between $35 to $80. The following day the
buyer saw his attorney, and shortly after returned the car to the
seller's lot. He then wrote the seller and the manufacturer "of his
intent to rescind the contract." 424 The seller refused to rescind the
contract and take back the car, and the buyer sued both for rescission. The evidence at trial revealed a contract clause promising
repair, excluding all other warranties, and limiting buyer's remedies
to such repair. 42 The court found the exclusion and limitation valid. 42 6
In finding that seller had a right to cure the minor defects, the
court cited section 2-508(1).427 Yet, it would be a mistake to interpret
422. Although the court appears to have done so in Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W.
Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971), the court was in fact not dealing with the right to cure after rejection
(and before acceptance), but rather the right to cure after an attempt to revoke acceptance. See the
discussion in the following text.
423. Id. There are two Reece opinions. The first opinion, Reece (I), involved the appeal of the
selling car dealer, defendant seller. The second opinion, Reece (II), involved the separate appeal of

the manufacturer, the Ford Motor Company. The issue in Reece (II) was the ability to rescind a
contract against a nonprivity manufacturer. See Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 461,
184 S.E.2d 727 (1971).
424. Reece (I), 155 W. Va. at 456, 184 S.E.2d at 724.
425. Id.

426. After 1975, all such exclusions and limitations of remedies have been void under the West
Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1986).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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Reece as authority for the position that a seller has a section 2-508
right to cure after acceptance to prevent or counteract a buyer's
revocation of acceptance. As clearly shown by the facts and the
court's reference to "revocation of acceptance" and to section 462-608(1), Reece involved an offer to cure made after buyer's acceptance. But the court seemed to confuse revocation with rejection.
This is demonstrated by the court's reference to the law on "where
the buyer rejects, ''428 its citation to a much-cited case involving rejection before acceptance, Wilson v. Scampoli,429 and to section 2602(1) covering how to reject before acceptance. 4 0 Furthermore, the
court cited subsection (1) of section 2-508 and subsection (1) by its
terms could not have applied to the facts of Reece, because it only
gives the seller a right to cure before "the time for performance
has not yet expired." This means before the contract delivery date,
which in Reece had passed months before the attempted revocation
and promise to cure. Finally, there was no need to find a statutory
right to cure, as the seller had that right under the remedy limitation
terms of the contract.
In Kesner v. Lancaster,431 the court mentioned Reece and its discussion of section 2-508(1) noting "This section is generally not applicable where the buyer accepts the goods and then wishes to revoke
because of after-discovered defects. '"432 Kesner itself did not involve

the issue of a right to cure as seller made no attempt to cure.
In City National Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 433 the court addressed the seller's right to cure after the buyer had first accepted
the goods and then attempted to revoke that acceptance. In City

428. Id.
429. Id. at 459-60, 184 S.E.2d at 725-26. In Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967),
the newly purchased television would not work when first plugged in upon delivery. The seller promised
to repair it but the buyer refused, demanding another "brand new" replacement television. The court
held the seller had a right to cure the nonconforming tender under section 2-508(2) by making minor
repairs. Wilson is less a case questioning the right to cure under section 2-508, but rather more a
case questioning whether the cure may be effectuated through repair of the defective tendered goods,
rather than a substitution of different new goods.
430. Reece (1), 155 W. Va. at 459, 184 S.E.2d at 726.
431. 378 S.E.2d 649 (,V. Va. 1989).
432. Id. at 652.
433. 384 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1989).
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National, the buyer purchased a pick-up truck on September 29,
and it began to "miss" and emit smoke during October. It was
returned for repair three times and the seller treated buyer rudely
the last time. A further repair at another dealer in March of the
following year failed to solve the problem. In June, after the truck
had been driven 12,000 miles, the buyer left it with the second dealer
who said it could not be repaired in the near future, as it would
take time to obtain parts and authorization (apparently from the
manufacturer's distributor) for further repair. In June, the buyer
purchased a new vehicle and notified the bank that he would not
make further payments on the truck. In August, the second dealer
repaired the truck by rebuilding the engine. In September, the bank
repossessed and sold the vehicle and, in November, brought suit for
the deficiency. The buyer responded by suing the bank, 43 4 the seller,
the manufacturer, and the distributor. The seller's first notice of
revocation from the seller was the December filing of the crosscomplaint. All but the seller settled before trial.

434. The seller sued the bank under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act W.
VA. CODE § 46A-2-103 (1986 & Supp. 1991). This section provides that a bank's right to collect on
a loan it made directly to a consumer buyer is subject to defenses the buyer has against the seller,
when the bank participated in, or was connected with, the sales transaction. The opinion does not
state what connection the bank had with the sales transaction, but statutory examples of such participation or connection include, among others:
(i) The lender and the seller have arranged for a commission or brokerage or referral fee
for the extension of credit by the lender;
(ii) The lender is a person related to the seller unless the relationship is remote or is not
a factor in the transaction;
(iii) The seller guarantees the loan or otherwise assumes the risk of loss by the lender upon
the loan other than a risk of loss arising solely from the seller's failure to perfect a lien
securing the loan;
(iv) The lender directly supplies the seller with documents used by the borrower to evidence
the transaction or the seller directly supplies the lender with documents used by the borrower
to evidence the transaction;
(v) The loan is conditioned upon the borrower's purchase of the goods or services from
the particular seller, but the lender's payment of proceeds of the loan to the seller does
not in itself establish that the loan was so conditioned;
(vi) The seller in such sale has specifically recommended such lender by name to the borrower
and the lender has made ten or more loans to borrowers within a period of twelve months
within which period the loan in question was made, the proceeds of which other ten or
more loans were used in consumer credit sales with the seller or a person related to the
seller, if in connection with such other ten or more loans, the seller also specifically recommended such lender by name to the borrowers involved ....
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-103(l)(a)(i)-(vi) (1986); see also City National, 384 S.E.2d at 379 n.l.
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One of the seller's defenses to the buyer's UCC breach of warranty claim was that the notice of revocation was so late that seller
was deprived of its rights to cure the nonconformity within the
meaning of section 2-508.
In response, the court quoted Kesner as stating section 2-508(1)
"is generally not applicable where the buyer accepts the goods and
then wishes to revoke because of undiscovered defects." 43 5 The court

went on to state:
Thus, the rights of the seller with respect to revocation of acceptance are controlled by the provisions of W. Va. Code, 46-2-608. Because this statute does not
expressly give the seller the right to cure nonconformities in the goods, it is often
held that where the buyer justifiably revokes his acceptance, he is not required
to afford the seller the opportunity to cure or repair the defects .... This is

especially true where, as here, the seller has previously been given the opportunity
to correct the defect and has either failed or refused to do so.46

The court concludes that the rights of the parties were clearly
controlled by section 2-608(1)(b), and that having failed to avail itself
of the opportunity to repair, the defendant could not complain that

it had been deprived of its right to cure. 437
The court's conclusion is consistent with the apparent majority
of cases,48 and the commentators agree. Of course the seller has a

435. City National, 384 S.E.2d at 380.
436. Id. at 380-81.
437. Id. at 381.
438. Seekings v. Jinning GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210, (1981); McCormick
v. Ornstein, 119 Ariz. 352, 580 P.2d 1206 (1978); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho
189, 668 P.2d 65 (1985); Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 420 Mich. 452, 362 N.W.2d 704 (1984);
Asciolla v. Monter Oldsmobile- Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977); Pavesi v. Ford
Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954 (1978); Grappelberg v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88
(Tex. 1984).
But see Guerdon Industries, Inc. v. Gentry, 531 So.2d 1202 (Miss. 1988) (buyer must allow seller
to cure before revoking acceptance); Davis v. Colonial Mobile Homes, 28 N.C. App. 13, 220 S.E.2d
802, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976) (no right to cure where seller is unable to
say how long repair would take); Erling v. Honera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980).
See generally J. Wmm & R. Sumom, supra note 7. at 378 (the courts generally hold that the
seller's right to cure under 2-508 does not limit the buyer's right to revoke acceptance under 2-608);
67A Am. JuR. 2D Sales §§ 1198-99 (1985) (fact that the seller is specifically given a right to cure in
2-508 could be taken to imply that no such right exists under 2-608).
See also Travilio, The UCC's Three R's: Rejection, Revocation, and (The Seller's) Right to Cure,
53 U. CN. L. Rav. 931 (1984); Note, Revocation of Acceptance: The Seller's Right to Cure After
Gappelberg v.
38 BAYLOR
L. REv.@441
(1986);
.
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right to cure in the face of the buyer's contemplation of a section
2-608(l)(a) revocation, because that section by its wording covers
only situations where buyer is awaiting seller's cure. Seller's limitation is that he must "seasonably" complete the cure. 439 When buyer
is revoking acceptance under section 2-608(l)(b) for a defect newly
discovered after acceptance, it seems harsh and inconsistent with
seller's section 2-508(2) cure rights to not give the seller a right to
cure. But seller is offered some protection in that the section allows
buyer to revoke only where the defect "substantially impairs its value
to buyer." Where the defect is easily repairable, the court is unlikely
to find the defect "substantially impairs" the value of the goods to
buyer. 440 Revocation being disallowed, the question for the buyer
then becomes, does the buyer wish to leave the goods unrepaired
and take his chances in pursuing only monetary damages, or allow
the seller to reduce the damages by repairing the goods?" 1
City Nationalshould not be characterized as holding that in West
Virginia a seller can never exercise a section 2-508 right to cure after
revocation of acceptance. First, the court only said that section 2442
508 is generally not applicable after acceptance and revocation.
Second, the facts of the case show that the seller was in fact given
the opportunity to cure after the post-acceptance discovery of the
defect, and failed to take advantage of it.44 The ultimate test will
come when the court is presented with a case where the buyer accepts
the goods, then discovers a latent defect substantially impairing their
value to him, then revokes the acceptance, and then the seller attempts to repair or deliver substitute goods in order to avoid breach,
but the buyer insists on returning the goods, cancelling the contract,
and holding seller liable for money damages.4"
D. Buyer's Acceptance Under Section 2-607
Section 2-607 provides that after accepting the goods, the buyer
loses his right to reject the goods for just any nonconformity in the
439. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-608(1)(a) (1966).
440. See Pratt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 709, 714-15 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
441. Consequential damages caused by a nonconformity in the goods are not recoverable if they
could have been prevented by buyer's mitigation, including allowing seller to repair the goods. W.
VA. CODE § 46-2-715(2) (1966).
442. City National, 384 S.E.2d at 380.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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444. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-711(1) (1966).
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goods or the manner of tender, and may not revoke the acceptance
for any nonconformity known by the buyer at the time of acceptance. 445 Kesner so states in dicta." 6
In two product liability cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals cited section 2-607 in addressing questions of implied
indemnity. In Goldring v. Ashland Oil Refining Co., the court cited
section 2-607(5) as supporting the concept of implied indemnity,
stating "The UCC acknowledges that one person in the chain of
distribution may be 'answerable over' to another person in the chain
who is "sued for a breach of a warranty or other obligation." 447
In Hill v. Ryerson & Son, Inc.,448 an employee of the buyer was
injured by a splitting hydraulic cylinder and sued the seller of the
cylinder. The seller impleaded the manufacturer as a third-party defendant, asserting a cause of action in implied indemnity. The manufacturer raised lack of timely notice as a defense. The manufacturer
asserted that section 2-607(3)(a), in providing "the buyer must within
a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach notify the seller of breach or be banned from any remedy,"
required the seller to so notify the manufacturer, and, thus, seller's
failure to do so defeated any action for implied indemnity. The court
disagreed, stating that section 2-607(3)(a) was designed for buyers
and sellers and "has little relevance to the product liability field.'' 449
In conclusion, the court extended its ruling to cover not only actions
for implied indemnity, but to actions brought by injured persons
themselves, stating "[w]e, therefore, conclude that ... 2-607(3)(a)
... is not available as a defense in a product liability action for
personal injuries or in a related suit for implied indemnity." 450

445. Id. § 46-2-607(2).
446. Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649, 656 (V. Va. 1989).
447. 59 F.R.D. 487, 490 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
448. 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980).
449. Id. at 30, 268 S.E.2d at 302.
450. Id. at 35, 268 S.E.2d at 305. While holding the notice requirement of 2-607(3) does not
apply to product liability actions, the Hill court cited 2-607(5) as giving implicit recognition to the
binding effect of notice in an implied indemnity action where the seller is sued for a breach of warranty
by her buyer for which the manufacturer is answerable over. Id. at 30, 268 S.E.2d at 303 n.3.
Subsection (5) provides that where the seller is sued for an obligation for which her seller is answerable
over, she may give her seller written notice of the litigation, inviting her seller to come in and defend,
and if her seller
does Research
not do so, Repository
her seller is @
bound
common determinations of fact. Although
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The law appears unsettled as to the duty of a buyer to notify
the seller under section 2-607(3)(a). 451 It appears clearer that a nonprivity party does not have the section 2-607(3)(a) duty to notify a

nonprivity seller or manufacturer in an action for personal injury, 452
but might well have the duty where the action is for economic loss. 413
The court's holding that the Code should have little or no relevance

to a manufacturer's duty to indemnify its buyer (the seller) is suspect, because the manufacturer and the buyer entered into a sales
contract which was intended to control their rights and liabilities
inter se. If the contract between the manufacturer and seller had
specifically provided for an allocation of liability for injuries caused

by the goods to third persons, that contract would be relevant to
the rights of the seller and buyer inter se. As a contract to sell goods,
the Code would apply.
E. Buyer's Revocation of Acceptance Under 2-608

The buyer's right to revoke his earlier acceptance of goods after
newly discovering defects, or after the failure of the seller to fulfill
earlier promises to cure the initially discovered defects, has its roots
in common law. The right to rescission has long been recognized
in West Virginia. 454 In 1971, the West Virginia Supreme Court of

not clear, the court's point might be that it makes little sense to interpret 2-607(3) as requiring early
notice to a manufacturer in order to allow indemnity, when 2-607(5) provides that a seller who is
later sued by her buyer and notifies the manufacturer (her seller) of the litigation, binds the manufacturer to factual findings in the litigation. If possibly late notice can bind the manufacturer, why
would early notice be required?
451. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK oF ran LAW OF TORTS § 97 (5th ed. 1984) (2-607(3) is a boobytrap for the unwary). One clear reason for the notice requirement is to allow the seller to act quickly
in making repairs, replacements and other curative acts so as to minimize her potential liability. Where
the product has already injured a buyer, it is probably too late to prevent further harm. See J. WHrrn
& R. StummE s, supra note 7 at 381.
452. See Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Bennett v.
Richardson-Merrill, Inc. 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill. 1964); Tomczuk v. Town of Chesire, 26 Conn.
Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965) (the duty is on the buyer and the non-privity injured party is not the
buyer under 2-103(a)); Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184
A.2d 63 (1962); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982),
aff'd, 456 A.2d 930 (1983). See also, Annotation, Notice to Manufacturerby Remote Buyer, 24 A.L.R.
4th 277 (1983).
453. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Cooley v. Big
Horn Harvestore Systems, Inc., 767 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1988); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,
557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
454. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
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Appeals first addressed a number of the issues accompanying the
Code-revocation provision in Reece v. Yaeger FordAuto Sales, Inc.455
In 1989, the court decided two more cases primarily involving issues
of revocation of acceptance. These cases, Kesner v. Lancaster'56 and
City National Bank of Charleston v. Wells,457 saw the court finally
come into its own in using the UCC. The court skillfully interrelated
a number of Code sections, made good use of the Official Comments, and frequently referred to well-known UCC treatises4 8 as
well as law review articles and UCC case law from other jurisdictions.
The facts of Reece and City National Bank have been detailed
above. In Kesner, the buyer went to the nonmerchant seller's home
to examine a used front-end loader for purchase. During his inspection, the buyer noticed that it was freshly painted and that the
undercarriage was in good condition. The seller started and ran the
engine but discouraged the buyer from operating the machine. The
seller said the machine was in fine shape. On a second visit, the
buyer purchased the machine for $9,000, loaded it on a low-boy,
and delivered it to the work site. The machine broke down on the
site within minutes after it began to remove topsoil. Attempting to

455. 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971).
456. 378 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1989).
457. 384 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1989). Revocation of acceptance was a primary issue in a fourth
West Virginia case, Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238 (1966). The
transaction involved occurred in 1963, before the applicable date of the Code, and was therefore not
covered by the Code. Along with a review of the common law, the court discussed the newly enacted
UCC. The court clearly confused revocation with rejection, and the court's discussion should be of
little or no precedential value on Code issues.
458. UNWoRu COMMERCIAL CODE (3d ed. 1988), by Professors James J. White of Michigan
University and Robert S. Summers of Cornell University, is a frequently-cited, sophisticated, singlevolume treatise which explains the varied possible interpretations of the Code sections, and provides
a critical analysis and comprehensive review of the case law. UNIrom Co
RcIA CODE (3d ed.
1983) by Ronald Anderson is a comprehensive eleven volume much-cited authority on the UCC.
Although it refers to significantly more cases than White & Summers, it often fails to provide a
sophisticated critical analysis, settling instead for a text composed largely of positive statements of
the law, each citing the case which so stated. The statements often do not represent anything that
could be called settled rules of law under the UCC. Two other well-known and more-comprehensive
UCC research services, Callaghan's UNroRM COMMERCLAL CODE REPoRTiNG SERVICE (approximately
100 volumes) and BENDER'S UNIFOM, COMIMCIAL CODE SERVIcE (approximately 30 volumes), have
not been cited often by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Article 2 cases. Both are excellent research
tools for the UCC.
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repair it himself, the buyer noticed pre-existing transmission damage,
stripped and rusted bolts, and cracked and welded rails. Estimates
to repair the machine were $720 and maybe much higher. Seller
refused the buyer's attempts to revoke acceptance, return the machine, and obtain the return of the purchase price.
Both Kesner and City National point out that the term "rescission" is no longer used in sales of goods cases. The Code has replaced it with "revocation of acceptance." This makes it clear that
reference is being made to the return of the goods, as opposed to
a cancellation of the contract, and discards the old rescission concept
that buyer must elect between keeping the goods and suing for dam45 9
ages, or returning the goods in exchange for a refund of the price.
In order for the buyer to revoke his prior acceptance, the defect
must "substantially impair" the value of the goods to him.4 6 In
denying the revocation in Reece, the court emphasized that the cost
of repairing the defects in the new automobile was estimated at only
$35 to $80.6 1 In allowing the revocation in City National, the court
mentioned that the automobile had serious engine problems that
could not be repaired for a long time, and finally required a rebuilt
engine. 462
In Kesner the seller argued that since the cost of repairs was
much less ($720) than the $9,000 purchase price, the value of the
loader was not substantially impaired. 6 3 The court, noting the loader
had been inoperable since purchase, needed major repairs, and the
$720 estimate did not include other possible costs, upheld the jury's
finding of substantial impairment. 4 The court correctly saw the
issue as a question for the jury,4 65 and referred to a test for determining substantial impairment. The test is subjective, in that the
459. See Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 652 n.2; City National, 384 S.E.2d at 379 n.2; see also, W. VA.
CODE § 2-608 comment 1 (1966).
460. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-608(1) (1966).
461. Reece, 155 W. Va. at 456, 184 S.E.2d at 724 ("It can readily be seen that these defects

are of a minor nature." Id. at 459, 184 S.E.2d at 725.
462. City National, 384 S.E.2d at 378. The opinion does not suggest the seller argued that the
defect did not substantially impair the value of the goods.
463. Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 654.
464. Id. at 655.
465. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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needs and circumstances of the particular buyer must be examined
and the nonconformity must substantially impair the suitability of
the goods for these needs. It is also objective in that the "actual
defects, ...

must not be trivial or insubstantial," 46 meaning the

buyer's personal belief as to the reduced value of the goods is not
enough. The trier of fact must make an objective determination that
the value of the goods has been impaired as to the buyer's needs. 467
No West Virginia case has raised issues relating to a buyer's
attempt to revoke acceptance because of seller's failure to cure a
nonconformity in the goods known to the buyer at the time of buyer's acceptance. 468 All involve discovery of the defect after acceptance. Kesner paraphrases the language of section 2-608(1)(b) when
it states "[t]he buyer must show that his acceptance of goods without
discovery of the nonconformity was either due to the difficulty of
discovering the defect or induced by the assurances of the seler." 469
In Reece, some of the defects were visible flaws in the appearance
of the automobile easily discoverable before acceptance, yet the court
did not say these easily discoverable defects prevented revocation
(revocation was denied on at least two other grounds). In City National, the defect was a difficult to discover engine problem. In
Kesner, the knowledgeable buyer visually inspected the machine and
did not discover the latent transmission problems. Importantly, the
Kesner court pointed out that the seller assured the buyer that the
machine was "in fine shape," and that a seller's assurance, standing
alone, will relieve the buyer from the duty to make a discovery of
the nonconformity. The clear implication is that this is so even if
the defect is not difficult to discover. 470 Finally, Kesner makes clear
that this determination is also a jury question. 471

In Reece, the court stated the rescission must be within a reasonable time after the purchase. 472 This is clearly wrong, and can
466. Id. at 654 & n.13.
467. Id. at 654 (quoting Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. 117 N.H. 85, 88-89, 370

A.2d 270, 273 (1977)). See also, J. Wi
& R. SuloEaRs, supra note 7, at 370-72.
468. See W. VA. CODE § 46-2-608(1)(a) (1966).
469. Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 655 & n.14.
470. Id. at 655 & n.15 (citing Desilets Granite Co. v. Stone Equalizer Corp., 133 Vt. 372, 340
A.2d 65 (1973) (J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 419-20).

471. Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 655.

472. Reece,
155Research
W. Va. atRepository
460, 184 S.E.2d
at 726.
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be explained by the Reece court's confusing a section 2-608 revocation of acceptance of the goods with a section 2-601 rejection of
the goods which, under section 2-602, must be within a reasonable
time. 473 Kesner474 and City National475 point out that while revocation
of acceptance must be within a reasonable time, it is measured from
the time the buyer discovered, or should have discovered, the nonconformity, not from the time of the purchase itself. City National
points out that "reasonable time" is defined in section 1-204(2) of
476
the Code, and is a question of fact for the jury.
In City National,the buyer revoked acceptance fourteen months
after he discovered the defects, and the court still allowed the revocation of acceptance.4 7 The court cited cases from other jurisdictions allowing revocation after periods of time ranging from twelve
to forty-eight months. 478 The court seemed to hold that a lengthy
delay will .not prevent revocation where the delay is attributable to
efforts or promises to correct a nonconformity479 that the seller had
a continuing obligation to repair.4 80 Both positions are consistent
with the majority of cases. 481 The court also included the seller's
rudeness to buyer in the considerations justifying delay in revoca2
tion.48
These cases also -point out that the buyer can give up his right
to revoke acceptance. Kesner, citing Reece, warns that use after
473. "Rejection must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender." W. VA. CODE
§ 46-2-602(l) (1966).
474. Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 653.
475. City National, 384 S.E.2d at 381.
476. Id.

477. Id. at 380-82. Eight months after discovery, the buyer delivered the automobile to a dealer
not his seller, and notified the lending bank he was stopping payments. The seller itself supposedly

did not receive notice of the revocation until it was cross-sued six months later, or fourteen months
after discovery of the defects.
478. Id. at 381.
479. In City National, the buyer returned the vehicle three times to the seller for repair, and
twice to another dealer. All attempts at repair were unsuccessful. Id. at 378.
480. Id. at 381 (citing 67A AM. JuR. 2D Sales § 1213 (1985); Annotation, Time for Revocation
of Acceptance of Goods Under UCC § 2-608(2), 65 A.L.R. 3D 354, 362-63 (1975)). It appeared that

the contract in City National contained a warranty requiring the seller to repair defects. Id. at 378.
481. See, e.g., Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); Pavesi v.
Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super 373, 382 A.2d 954 (1978); Fablok Mills, Inc, v. Cocher Machine
& Foundry Co. 125 N. J. Super 251, 310 A.2d 491, cert. den. 64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405 (1973);

Warren v. Guttanit, Inc., 317 S.E.2d 5 (N.C. App. 1984).
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revocation may waive the revocation. 43 Reece demonstrated that the
parties may take away the right to reject in their contract leaving
the buyer only with the right to keep the nonconforming goods and
settle for money damages.4 Section 2-719(1), and the case law support this position.
Finally, in a separate opinion dealing with the buyer's suit to
rescind against the nonprivity manufacturer, technically a request to
force a return of the goods and a return of the purchase price, the
Reece court held that rescission is not a remedy against a nonprivity
manufacturer. 485 Although this is the general rule, 486 where the manufacturer has expressly warranted the goods to the ultimate buyer,
or led the ultimate buyer to believe that a warranty has been extended, revocation may lie.4 This can be especially appropriate where
48
buyer's seller is unable to respond in damages.
VII.

AssURANCE OF FuTUR

PERFORMANCE AND EXCUSE FOR

NONPERFORMANCE

A.

Adequate Assurance of Future Performance
The Code recognizes that the essential purpose of a commercial
contract is actual performance, not merely a promise and a right
to win a lawsuit, and that each party has a contractual right to feel
secure while awaiting that performance. 489 The Code provides that
483. Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 652 n.3.
484. Reece, 55 W. Va. at 457-58, 184 S.E.2d at 724-25. The Reece court discussed several grounds
for denying the buyer's revocation, any one of which, standing alone, should have been sufficient
under the Code. The court did not specify any single one as controlling, holding, "It appears from
the facts and circumstances in the case at bar, and from the authorities cited herein ... that the
purchaser ... was not entitled to rescind the contract of sale . . . ." Id. at 461, 184 S.E.2d at 726.
485. Reece v. Yaeger Ford Sales, Inc. (Reece II), 155 W. Va. 461, 469, 184 S.E.2d 727, 731
(1971).
486. Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974) (Ohio); Edelstien
v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J. Super. 57, 422 A.2d 101, (1980); Wright v. O'Neal Motors,
Inc., 57 N.C. App. 49, 291 S.E.2d 165 (1982); Noice v. Paul's Marine & Camping Center, Inc., 5
Ohio App. 3d 232, 451 N.E.2d 528 (1982).
487. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); Volkswagen, Inc. v.
Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss. 1982). See also Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So.2d
1024 (Miss. 1982).
488. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982).
489. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-609 comment 1 (1966).
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when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the
other party's performance, the first party may in writing demand
that the other party provide adequate assurance of due performance,
and, until receiving commercially reasonable assurance, the first party
may suspend performance. 490 Failure to provide such adequate assurance within a reasonable time constitutes a repudiation of the
contract. 491 A repudiation of a contract performance which substantially impairs the value of the contract entitles the aggrieved
49 2
party to, among other things, pursue any remedy for breach.
In Mollohan v. Black Rock Contracting, Inc. ,' 4 93 a service con-

tract not covered by the UCC, a contractor contracted to unload
56,884 tons of rock from railroad cars. Prior to the performance
date, the contractor then told the owner's agent that it (contractor)
did not have sufficient equipment to perform the contract. The court
held that the contractor had not repudiated the contract. In applying
the traditional common-law rule, the court held that in order to
constitute anticipatory breach, the repudiation must be positive, absolute, and unequivocal.4 94 The court refused to adopt as a commonlaw rule the section 2-609 Code concept of repudiation through a
failure of adequate assurance of performance, "except to the extent
that a demand for assurances and a failure to give them may be
evidence of repudiation ...

to prove absolute, unequivocal and pos-

itive repudiations and anticipatory breach." 495 The facts in Mollohan
did not show the kind of clear demand for assurance of performance
and a failure to give such adequate assurance as is required by section 2-609. Therefore, even if the case had been a sale of goods
case covered by Article 2, the court would not have properly found
a failure of assurance and a repudiation. If on the other hand, after
being told by the contractor that the contractor did not have sufficient equipment to perform the contract, the owner had demanded
490. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-609(1).
491. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-609(4).
492. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-610(b).
493. 160 W. Va. 446, 235 S.E.2d 813 (1977).
494. Id. at 451, 235 S.E.2d at 815 (citing Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake and Export Coal
Corp., 91 W. Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922)); see also, Riley, The Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach
as Applied in West Virginia, 31 W. VA. L.Q. 182 (1925).
495. Mollohan, 160 W. Va. at 451 n.1, 235 S.E.2d at 816 n.1.
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that the contractor tell owner whether or not it still intended to
perform the contract, and the contractor refused to so state, the
court in Mollohan might have found that an absolute repudiation
existed.
B. Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions
The Code continues the excuse for breach found in the commonlaw concepts of impossibility and frustration of purpose, emphasizing the new idea of commercial impracticability. This section, 2615, provides that a seller's delay or nondelivery is not a breach if
the agreed-upon performance has been made impracticable by a government regulation, or by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the contract. 496
Although the section excuses the seller from the performance of a
contract duty even in cases where performance is not really impossible, in practice it has been very difficult for sellers to qualify
for excuse under section 2-615. The severe fluctuations in energy
prices in the 1970's brought a significant number of section 2-615
cases before the courts, as oil, gas, coal, and uranium suppliers
sought relief from long-term-supply contracts. The vast majority of
parties seeking 2-615 relief lost. 497
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cited section 2615 in Elkins Manor Association v. Eleanor Concrete,498 but passed
496. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-615(a) (1966).

497. Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Machine Co., 646 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981);
Transatlantic Financing Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, (D.C. Cir. 1966); Aluminum Co. of
America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, (W.D. Pa. 1980); Iowa Electric Light and Power
Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301

(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Hancock Paper Co. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 424
F. Supp. 285, (E.D. Pa. 1976); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.

Fla. 1975); Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Chesapeake Shoe Co., 21 Bankr. 604 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Lawson, 135 Ga. App. 799, 219 S.E.2d 167, (1975); Lawrance v. Elmore
Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d 930, (1985); Missouri Public Service Co. v. Peabody
Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865, 100 S. Ct. 135, 62 L.Ed. 2d 88

(1979); Helms Construction & Development Co. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Highways, 97 Nev. 500,
634 P.2d 1224 (1981); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784
(Sup. Ct. 1974). See also Asphalt International, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d
261 (2d Cir. 1981); Northern Corp. v. Chugach Electric Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974), vacated
on rehearing, 523 P.2d 1243 (1974); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458

(1916).

498. 396
463 (%V.Va.
1990).
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up an opportunity to interpret the section when it ruled that Article
2 generally, and section 2-615 specifically, did not apply to the con49
tract covering the sale and installation of pre-stressed concrete slabs.
In Elkins, the seller raised section 2-615(a) as a defense to its late
delivery of the concrete slabs.. ° The seller's production had been
delayed, apparently because the government agency involved in financing the buyer's project ruled that seller's production process did
not meet government regulations and because of financial difficulties. Seller had to stop production while it changed its production
process. The slabs were delivered late and when the buyer sued for
resulting loss the seller argued it was excused because the government-caused delay made timely delivery commercially impractical
under section 2-615.501 The court apparently rejected this defense,
holding that the UCC, including section 2-615, did not apply.
In a curious statement, the court opinion implies that if section
2-615 were applicable, 2-615 could not under any circumstances provide the seller with an excuse for late delivery, because a 'time is
of the essence' clause contained in the contract imposed a higher
duty of performance.50 2 By "higher," the court could mean "higher
than the Code-supplied duty of performance." This makes little sense
under section 2-615, unless the court means that by this contract
provision the parties intended that all risks of late or nondelivery,
from whatever cause or source, were to be borne by the seller.
For example, if the contract called for delivery of forty-five-feetlong-concrete slabs, and the State of West Virginia highway department later promulgated a regulation absolutely limiting for six
months all trailer loads to no longer than forty feet, would the seller
be held liable for its resulting late or nondelivery? If the "time is
499. See supra text following note 83 for a discussion of the court's questionable determination
that the Code did not apply to this contract.
500. 396 S.E.2d at 468.
501. Late delivery was only one of several apparent breaches by the seller. Some timely delivered
slabs were defective and rejected. The seller failed to provide delivery to the site as required by the

contract. Finally, the seller failed to provide a crane and labor, and failed to install the slabs in the
building, both in clear breach of the contract. Id. at 466-67.

502. The court's words were "this UCC section can not alter express contract language. The
contract contained a 'time is of the essence' clause, which imposes a higher duty of performance."

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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of the essence," clause were interpreted as reflecting the parties'
intent to make timely delivery a material part of the contract (so
that late delivery was a material breach of the contract) but it was
also clear that at the time of making the contract both parties assumed that roads leading to the buyer's site would continue to allow
transport of forty-five-feet-long loads, then section 2-615 would likely
excuse the seller from making the timely delivery. 5 3 But if the clause
were interpreted as reflecting the parties intent to allocate all risks
of late delivery, no matter from what cause, then section 2-615 would
not excuse the seller because the parties' basic assumption was that
the risk of all contingencies, including governmental regulations closing the roads to delivery, were to be borne by seller. The court in
Elkins is correct in that the parties can control the allocation of
risks and assumptions in their contract. But the question of what
the parties actually agreed to in the contract is a jury question, and
the rule of law to be applied to the jury-determined facts would be
the section 2-615 possibility of excuse for nonperformance.
None of this is to imply that the concrete slab seller in Elkins
should have qualified for a section 2-615 excuse under the facts
appearing in the opinion, even if the Code had been applied. Certainly there was no basic assumption by the parties in Elkins that
the government would not disqualify the seller's production process
if the delivered slabs were found defective. They probably assumed
the opposite. Apparently this is what eventually happened, and the
elements of section 2-615 were not met. It would be expected that
the trial court instructed accordingly upon remand. It is important
to note that the concrete slab seller did not automatically lose its
legal claim to the defense of commercial impracticability just because
the court held that the Code, and section 2-615, did not apply.
Commercial impracticability has a foundation in American jurisprudence as evidenced by its adoption in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts.5 0 The seller may well make the same argument under
common law upon retrial.

503. See Dorr v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 78 W. Va. 150, 88 S.E. 666 (1916).
504. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTEAcTs §§ 261-272 (1981). See especially, §§ 261 and 264.
See also Bobcock Coal & Coke Co. v. Brackens Creek Coal Land Co., 128 W. Va. 676, 37 S.E.2d
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A discussion of one aspect of section 2-615 appears in a con5 0 5 a non-UCC case examcurring opinion in McGinnis v. Cayton,
ining the validity of a nineteenth century oil and gas lease. The lease
provided a market price for oil and a minimum price for the gas
which was considered of little or no value at the time of the lease.
The court remanded to allow the parties to investigate the possibility
that in making the lease, the parties might have been operating on
the assumption that the value of gas would remain de minimis, making the contract voidable or reformable under the doctrine of mutual
mistake. 5° A concurring opinion agreed, but suggested that if the
parties drafting the lease had assumed that gas would always have
no value, and that neither assumed the risk of its becoming valuable,
then the resulting loss to the seller "would be so severe and create
such hardship that performance would be commercially impracticable. ' 50 7 This would be an unusual use of commercial impracticability in that the "seller's" performance was not made impracticable
in that the seller would suffer great loss by having to go out and
pay great sums for the goods, but that possessing the goods already,
the seller would lose the great profit from the goods.

VIII.
A.

REMEDIES

Seller's Remedies

The remedies for both the seller and the buyer are laid out in
part 7 of Article 2. The seller has a variety of remedies, including
a limited right to withhold or recover goods on discovery of the
buyer's insolvency,5 0 8 the right to stop the manufacture' 9 or the delivery of goods, 510 and a right to monetary remedies including dam-

519 (1946); see, e.g., Paxton Lumber Co., Inc. v. Panther Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 341, 352; 98 S.E.
563, 567 (1919); Colson, The Excuse of Impossibility in West Virginia Contract Law, 48 W. VIA.
L.Q. 189 (1942). See also Note, Hardship As a Defense to Specific Performance in West Virginia,
44 W. VA. L.Q. 387 (1938).
505. 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
506. Id. at 769-70.
507. Id. at 775 (citing § 2-615 and cases decided thereunder).
508. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-702 (1966).

509. Id. § 46-2-704.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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ages based on resale loss, 5 '1 based upon comparative market price

or lost profit,512 and in limited situations, the whole price.513 Where
appropriate, the seller has a right to incidental damages.5 1 4 These
remedies are generally collected in section 2-703. To date, there have
been no West Virginia cases discussing seller's damages under Article
2.
B. Buyer's Remedies
1. Generally
The buyer's remedies are collected in section 2-711, a section
which parallels section 2-703 for the seller. This section provides
that where the seller wrongfully fails to make a delivery, or repudiates, or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance, then the buyer may cover and collect damages, or not cover
and collect damages for non-delivery, or in special cases obtain specific performance. If the buyer has accepted a nonconforming tender,
and has decided to keep the goods, the buyer has a right to any
existing damages.515
Where, after seller's breach, the buyer makes a reasonable cover
purchase in good faith and without unreasonable delay, the buyer
may recover the difference between the higher cost of cover and the
lower contract price together with any incidental or consequential
damages.5 16 If the buyer decides not to cover he may recover as
damages the difference between the higher market price and the
lower contract price together with incidental and consequential damages.517 Where the buyer has accepted a nonconforming tender, and
given the proper notification as required by section 2-607(3), he may
recover the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
511. Id. § 46-2-706.
512. Id. § 46-2-708.

513. Id. § 46-2-709.
514.
515.
516.
517.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id.§

46-2-710.
46-2-714.
46-2-712.
46-2-713. The market price is defined in id. § 46-2- 723.
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breach as determined in any reasonable manner, including incidental
or consequential damages. 518 The general measure of damages for
breach of warranty as to accepted goods is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods as accepted
and the value they would have been had they conformed to the
warranty. Incidental damages in these cases include the traditional
damages incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and care of
the goods. 519 Consequential damages include damages resulting from
the seller's breach that cannot be prevented by mitigation and which
meet the traditional Hadley v. Baxendale52 requirement that the seller
had reason to know at the time of contracting of the general or
particular requirements and needs of the buyer, and that such damages might result from breach.5 21 In an unusual case, the buyer has
a right to specific performance. 52 Liquidated damage clauses are
also covered by the Code, and damages may be limited in some
cases by the agreement of the parties. 52 Buyer's remedies under the
Code have been addressed in approximately six cases in West Virginia.
When the seller has repudiated or failed to perform, or the buyer
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance, the buyer may
cancel the contract under section 2-711(1) and recover appropriate
damages under the following several sections.5 z The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has held that such a cancellation under
section 2-711 approximates the same result as an action for rescission
under prior law. 52 As a practical matter, if a buyer wishes to treat
the contract as terminated after the seller's breach in order to stop
further performance by either party, the buyer simply "cancels" the
contract under section 2-711.
518. Id. § 46-2-714.
519. Id. § 46-2-715(1).
520. 9 Ex. 341; 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
521. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-715(2) (1966).
522. Id. § 46-2-716.
523. Id. § 46-2-718.
524. Id. § 46-2-711.
525. City Nat'l Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 384 S.E.2d 374, 379 n.2 (,V. Va. 1989) (citing R.
ANDERSON, supra note 458, § 2- 608:6). In the same note, the court acknowledged that it is generally
recognized that the UCC has rejected the use of the term "rescission." For further discussion, see
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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No West Virginia case has addressed the buyer's section 2-712
right to "cover" by purchasing replacement goods upon the seller's
failure to deliver conforming goods. There have been no West Virginia opinions addressing the buyer's section 2-713 right to decide
not to purchase replacement goods and in the appropriate case simply hold the non-delivering seller liable for the difference between
the bargain contract price and the higher market price of the goods.
Finally, no West Virginia case has considered the buyer's right to
specific performance under section 2-716.
2.

Where the Buyer Keeps Non-Conforming Goods

A Number of West Virginia cases have examined the section 2714 measure of damages available where the buyer has accepted
goods which are non-conforming, and decides to keep them in spite
of their non-conformity. Section 2-714 provides:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods.. .he may recover as damages for any
non-conformity.. .the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from seller's

breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference.. .between
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a

different amount.52

Damages under section 2-714 are only available where the buyer
keeps the non-conforming goods. If the buyer revokes acceptance
in order to return the goods to the seller, 527 the buyer's remedies
are under sections 2-712 (cover), 2-713 (lost bargain), or 2-716 (specific performance).
In Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc.,5s the buyer purchased a
used car from the seller for $3,500. Within two days of the purchase,
the transmission began to falter. After several attempts at repair by
the seller and by another service shop, the transmission operated

526. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-714 (1966).
527. Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649, 656 (w. Va. 1989). For a detailed discussion of Kesner,

see supra text following note 458.
528. 370 S.E.2d 734 (w. Va. 1988). See Comment, Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc.: Providing

Damages forby
Breach
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only in first gear. During four months of the year following purchase, the buyer was unable to drive the car because of the transmission problem. A year after purchase, after having driven the car
four thousand miles, the buyer stopped using the car because it was
too difficult to drive. The buyer sued the seller for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability and the seller counterclaimed for the
remaining purchase price. As evidence of the breach of warranty
damages under section 2-714(2), the buyer testified (1) to the costs
of repair, (2) that the car operated in first gear only, and (3) that
the car was no longer used after one year because it was too difficult
to drive.5 29 The jury awarded $3,400 to the buyer and $0 to the seller
on the counterclaim. The trial court reversed, finding there was no
contract liability and no damages, and granted the seller the $1,990
remaining on the purchase price. The court found the evidence of
repair costs was not evidence of general damages under section 2714, but was only evidence of special damages, and was inadmissible
because special damages had not been pleaded. The trial court went
on to find that the remaining evidence, buyer's testimony that the
car had only worked in first gear and later could not be driven,
was insufficient to support a finding that the car was essentially
worthless.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, recognizing that the plaintiff had the burden of proving the amount
of damages, cited prior West Virginia cases in holding that lay witnesses may express their opinions as to the value of property as long
as the opinion is not speculative or conjectural.5 0 The court went
on to hold that the buyer's testimony that the car was worthless
and could not be driven in its current condition was not sufficient
to support a finding that the vehicle was essentially worthless. 53

529. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d Id. at 736.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 737. Because the purchase price of the automobile was $3500 and the jury award
was $3400, the court characterized the award as a finding that the automobile as delivered was essentially worthless.

The Nelson court noted that in a prior West Virginia case, Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc.,
368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988) (see infra text at note 570, the jury awarded the buyer the full purchase
price of the automobile for breach of implied warranties on similar evidence. The Nelson court pointed
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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But importantly, the court held that the evidence of repair costs
was admissible to show general damages under section 2-714.532 The
court found that "the cost of repair is strong evidence of the difference between the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted ....

In most cases damages can be determined based

on estimates of what it would cost to repair or replace." 5 3 The court
also noted that when repair costs are used to determine the value
34
of the goods as accepted, the buyer's damages are his repair costs.
This comment comes early in the court's discussion of the case, and
as the context indicates, should not be read to mean that whenever
evidence of repair costs is introduced, the only general damages
under section 2-714(2) should be those costs of repair.
In MountaineerContractors,Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc.,535
the court recognized that although the difference between the value
of the goods accepted and the value the goods would have had if
they had been as warranted was the usual measure of damages under
2-714, this measure is not intended to be the exclusive measure of
damages. Where special circumstances show proximate damages of
a different amount, the usual measures of damages for breach of
warranty need not be used. 536 In Mountaineer, the seller delivered
defective used mining equipment during a coal boom directly to the
buyer's work site. Apparently needing the equipment, the buyer accepted it upon seller's promise that it would pay for repairs. The
buyer then proceeded to have the equipment repaired, but the seller
failed to pay for the repairs. The buyer kept the equipment and
sued for damages under section 2-714.

was repaired twenty-three times, ten of which occurred prior to the purchase, and through seller's

own statement against interest concerning the unreliability of the automobile when sold. In addition,
in Muzelak the insufficiency of proof for general damages under § 46-2-714(2) was not raised on
appeal. See id. at 737 n.6.
532. Id. at 737 (citing Hardman Trucking, Inc. v. Poling Trucking, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 551, 554
(W. Va. 1986), Mountaineer Contractors v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292, 302-03,
268 S.E.2d 886, 893 (1986); Spencer v. Steinbecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 497, 164 S.E.2d 710, 715 (1968).
533. Id. at 737, ( citing 3 W. HAwKLAND, UCC Series, § 2-714:04 (1984).
534. Id. at 736 n.5, (citing 3 W. HAWKLAND, UCC Series, § 2-714:04 (1984)).
535. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980). For a detailed discussion of Mountaineer,see supra

text accompanying note 172.
536. Id. at 303, 268 S.E.2d at 893 (citing W. VA. CODE § § 46-2-714(2) (1966) and comment

3 to that section,
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The court instructed the jury that in assessing damages, that it
could consider money expended for repair parts and for the cost of
repair labor, and any loss sustained by the loss of the use of the
equipment until it was repaired. 53 7 The instruction did not instruct
the jury to find the damages based upon the respective as-warranted
and as-delivered values, but instead directed the jury to consider the
cost of repairs and consequential damages. The court justified this
departure from the usual section 2-714 measure by stating that the
sale took place during a coal boom when it was "virtually impossible" to purchase comparable mining equipment of the kind purchased because of the great demand for machinery of that nature.
The court pointed out that the purchase price paid by the buyer in
Mountaineer was in some cases over twice the estimated price of
comparable new equipment which was impossible to buy. The court
concluded that in view of these facts, it would have been very difficult to ascertain the actual value of the equipment either at the
time it was sold or at the time it was accepted by the buyer.539
The court's holding was certainly reasonable in the circumstances. Not only does section 2-714(2) authorize other damages when
"special circumstances show approximate damages of a different
amount," but, as the court pointed out, the Code provides that
"the remedies provided by [this Code] shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed," 540 Requiring the seller
537. The actual instruction was as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that ... you may consider such items of damage as are
the proximate result of the breach of warranty in this case.
In this respect you may consider ... the following items of damages as you believe
proximately result from the breach.

... to

1. Any money expended for the purchase of parts to repair the equipment;
2. Any money expended to pay for labor used in making the repairs;
3. Any loss sustained by reason of the loss of use of the equipment purchased from
the date of purchase until its repair, providing plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in
making repairs.
Id. at 302 n.5, 268 S.E.2d at 893 n.4.
538. Id. at 303, 268 S.E.2d at 893.
539. Id. at 303-04, 268 S.E.2d at 893.
540. Id. at 304, 268 S.E.2d at 893 (paraphrasing and citing W. VIA. CoDE § 46-1-106 (1966)).

§ 46-1-106 states a general rule regarding remedies which applies and supplements the specific remedial

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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to pay for repair costs did just that. Furthermore, it was especially
appropriate in Mountaineerto use the cost of repair as the measure
of damages. Although the suit was for breach of warranties, the
buyer's chief assertion was that the seller "expressly warranted" that
it would repair any defects in the equipment discovered after the
buyer used the equipment for one day. The suit was largely to force
the seller to perform that promise to pay for repairs.
3.

Incidental and Consequential Damages

As just stated above, the basic, broad remedial principle of the
UCC, provided in section 1-106 of the general provisions of the
Code, is to liberally administer the remedies provided by the Code
"[t]o the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good position
as if the other party had fully performed." 541 This principle includes
granting buyer the right to recover for both incidental and consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach, and this right
is so provided in section 2-715. Recovery for incidental and consequential damages is specifically granted to the buyer where the
buyer makes a "cover" purchase after the seller's breach 5 42 where
the buyer decides not to cover after the seller's breach but to simply
hold seller liable for the difference between the contract price and
the higher market price,5 43 and where the buyer has decided to accept
and keep the goods after a non-conforming tender.5 " Incidental and
consequential damages have been addressed as major issues in three
West Virginia cases. 545
Recoverable incidental damages are those expenses reasonably
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care of goods
rightfully rejected, those expenses incurred in effecting cover, and
other expenses incident to the delay or other breach.5 4 To recover

541. W. VA. CODE § 46-1-106 (1966).
542. Id. § 46-2-712(2).
543. Id. § 46-2-713(1).
544. Id. § 46-2-714(3).
545. See City Nat'l Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 384 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1989); Muzelak v.
King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988); Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain
State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980).
546. W.
VA. Research
CODE § 46-2-715(1)
(1966).
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consequential damages, the buyer must establish (1) that the damages
were caused by seller's breach, (2) that at the time of making the
contract it was foreseeable that such damages might result from the
seller's breach, (3) the amount of damages with reasonable certainty,
and (4) that the losses could not have been avoided by buyer's mitigation.5 7 The burden of proving consequential damages is on the
buyer. 54
Section 2-715 appears to continue the common law as to recoverable consequential damages, 549 and pre-Code common law cases
should have precedential value under the Code. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has stated that recoverable Code consequential damages include lost profits, 550 finance charges 5 51 overhead, 5 2 labor, 553 damages resulting from a bad credit report, 54
attorney's fees,55 and annoyance and inconvenience damages. 5 6 The
court has also recognized that prejudgment interest is permitted in
Code recoveries where the jury so determines that such interest should
be granted. 557
Interestingly, in City NationalBank the court held the breaching
seller liable for damages resulting from a bad credit report even
though the bank, not the seller, filed the notice of the delinquent
account. The seller had originally financed the sale of the vehicle
to the buyer, taking a negotiable note from the buyer. The note was
then assigned by the seller to the bank. When the buyer discovered
547. City Nat'! Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 377 syllabus point 4, 383 (citing Wmm AND SUMMERS,
supra note 7 at 309.
548. Id.

549. See W. VA. CODE § 46-2-715 comment 2 (1966).
550. City Nat'l Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 382 (citing, among other sources, Star Furniture Co. v.
Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982)).
551. City Nat'! Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 383.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 383-84.
555. Id. at 388; Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710, 716-17 (W. Va. 1988).
556. Muzelak, 368 S.E.2d at 715-16 (citing Jarrett v. E.L. Harper and Son, Inc., 160 W. Va.
399, 235 S.E.2d 362 (1977)).
557. City Nat'l Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 388-89. The City Nat'! Bank court held that the buyer had
a right to have the jury consider prejudgment interest under W. VA. CoDB § 56-6-27 (1966) and
Thompson v. Stucky, 300 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1983), but denied the buyer such prejudgment interest
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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extensive defects in the vehicle, he attempted to return the vehicle
to the seller and stop making payments to the bank on the vehicle
note. The bank then apparently submitted a routine delinquent account notice to a credit reporting agency. As a result, the buyer
experienced some delay in receiving a car loan, and was later unable
to obtain an equipment loan. The failure to obtain the equipment
loan required the buyer to pay other contractors three thousand
dollars to perform work that the buyer could have performed had
he been able to obtain the loan. The court found that the seller's
breach of warranty was the approximate cause of the buyer's default
on the note obligation to the bank, and that this produced the bad
credit report which led to the buyer's losses.55 8 It should be noted
that if the buyer in City National Bank had purchased the truck
for his personal use, and not for use in his business, the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act would have given the buyer
the right to stop making payments to the bank (assuming the buyer
would have had the right because of the seller's breach to stop making payments to the seller if the seller still owned the note) under
the Act's provisions making holders of negotiable instruments and
assignees of instruments subject to claims and defenses that the buyer
has against the seller.55 9 In fact, the buyer in City National Bank
did sue the bank under the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, but the parties settled before trial. 56
As noted above, section 2-715(2) incorporates the Hadley v.
Baxendale 61 requirement that in order to be recoverable, the con-

558. Id. at 384.
559. W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-101, 46A-2-102 (1986 & 1991 Supp.). The buyer in City Nat'l Bank
appeared to be buying for business purposes and not for his personal use. The court stated that
before purchasing the truck, the buyer advised the seller that he needed the vehicle for use in his
business. City Nat'l Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 378, 384. In this case, the West Virginia Consumer Credit
Protection Act probably should have been inapplicable. Yet, the court treated the transaction as a
consumer transaction later in its opinion in applying the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act.
See id., at 388-89. Either the court erred, or the buyer had mixed personal-business purposes for the
vehicle. See W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-1-102(13)(a)(iii) (definition of "consumer credit sale"), 46A-2-101,
46A-2-102(l) (1986 & Supp. 1991.
560. City Nat'! Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 379 & n.1. The section cited, § 46A-2-103 of the Act, was
probably the wrong section to apply to the facts. Sections 46A-2-101 and/or -102 appear to be the
applicable provisions.
561. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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sequential damages must have been foreseeable at the time the contract was made. The City National Bank court commented on this
requirement when it discussed the seller's liability for losses resulting
from the buyer's inability to obtain a loan because of the bad credit
report. The court pointed out that at the time of the purchase the
buyer advised the seller that he intended to use the truck for his
business. "The [seller] was intimately involved in the financing arrangement and thus, had reason to know that if the vehicle were
defective, the plaintiff might legitimately refuse to make any further
payments. In such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the plaintiff might suffer an impaired credit rating and incur
562
additional business expenses."
The court in City National Bank also discussed the Code stipulation that consequential damages are not recoverable if they could
have been prevented by the buyer's mitigation. 563 The court held
that the buyer's duty to mitigate does not require him to undertake
undue or oppressive burdens. 5 4 The court pointed out that the buyer
had attempted to have the truck repaired but was unable to accomplish such repair, and that he was financially unable to pay for
a second truck which would have allowed him to avoid the consequential damages.5 65 The court concluded that there was no unreasonable failure to mitigate damages.
4.

Punitive Damages

The Code makes no specific provision for punitive damages, and
in fact provides that "neither consequential nor special nor penal
damages may be had except as specifically provided in this act or
by other rule of law. 5 66 The Code does provide that "remedies for
material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available
562. City Nat'! Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 384.
563. "Consequential damages ... include (a) any loss ...

which could not reasonably be pre-

vented by cover or otherwise." W. VA. CODE § 46-2-715(2) (1966).
564. City Nat'! Bank, 384 S.E.2d at 384.

565. Id. Even though the buyer had stopped making payments on the purchased truck, it apparently would have taken more than the amount of the suspended payments to purchase a replacement
truck.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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under this article for non-fraudulent breach." 567 The Code also provides in its Article 1 general provisions that: "Unless displaced by
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity,
including the law.. .relative to.. .fraud,. . .shall supplement its
provisions. "68

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed fraud
and punitive damages in the context of a Code sales transaction in
Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc.569 The buyer in Muzelak, having
previously purchased a car from the seller's sales manager, called
the sales manager with a request for a car. The sales manager returned the call, stating that he had "the right car for her. ' 570 He
did not mention that there had been a series of serious repair problems with the car. In fact, the car had been used as a demonstrator
for eight months by another salesperson, and it had been repaired
ten times during those eight months. An engine vibration problem
had never been solved. After the buyer purchased the car, the sales
manager told a fellow worker that it took someone of his sales ability
"to get rid of" the car.571 After the purchase, the buyer returned
the car for repair thirteen times (most of which were covered by
warranty) but the car was never satisfactorily repaired. A constant
engine vibration and transmission fuel leak were never corrected.
The car was so unreliable that the buyer did not drive the car after
the first eight months of use. The buyer sued the seller for-breach
of express and implied warranties, for breach of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 572 for negligence, for breach of common law misrepresentation under section 2-721 of the Code, and for misrepresentation and deception under the West Virginia Consumer Credit
Protection Act.5 73 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $15,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The circuit
court reduced the compensatory damages by a third, and allowed

567. Id. § 46-2-721.
568. Id. § 46-1-103.
569. 368 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1988).
570. Id. at 711.
571. Id. at 712.
572. 15 U.S.C. § 2-301(10) (1988).
573. W.
§ 46A-6-102(f)(13)
(1974).
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the buyer one-half of her attorney's fees under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.
In Muzelak, the buyer pleaded a cause of action for common
law material misrepresentation under section 2-721 of the Code. 74
The court instructed the jury on misrepresentation, using as part of
its instruction language found in the West Virginia Consumer Credit
Protection Act's definition of unfair and deceptive acts or practices,
which provides:
(f) Unfair.. .or deceptive acts or practices means... The act, use or employment by any person of material misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression or omission in connection with the sale or advertisement
of any goods or services .... 15

On appeal, the seller asserted that the trial court erred in allowing
the jury to find punitive damages in the amount of $25,000 on the

instruction given, because the buyer's claim and the court's instruction were based upon the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection
574. Muzelak, 368 S.E.2d at 712 & n.3.
575. W. VA. CoDE § 46A-6-102(F)(13). This Code language became the central part of the court's
instruction, which in full reads as follows:
MISREPRESENTATION OR CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS. Betty Muzelak has sued King Chevrolet for making material misrepresentations regarding the 1982
Chevrolet Cavalier sold.
The court instructs the jury that the act, use or employment by any person of material
misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with
intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission in connection with
the sale or advertisement of any goods or services, is unlawful. W. VA. CoDE, § 46A-6102(f)(13); 46A-6-104; 46A-6-107; 46A-6-108.
If you, the jury, find that King Chevrolet, Inc. has employed any material misrepresentation, or the concealment, oppression or omission of any material fact with intent
that Betty Muzelak rely on such concealment, suppression or omission in connection with
the sale of the 1982 Chevrolet Cavalier and that thereby Betty Muzelak suffered any ascertainable loss of money or personal property, Betty Muzelak is entitled to recover her
actual damages. W. VA. CODE, § 46A-6-102(f)(13); 46A-6-106(1).
Muzelak, 368 S.E.2d at 713 n.5.
The seller, King Chevrolet, had offered the following instruction:
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff, Betty Muzelak, must prove with clear
and convincing evidence to the jury that she was (1) influenced to purchase the 1982 Chavalier by some misrepresentation of material fact, or the concealing, suppressing or omitting
of a material fact, and (2) that defendant King Chevrolet intended that she rely on such
concealment, suppression or omission when she purchased the vehicle. W. VA. CoDE, §
46A-6-102 [1974].
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
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Act, a statute which provides its own remedies, limiting the remedy
'576
to the recovery of "actual damages or $200, whichever is greater.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied the seller's
appeal on this point, finding that the seller had not objected to the
court's instruction at trial, and also finding that the jury award was
justified under West Virginia common law fraud and misrepresen7
tation, which was pleaded and proven by the buyer.
The court held that:
The essential elements in an action for fraud are: (1) that the act claimed to be
fraudulent was the act of the defendant or induced by him; (2) that it was material
and false; that plaintiff relied on it and was justified under the circumstances in
relying upon it; and (3) that the was damaged because he relied upon it." 8

The court found that the elements of common law misrepresentation were proved with sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. The seller's intent to sell a demonstrator with a poor service
history, the salesperson's bragging about the sale to fellow salespersons, the reliance of the buyer on the seller as a result of satisfaction with a prior purchase, all connected to the seller's omission
of the information on the car's unreliability and poor service history,
were clearly sufficient to satisfy the elements of common-law material misrepresentation.5 79 The court went on to hold that "[ijn actions of tort, where gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton,
willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to civil obligations affecting the rights of others appear, or where legislative

576. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-106(1986). The pertinent part of this section provides:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment
by another person of a method, act or practice prohibited or declared to be unlawful by
the provisions of this article, may bring an action in the circuit court of the county in
which the seller or lessor resides or has his principal place of business or is doing business,
or as provided for in sections one and two [§§ 56-1-1 and 56-1-2], article one, chapter fiftysix of this Code, to recover actual damages or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater.
The court may, in its discretion, provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or
proper.
Id. at 46A-6-106(1) (emphasis added).
577. Muzelak, 368 S.E.2d at 713-14.
578. Id. at 714 (citing Lengyel v. Lint, 167 W. Va. 272 syllabus point 1, 280 S.E.2d 66 syllabus
point 1 (1981); Horton v. Tyree, 104 W. Va. 238, 139 S.E. 737 (1927)).
579. Id. at 715.
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enactment authorizes it, the jury may assess .. punitive .. damages. ' '580 Finally the court held that the $25,000 award was not grossly
excessive or monstrous .51 The court pointed out that the punitive
damage award was less than 2.5 percent of the seller's net worth
of over one million dollars.
XI.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A.

Generally
The UCC statute of limitations provides that any action for breach
of contract must be brought within four years after the cause of
action accrues. This period may be shortened by the parties to not
less than one year, but may not be lengthened.51 2 The cause of action
accrues upon seller's breach. 583 A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made, unless a warranty explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance, in which case the cause of
action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. 5 4
The pre-Code case law on tolling of the statute of limitations is
5
continued. 58
The West Virginia UCC statute of limitations has been applied
to actions brought to recover for rotting masonite apartment siding 586,
for deteriorating house brick, 587 and for the purchase price of stone. 588
Its application has been refused in a personal injury action.8 9 These
court opinions have addressed issues relating to when the Code stat580. Id. (citing Cook v. Hecks, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d
872 (W. Va. 1982)).
581. Muzelak, 368 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., Inc., 160 W. Va.
105, 232 S.E.2d 821 (1977)).
582. W. VA. CODE § § 46-2-725(l) (1966).
583. Id. § 46-2-725(2).

584. Id. As to an action brought after an earlier action for the same breach had been discontinued, see id. § 46-2-725(3).
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.

Id. § 46-2-725(4).
Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite Corporation, 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
Basham v. General Shale, 377 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1988).
Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589 fV. Va. 1985).
Maynard v. General Electric Co., 350 F. Supp. 949 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), aff'd 486 F.2d

538 (4th Cir. 1973).
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ute of limitations applies (instead of other statutes of limitations),
when the statute begins to run, allegations of explicit warranties of
future performance made so as to delay the commencement of the
statute, and tolling the running of the statute. The court has made
it clear that, as to the sale of goods, the section 2-725 Code statute
of limitations supercedes any general statute of limitations. 90
B.

Scope and Applicability of Section 2-725

5 91 the contractor
In RoxalanaHills Ltd. v. Masonite Corporation,
purchased building siding and applied it to the exterior of an apartment complex. Six years after the purchase the buyer discovered
that the siding absorbed moisture, became soft, rotted and decayed,
became unsightly, and caused inconvenience to the tenants.5 92 The
buyer sued the seller and the manufacturer for tort and for breach
of a UCC warranty. The tort action was covered by a two-year
statute of limitation running from the time of discovery; 93 the breach
of warranty action was covered by the Code section 2-725 four-year
statute, running from the time of tender of delivery, unless a warranty explicitly extended to future performance. Delivery being six
years before the lawsuit, the buyer had to establish a tort cause of
action or a warranty extending to future performance. Buyer could
do neither.

In rejecting buyer's tort claims in strict liability, the federal court
cited the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's holding in Star
Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co.594 requiring that if the damage is to the property itself, it must result from a "sudden calamitous
event" or it is not covered by strict liability. "Damages which result
merely because of a 'bad bargain' are outside the scope of strict
liability." 595 Importantly, the Roxalana court continued by stating

590.
591.
592.
593.

Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589, 591 (W. Va. 1985).
627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
Id. at 1197-8.
See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1981). In product liability cases, the statute begins.to run

when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he has been
injured by the product. Hickman v. Grover, 358 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1987).
594. 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
595. Id. at 859, quoted in Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. at 1196.
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"[E]ven if a sudden calamitous event were not required ... the

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia expressly excluded tort
liability for 'bad bargains'. ' 5 96 The court then reviewed federal cases
from around the country 5 97 indicating that mere damage to other
property does not preclude a finding of purely economic loss.598 The
court emphasized that the buyer did not even mention "safety of
the product" in the pleading, and concluded that no cause of action
59
existed in strict liability.
In determining that a simple negligence cause of action did not
exist, the Roxalana court predicted that West Virginia, in applying
the same concepts it applied to strict liability, would deny a tort

cause of action for mere economic loss flowing from a bad contractual bargain.60
Two years after the federal court's decision in Roxalana, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals confirmed that the UCC
statute of limitations applied to a cause of action arising out of the
gradual deterioration of building materials not accompanied by personal injury or a sudden calamitous event. In Basham, et al. v.

596. Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. at 1196.
597. Id. at 1196-98. The court opinion follows a curious development around the country, that
is citing primarily federal case law on matters governed purely by state law under Erie v. Tompkins,
often without even identifying the state whose laws are presumably being applied by the courts. The
theoretical basis for citing primarily federal case law is not clear. If a West Virginia state court ruling
is primary authority on West Virginia law, and the ruling of a state court in another state on a similar
situation in its state is (as a primary authority on its state law) at most secondary authority on what
West Virginia law should be, then a federal court deciding a state law issue in that state is (as a
secondary authority on the law of that state) at most a tertiary authority on what West Virginia law
should be. Adding to this the practice of citing a federal circuit court of appeals ruling without
identifying the state whose law the circuit court of appeals is applying, what is being cited as an
authority on our law is a tertiary authority, ruling on some unidentified law.
It is one thing to predict that West Virginia is likely to follow a certain rule because Virginia
or Pennsylvania, or even California does so, but quite another to say West Virginia is likely to follow
a certain rule because a non-West Virginia federal court predicts some unidentified state will apply
that certain rule. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
598. Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. at 1197 (citing Daitom Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp. 741 F.2d 1569 (10th
Cir. 1984) (Kansas) (defective dryer resulted in unsalable product); Jones and Laughlin v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 1980) (defective roof caused damage inside building);
National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147, 149 (N.D. I11.
1981) (defective can caused
buyer's soft drink to deteriorate)).
599. Id. at 1198.
600. Id. at 1198-99.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/2
116

Cardi: The Experience of Article 2 of the Uniform Commerical Code in Wes
1991]

THE U. C. C. IN WEST VIRGINIA

General Shale et al.,60 1 the exterior of the plaintiffs' homes became

unsightly when the brick facade began to disintegrate.6 The homeowners sued the manufacturer of the bricks, the suit occurring at
least six years after the deliveries of the bricks. Citing the Roxalana
opinion with approval, the court held that "a party who suffers
mere economic loss as a result of a defective product must turn to
the Uniform Commercial Code to seek relief. ' W3
The court also rejected the homeowners' position that a separate
independent tort cause of action was created by their allegations of
the manufacturer's willful, wanton, and reckless conduct and their
own request for punitive damages. 604 The court did imply that a
separate tort cause of action might be found in fraud, but did not
specifically rule on this, finding that the complaint failed to allege
the circumstances of fraud with particularity as required by the rules
of civil procedure. 6°5
In Basham, the homeowners also argued that their action was
covered by the West Virginia ten-year statute of limitations for
"deficiency in the planning, design, surveying, .

.

. or the actual

'
construction of any improvement to real or personal property."6
The court had no trouble finding that the clear and unambiguous
wording of this 'architects and builders' statute" demonstrated it
was not intended to cover actions against the manufacturer of defective construction materials.

In 1985, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied
the Code statute of limitations to the seller's attempt to collect the

601. 377 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1988).

602. In addition to also alleging that bricks on their homes, patios, steps, barbecue grills, fireplaces, and chimneys had disintegrated, the plaintiffs also alleged other damage, including water
leakage into the interior. Id. at 830-31 & n.1. The opinion does not indicate whether property other
than the brick itself, was damaged. Obviously the houses as a whole were. The court did not address
the issue of how damage caused by the purchased goods to other, non-purchased property might
affect the determination of whether the tort or the Code statute of limitations should apply.
603. Id. at 834.

604. Id. at 835.
605. Id. at 835-36 (citing W. VA. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
606. Id. at 833, (quoting W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (1988)).
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purchase price of stone from a buyer in Greer Limestone Co. v.
Nestor.607

On two occasions, West Virginia federal courts have refused to
apply the UCC statute of limitations. In Maynard v. GeneralElectric
Co.,608 an employee of a trucking company, engaged by the seller
to ship the goods to the buyer, was injured when the carton containing the goods fractured and fell off a forklift. The lower court
ruled that the tort claims were barred by the tort statute of limitations, and the breach of the UCC warranty claims barred by the
lack of privity (still a West Virginia requirement in 1972). On appeal,
the employee added the argument that he (or his employer and he
through his employer) was the beneficiary of a warranty that the
goods would be properly boxed. There is some chance that the employee was arguing that the warranty was implied in the seller-buyer
sales contract, to which the Code statute of limitations would apply. 6°9 The opinion indicates the employee was alleging that the warranty was implied in the contract between the seller and the carrier,
which, as a contract for trucking, would not have been covered by
the Code. In any case, the appellate court, tracing the history of
personal injury actions in West Virginia, ruled that the two-year tort
statute of limitations applied to all actions for personal injury damages. 610 The other case, Bradford v. Indiana and Michigan Electric
Co., applying admiralty law, rejected the application of section 2275 to an action for indemnity for a defective product. 61 1

607. 332 S.E.2d 589 (1985). The court never identified the actual materials purchased by the
buyer, but the seller was in the business of selling stone and stone products.
608. 350 F. Supp. 949 (1972).
609. The editors of Umrogm COMMERCIAL CODE REPoRTaN

SERviCE take this position in their

commentary. See 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 471 editor's note (1973).
610. 486 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1973) (MaynardII).
611. 588 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. W. Va. 1984). In Bradford, a seaman was injured by a defective
product and sued his employer under admiralty law and the Jones Act. The employer in turn sued

the product seller and manufacturer for indemnity, and these defendants raised the statute of limitations as a defense. The court, searching for a statute of limitations to guide the court, first determined
that admiralty law had no statute of limitations, that the defense should be treated as a laches defense.
The court then searched for a statute of limitations to serve as a guide to laches. It rejected the fouryear UCC statute, citing an earlier fourth circuit case holding that 2-725 does not govern suits for
indemnity for defective products. See Walker Mfg. v. Dickinson, Inc., 619 F.2d 305, 310 (4th Cir.
1980).
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C. Commencement of the Statutory Period
Under section 2-725(2), the statute begins to run upon the tender
of the goods to the buyer, even if the goods are to last a long time.
In Basham,612 the bricks were expected to last for the respective lives
of the houses; the lives of the houses could be decades, and it could
be expected that some defects would not be discovered until long
after the sale. The court, based upon the express language of section
2-725(2), rejected the time of discovery rule of Hickman v. Grover61
and held the running of the statute is not delayed by the difficulty
of discovering the defect. 614 This decision reflects the Code language
61 5
and the general rule.
Roxalana addressed the Code provision that provides "where a
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the
[statute of limitations begins running] when the breach is or should
have been discovered. ' 61 6 In this case, the buyer alleged a number of
express warranties which the buyer argued extended the time for the
running of the statute. First, the buyer alleged that product literature
in the form of an advertisement or pamphlet stated that the factoryapplied finish nails were warranted for five years and that the siding
was warranted against hail damage for twenty-five years. The court
did not discuss the effect of these warranties on the statute of limitations. It could be presumed that the court concluded that these
warranties were not relevant to an extension of the statute in the case
at hand because the defects in the siding related to its absorption of
water and decay, and not to any defect or failure in the nails or the
ability of the siding to resist hail damage.

612. 377 S.E.2d 830 (fV. Va. 1988).
613. 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987).
614. Basham, 377 S.E.2d at 835.
615. "A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's
lack of knowledge of the breach." W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725(2) (1966). See O'Brien v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981); Foodtown v. Sigma Marketing Systems, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 485
(D.N.J. 1981); Moody v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 324 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ga. 1971). But see Vaughn
Bldg. Corp. v. Austin Co., 620 S.W.2d 678, aff'd 643 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1982). See also the discussion
infra of warranty for future performance.
616. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725(2) (1966).
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Next, the buyer apparently alleged that warranties were created by
statements made by seller's agents after the siding was purchased and
applied to the building. One statement, made in a letter to buyer,
stated that the siding should perform "quite satisfactorily." Other
statements, apparently made by agents of the seller at a deposition
in the case, stated "[i]f properly installed, [the siding] would last the
lifetime of the building to which it is attached." The court analyzed
these statements by referring to the Code's section 2-313 provision on
the creation of express warranties. Noting that a statement only becomes an express warranty if it is made "part of the basis of the
bargain," the court reasoned that such statements made after the completion of the apartment complex could not constitute a basis of the
bargain for the previously sold goods. 6 7 The court further held that
these statements, "relied upon by Roxalana (buyer) as warranties, are
easily dismissed as merely opinions, in addition to the problem of
their not being a basis of the bargain." 61 8
The court's conclusion that these statements could not be part of
the basis of the bargain because the statements were made after the
sale and delivery is in accord with the majority of court opinions on
this matter, but the court failed to consider its earlier decision in
Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack.619 This case
held that statements made after the contract were made can become
express warranties as modifications to the contract, which need no
additional consideration to be binding. Clearly, the statement made
in a deposition as to a product characteristic already proven not to
be true, and which is already the subject of litigation, could not be
viewed as the offer of an express promise of that quality so as to
constitute a modification of the contract. 62°
The court was correct in concluding that the post-sale statement
that the siding should perform "quite satisfactorily," was both merely

617. Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1194, 1200 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
618. Id. at 1201.
619. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1980). See supra discussion text accompanying note 288.
620. Where a similar statement ("the siding will last the lifetime of the building") was held to
create an express warranty at least one court has held that it constituted a warranty explicitly extending
to future performance of the goods. See Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332
N.W.2d 212 (1983).
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a seller's commendation and could not be part of the basis of the
bargain. But the court probably erred in concluding that the statement,
"the siding is specially formulated for weatherability and durability,"
made in a written advertisement-pamphlet, was not an express warranty in that it merely expressed the "value of the product and falls
short of the factual affirmation or description that forms a basis of
the bargain." 62' This advertisement-pamphlet probably did create an
express warranty under section 2-313, at least as to some characteristics. Certainly siding manufactured by the same process that was
used to manufacture interior paneling would likely not be "specially
formulated for weatherability and durability," and should be held to
breach the warranty statement. However, just because the statement
creates an express warranty does not mean that the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance of the goods." 622 It is a question
of fact as to whether this statement explicitly extends to the future
performance of the goods. Obviously, a buyer could not determine
whether siding was specifically formulated to provide durability and
weatherability unless the buyer performed laboratory tests or the siding
remained on the outside of a building for some time in the future to
see whether in fact it was durable and did weather. On the other
hand, the statement did not "explicitly" provide a specific future time
period covered by this promise, and most warranties of the quality
of most goods would have to await future performance to test the
truth of the statements. The language of section 2-725(2), "requiring
that the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance" was not
meant to cover all such statements. The cases are mixed, but tend to
require language referring to a future event such as "lifetime guar'
antee" or "warranted for three years" or "will last for 24,000 miles."
The court correctly determined that the issue of whether these warranties extended to the future, so as to begin the running of the statute
621. Roxalana, 627 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
622. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725(2) (1966).
623. Anderson states that a warranty will not be interpreted as extending to future performance
unless it clearly does so, and ambiguities must be interpreted against such warranties. He even titles
his discussion "Strict Construction Against Future Performance Warranty." ANDERSON, supra note
458, § 2-725:89. See Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir. 1980); Moorman Mfg., Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill.2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Voth
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976).
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of limitations, was moot, because the buyer actually discovered the
defects within one year after the installation of the siding. Even delaying the beginning of the running of the statute of limitations until
that discovery, the four years had expired before the lawsuit was
brought. Therefore, even if the alleged warranties explicitly extended
to future performance and delayed the commencement of the statute,
the statute was only delayed until the discovery. The court's discussion
of the creation of these warranties is flawed, and its determination
as a matter of law that no warranty was created by the statement in
the advertisement-pamphlet concerning weatherability and durability
was probably wrong. Nevertheless, the action it took was probably
justified on two grounds. First, the warranty found did not "explicitly
extend to future performance," at least as the cases and commentary
seem to require, and, second, even if they did, and the statutory period
had been delayed, the statutory period would still have run before
the suit was filed.
D.

Tolling of the Statute

West Virginia courts have twice addressed the tolling of the statute
of limitations. "Tolling" refers to the interruption or suspension of
the running of the statute for a reasonable time until facts justifying
the tolling can reasonably be accommodated. "Tolling" is also sometimes used to refer to the beginning anew of the running of the entire
period of the statute.6m In Roxalana, the buyer alleged that the defendants' responses to inquiries regarding the problems set up an equitable estoppel which tolled the statute of limitations. Without a
discussion of the underlying facts, the court concluded that the seller
made no representations which induced the buyer not to take action
and referred to an earlier decision on the tolling principle. In Humble
Oil & Refining Company v. Lane,625 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held that, in order to establish estoppel sufficient to stop
the defendant from pleading the statutb of limitations, a party must
show she was induced to delay bringing her lawsuit by some words
or conduct that she relied upon to her detriment. In the absence of
624. See Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589 syllabus point 10 (W. Va. 1985).
625. 152 W. Va. 578, 584, 165 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1969).
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a promise not to plead the statute of limitations, a mere request for
delay or forbearance will not estop the other party from pleading the
statute of frauds. Although Humble involved a tort action, estoppel26
will apply to transactions covered by the UCC through section 1-103.6
The cases are mixed as to what actions, including attempted repair,
will constitute estoppel. 627
In Greer Limestone, the court directly addressed whether a payment on an account tolled the statute. The court, citing a long line
of West Virginia cases, held that the Uniform Commercial Code did
not change the traditional law that a payment made on a charge account constituted a new promise to pay the contract amount, and that
6
the statute of limitations began anew upon the date of such payment. 2
This is in accord with the express language of the section 2-725(4)
allowing continuation of the non-Code law on tolling, and with the
general rule. 629
XII.

CONCLUSION

A careful reading of the West Virginia Code cases reveals a surprising failure on the part of the courts to carefully work with the
precise Code language, to use all of the applicable Code sections, to
interrelate the applicable sections, and to explain how they reach their
conclusions under the Code language. At the same time, when the
courts have carefully analyzed the Code, they have generally demonstrated a progressive approach in interpreting and applying the UCC.
Overall, their decisions are clearly in the mainstream of developing

626. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
627. See, e.g., Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.
1983); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979); City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977); O'Keefe
v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333
F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972); A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk
Bldg. Corp., 278 Pa. Super. 385, 402, 420 A.2d 594, 602 (1980); Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor
Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1983).
628. Greer Limestone, 332 S.E.2d 589 (%V.Va. 1985). See also, Hamilton v. Pearce, 15 Wash.
App. 133, 547 P.2d 866 (1976).
629. Hiscock v. Hiscock, 257 Mich. 16, 240 N.W. 50 (1932); In re Manintakis's Estate, 258 Pa.
11, 101 A. 920 (1917). See 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 360 (1970).
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UCC jurisprudence. Finally, and maybe most importantly, the results
reached in most of the cases appear just and fair.
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